Four years on, Abraham Accords are strained by Gaza war — but prove resilient

When the Bahraini and Emirati foreign ministers stood proudly on either side of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump to sign the Abraham Accords four years ago, all four men — and their governments — imagined an era of steadily expanding ties between Israel and the Arab world.

“We’re here this afternoon to change the course of history,” Trump beamed from a balcony overlooking the South Lawn. “After decades of division and conflict, we mark the dawn of a new Middle East.”

Netanyahu said the new peace momentum could end the Arab-Israeli conflict “once and for all.”

UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed predicted that the accord’s “reverberations will be reflected on the entire region.”

“For too long, the Middle East has been set back by conflict and mistrust, causing untold destruction” and thwarting hopes of the region’s “youngest and brightest,” lamented Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Abdullatif al-Zayani. “Now I am convinced we can change that.”

But as the men were waxing poetic about the new era that the accords were about to usher in, events back in Israel foreshadowed how elusive that future would be.

Sirens sounded in southern Israel as rockets were fired out of Gaza. “The normalization agreements between Bahrain, the UAE and the Zionist entity are not worth the paper they were written on,” a spokesman for Hamas said. “Our people insist on continuing its struggle until it secures the return of all its rights.”

Almost no one outside of Hamas understood at the time how determined the terror group was to expand the fight against Israel. After Hamas’s invasion of southern Israel on October 7, and the subsequent Israeli operation to conquer Gaza and topple Hamas, it is clear to all the players who were at the White House four years ago, as well as the rest of the world, that the peace agreements could not prevent Iranian-backed terror groups from dragging Israel back into war.

On the fourth anniversary of the Abraham Accords — which were followed by normalization between Israel and Morocco — it is clear that the nature of Jerusalem’s ties with its newest Arab partners has changed as a result of the war.

At the same time, while 11 months of war between Israel and Hamas have put significant strain on the accords, there are also reasons for optimism about the durability of Israel’s relationships with the Arab world.

A strategic decision

Officials familiar with topic don’t deny the tension the war against Hamas has placed on its relations with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco.

“Naturally, the war creates a very significant test in relations, and creates some tension with countries that have peace agreements,” one official told The Times of Israel last week.

Since the war started, the only overt visits by senior Israeli officials were made by President Isaac Herzog and Finance Minister Nir Barkat. Both were in the UAE to take part in international events, not in a bilateral capacity.

New cooperation agreements, signed in highly publicized ceremonies before the war, have also been suspended.

At the same time, officials emphasize that despite the “very low glass ceiling” the war has placed on the relationships, one fact is undeniable — the accords are here to stay.

“Despite the tensions, the understanding is that there is a clear ratification of the path from all of the partners, and that the strategic choice of peace and cooperation is the correct choice,” an official involved in the Abraham Accords told The Times of Israel.

“The UAE has taken a strategic decision, and strategic decisions are long term,” Emirati presidential adviser Anwar Gargash, a UAE presidential diplomatic adviser said in January, at the height of the IDF ground operation in the Gaza Strip.

“There is no doubt that any strategic decision will face multiple obstacles, and we’re facing a major obstacle that must be dealt with.”

And the war isn’t the first obstacle the accords have survived.  The COVID-19 restrictions, a change in US administrations, a new government and domestic unrest in Israel all presented challenges.

“It was hard to find extended stable periods of routine,” noted Meir Ben Shabbat, Netanyahu’s national security adviser when the accords were signed and now head of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy.

Despite regular criticism of Israeli policies in Gaza and on the Temple Mount in official statements from its Arab partners, Jordan is the only one to officially recall its ambassador from Israel during the war. The Moroccan, Bahraini and Emirati envoys have avoided public events and the media, but regularly fly between the countries to continue their work behind the scenes.

The foreign ministries of all three countries declined to comment on the anniversary of the accords.

Notably, despite the change in the tenor of the ties, Israel’s bilateral trade has grown significantly with all three countries. Compared to the same period in 2023, bilateral trade with Bahrain in the first seven months of 2024 was up over 900%, with the UAE 4% and with Morocco 56%, according to the Abraham Accords Peace Institute.

The regional unrest has also helped cement Israel’s position as a hub for trade between Europe and Gulf countries. Trade that once flowed through Beirut’s port onto trucks bound for the Gulf has been sharply reduced because of the Syrian civil war and instability in Lebanon. The Houthis have deterred much of the cargo that would sail through the alternative route, the Suez Canal.

“The land route through Israel became the safest trade route between Europe and Asia,” said Ben Shabbat. “What was impossible before the Abraham Accords because of the boycott in the Arab world against Israel, became the preferred and most worthwhile route.”

” The traffic jams and the congestion at the border crossings with Jordan and Egypt verify the dry numbers, and indicate that despite the war, business continues.”

Though reduced, direct flights continue from Morocco and the UAE to Israel.

The war has also opened up new opportunities for the UAE, which has historically had a strained relationship with the Palestinians, to say the least.

In May 2020, the Palestinian Authority refused to accept medical aid from the UAE after it arrived on the first known direct commercial flight between Israel and Abu Dhabi, PA sources told multiple Arab media outlets. Palestinian media quoted a government source saying the aid had been rejected, explaining Ramallah was refusing to be used as a “tool for normalization” between Israel and the UAE.

In April, a meeting between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and a group of Arab counterparts in Riyadh deteriorated into a shouting match between the UAE foreign minister and a senior Palestinian official. Bin Zayed said during the meeting that there was no real reform in the Palestinian Authority, accused the Palestinian leadership of being “Ali Baba and the 40 thieves” and said all of the PA leadership is “useless.”

Despite the tension with the PA and Abu Dhabi, the UAE has used its trust with Israel and Egypt to become a leader in aid to the Gaza Strip, and has shown an interest in being a decisive player in rebuilding the war-torn territory, though with conditions like a pathway to a Palestinian state.

The Emiratis are deeply involved in all aspects of aid to Gaza, including desalination plants, aid convoys, airdrops and field hospitals. Think tanks in the UAE have also begun discussing the country’s role in post-war Gaza.

There are several reasons for the UAE to display a newfound and intense interest in Gaza and the Palestinian theater. There is an economic benefit to be had from the assistance that will flow to the Strip when fighting ends. Taking the lead on reconstruction is also a sign of the UAE’s regional leadership. And, perhaps most importantly, it allows the Emirati rulers to show to the public the benefit to the Palestinians that their ties with Israel bring.

Reasons to worry

Despite the reasons for long-term optimism, there are warning signs.

Even before the war, the Abraham Accords were becoming less popular on the streets of Israel’s new allies.

Washington Institute polling showed 45% of Bahrainis holding very or somewhat positive views of the agreements in November 2020. That support had steadily eroded to a paltry 20% by March 2022.

The trend is the same in the UAE. The 49% of the country that disapproved of the Abraham Accords in 2020 has grown to over two-thirds as of August 2022. And only 31% of Moroccans favored normalization at that time, according to Arab Barometer.

Moreover, much of the trade is not truly bilateral. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts cargo from China and India that is transferred at Dubai’s Jebel Ali port to ships heading for Israel as bilateral trade with the UAE, explained Moran Zaga, an expert on the Gulf region at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

And the preexisting diamond trade also makes up a slice of the total.

Emiratis are avoiding Israelis and business opportunities with Israelis, said Joshua Krasna, director of the Center for Emerging Energy Politics in the Middle East. “Why take the risk these days?” he asked.

“Businesses seem to be holding back, for reputational — afraid of criticism and boycotts — and personal reasons,” Krasna continued. “Some of the big anticipated deals have been abandoned or not come to fruition. And the people-to-people relationship seems to be frozen.”

While Emiratis will not criticize government policy, said Krasna, “they as individuals sympathize with the Palestinian suffering and are not enthusiastic about deepening ties to Israel at this time.”

Moreover, the drastic change in the visibility of ties started well before Hamas’s attacks: “Things changed with the current government,” Zaga argued.

Though the UAE signed the Abraham Accords with Netanyahu, it blocked a formal visit by the premier in 2021, as it did not want to be seen as interfering in domestic Israeli politics ahead of an election.

Ties moved ahead rapidly during the Naftali Bennett-Yair Lapid government, with both leaders visiting Israel’s three newest Arab allies. Lapid hosted their foreign ministers at the Negev Forum and agreements across a range of fields were signed.

When Netanyahu and his right-wing allies came to power in late 2022, ties changed noticeably. The Negev Forum was not repeated, and high-level visits dried up. No senior Bahrani, Emirati or Moroccan officials visited Israel.

Netanyahu was due to visit the UAE shortly after returning to office as his first state visit, but the trip was canceled after National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir’s visit to the Temple Mount holy site in Jerusalem, which Abu Dhabi denounced as a “storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque courtyard.”

Comments from Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich about the Palestinian people being an “invention” and a call to “wipe out” a West Bank town brought condemnation from the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes the UAE and Bahrain.

Ambassadors from Israel’s Gulf allies stayed away from an iftar dinner hosted by the Foreign Ministry in April 2023 to send a message to Jerusalem.

“The UAE did want ties to be warm, and worked with all ministries, students, NGOs,” said Zaga. “The people-to-people relationship is disappearing. What is left is what truly interests the Emiratis — infrastructure, technology and involvement in Gaza.”

Western Sahara and defense

Morocco, whose normalization agreement with Israel isn’t officially part of the Abraham Accords, did not experience a significant downturn under the current government. Though Rabat refused to convene the second Negev Forum over West Bank violence, Netanyahu announced Israel’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in July, after which King Mohammed VI invited Netanyahu to his country.

Israel also appointed its first-ever military attaché to the kingdom, and the Knesset speaker and interior minister made official visits as a series of agreements were signed.

After October 7, protests have been a regular feature on Morocco’s streets. Officials visits have been suspended, and many bilateral projects are paused.

But the defense relationship continued apace. Morocco reportedly signed a $1 billion deal with Israel’s Ofek spy satellites in July, to go with air defense systems and drones Israel sold to Rabat before the war.

That doesn’t guarantee a further expansion of ties, however.

“I think Morocco will only have an incentive to go back to further building the promises of the deal or the bilateral ties with Israel if it has some commitments on its claims to the Western Sahara,” said Samia Errazzouki, a postdoctoral fellow and Morocco expert at Stanford University.

“That’s been Morocco’s approach to foreign policy in the past five, seven years,” she explained. “It’s entirely based off of what benefits it, and what it stands to gain from the Western Sahara.”

Expanding the circle

Israel is “committed to expanding the circle of peace with other countries in the region,” said Foreign Minister Israel Katz in a statement marking the anniversary of the Abraham Accords.

While it appears that its strategic ties with Bahrain, the UAE and Morocco — as well as its veteran partners Jordan and Egypt — will survive the war, Israel has always seen the normalization agreements as an important step toward full integration in the Middle East.

Ben Shabbat sees that as inevitable: “The chances of an agreement with Saudi Arabia have not diminished. The same goes for other countries that want in. They are all waiting for the right time, given the multi-front war and the US presidential elections.”

But some argue that Israel’s vision, which hinges on peace with Saudi Arabia, might remain out of reach for the time being.

“It will be years before any new countries join,” said Zaga. “It also can’t, and won’t, happen before there’s a new government in Israel.”