Before we give the green light

It’s mid-March and the din of the drums of war on Iran is rising to unprecedented levels. On Wednesday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cited precedents for Israel going it alone, without United States approval or even against its wishes. Leading columnists and newspaper editors, seemingly briefed by the powers that be, are saying that a strike is inevitable but doable, and will produce the ultimate desired result.

An important indicator of this current trend is the clear public downgrade of intelligence in the decision-making process; one editor correctly wrote on Thursday that intelligence is not a mind-reader. But as we gather momentum toward the final moment when a glaring light shines green and bright for an Israeli strike, let us pause just one moment to set some things straight.

In the more distant past, the intelligence community was never consulted when the time came to take fateful decisions; the duty of the intelligence services is to gather data on the enemy, to assess the enemy’s capabilities and intentions and to gauge the possible outcomes of each of the operational options, all tabled by others on the operational side of the system.

When final decisions were taken in the past, the intelligence chiefs were requested to leave the room. There were many reasons for this, and all of them are as valid as ever today.

The operational estimate, sometimes called the “net assessment,” is the work of others who must compare the threats detailed by the intelligence agencies with the capabilities to meet said threats. Some of the capabilities are clandestine, and as such are for the most the creation of the intelligence services. But although these have to be incorporated into the “net assessment,” it is not the task or responsibility of the intelligence community to generate the ultimate integrated picture.

Indeed, when final decisions were taken in the past, the intelligence chiefs were requested to leave the room. There were many reasons for this, and all of them are as valid as ever today.

One reason, simply put, is that the question of whether a squadron of F-15 aircraft can destroy the Iranian nuclear capability is not one that intelligence personnel can or should answer. This is first and foremost an operational challenge, which includes – but does not exclusively consist of — an input of intelligence.

Ultimately, making fateful decisions is the prerogative of the political masters of every historic moment. They alone are in possession of the full picture, both domestic-political and foreign. They, and they alone, can decide, and they alone bear responsibility for the consequences of their deeds — for better or worse.

Intelligence chief and political master

After the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the dividing lines were blurred; political masters began drawing intelligence chiefs into inner circles from which their predecessors were conspicuously and rightly absent. As this trend gathered momentum in recent years, intelligence chiefs were “recruited” — or gladly volunteered — to appear as key decision-making figures. Thus they could either share in the glory of success or serve as ready scapegoats in case of failure.

The time has come for the levels of responsibility to be redefined. The intelligence community must provide its best possible product in data — both raw and processed — and its estimates of the enemy. As the intelligence chief makes his final presentation, the political master should not reveal his innermost thoughts, lest the intelligence be colored by a desire to supply tendentious information designed to support the leader.

Then, when the intelligence chief’s chapter in the decision-making process comes to an end, he must wish his master good luck, and step out of the room, leaving his papers on the table. At the top of the stack should be a page bearing a single, unstated sentence: “You’re on your own now, sonny boy!”

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Efraim Halevy was head of the Mossad between 1998 and 2002.