Hamas squandered the few chances it had left. Will Netanyahu do the same?
Even after Trump took office, Hamas had opportunities to move toward the 2nd phase of the ceasefire deal. That window has closed, but will Israel now pursue a clear plan for victory?
Lazar Berman is The Times of Israel's diplomatic reporter
Hamas’s strategic position is badly compromised.
Iran, Hezbollah, and almost all of Hamas’s allies are exhausted, at least for the foreseeable future, with apparently no appetite to lift a finger or fire a rocket to save the terror group. The exception, the Houthis in Yemen, are still launching missiles, but they have no deterrent effect on Israeli operations in Gaza.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems to have sufficiently solidified his coalition to keep domestic demonstrations from affecting his calculus on a hostage-ceasefire deal.
And Hamas shouldn’t expect the international community to push Israel to end the war in Gaza either. The US is the one country that could conceivably dictate Israeli decisions, but President Donald Trump is more focused on trying to hammer out a truce in Ukraine, and has said repeatedly that he is “really” fine with any decision Israel makes on Gaza.
Even with its options restricted, Hamas has had brief opportunities to improve its negotiating position, and even to achieve its aim of getting to the second phase of a hostage-ceasefire deal. But the terror group repeatedly misplayed its hand, calling into question its ability to accurately read both Israel and the international community.
Struggling to get to phase 2
In early February, it seemed that Hamas had somehow managed to weather the first month of the Trump administration and was potentially on track to get what it wanted from the ongoing deal — a permanent end to the war and a chance to rebuild its military sometime in the future.
Talks on the second phase, which envisions an end to Israel’s campaign in Gaza and the release of all the remaining living hostages, were supposed to start on February 3, but Israel had not made moves in that direction. Without many cards left to play, the badly bruised Hamas tried to make its displeasure clear by announcing it would freeze future hostage releases “until further notice.”
The tactic backfired. Trump told reporters that if all hostages weren’t released by midday a few days later, the ceasefire should be canceled and “let hell break out.” Hamas backed down, and carried out the release of three hostages as originally planned.
Then it looked like there was finally some good news for the terror group.
While US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was in Israel, Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff promised that the second phase of the hostage deal is “absolutely going to begin,” and that the president “wants to see” it happen. The US goals aligned with the wishes of the majority of the Israeli public as well, according to recent polls.
Shortly after Witkoff’s interview, Netanyahu’s office — insisting that it was coordinating fully with the White House — announced that he was sending a negotiating team to Cairo.
A gruesome spectacle
Things were slowly starting to swing in Hamas’s direction. Then the terror leaders in Gaza made a series of decisions that reminded the world that Hamas is a fanatic and bloodthirsty organization that cannot be trusted.
As it was preparing to hand over the bodies of the most recognizable hostages in the world — Shiri Silberman Bibas and her two young, orange-haired sons Ariel and Kfir, along with Oded Lifshitz — Hamas thought it would be a good idea to stage a grotesque ceremony with their coffins, complete with crowds of Gazans taking pictures with smartphones, children playing with guns, upbeat music blasting through speakers, and crude posters showing Netanyahu as a vampire.
They slapped propaganda material on the coffins, and proudly broadcast the spectacle for the world to see.
If that wasn’t enough, Hamas sent to Israel the body of a Gazan woman instead of Shiri Bibas, which was only discovered after work by an Israeli forensics team.
And Hamas didn’t stop there. Days later, it published a video showing two Israeli hostages being forced to watch as other captives were freed, begging to be saved as well.
Hamas’s decisions around the releases clearly had an effect in Washington and beyond. US hostage envoy Adam Boehler called them “horrific” and a “clear violation” of the ceasefire.
Netanyahu “is very angry; he’s a very angry man at what happened, especially what happened yesterday with these kids,” said Trump, referring to the return of the murdered hostage children. “It’s so barbaric. You wouldn’t think that would happen in the modern age, but it happened.”
Even UN Secretary-General António Guterres — whom Israel does not see as a friend — condemned Hamas for “the parading of bodies and displaying of the coffins of the deceased Israeli hostages.”
After Hamas’s renewed acts of depravity, the US fully backed Israel’s decision to delay the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners over the Hamas ceremonies, and did not push it to move toward the second phase.
Boehled over
Hamas had another small opening earlier this month. Trump’s hostage envoy Boehler embarked on secret direct talks with senior Hamas officials in Qatar, something most terror groups could only dream about.
Analysts saw the development as a worrying omen for Israel.
Israel “must be concerned that his maverick approach to policy could undermine their immediate interests,” said Neil Quilliam of the Chatham House. “After all, the US president has already thrown a number of key allies under the bus.”
The White House has “very little confidence in Israel and Israeli negotiators… to do what is necessary to get the hostages back,” said Andreas Krieg, a Middle East security expert at King’s College London.
Netanyahu had “for the last 12, 13 months if not longer… tried to undermine mediation processes to get the hostages back,” he said. “And I think the US has now understood that.”
With a direct line to a relatively senior and inexperienced Trump official, Hamas had the opportunity to figure out the minimum it needed to offer to get the Trump administration to press Israel to accept a ceasefire extension that could lead to a permanent end to the war.
Instead, Hamas continued acting like it was in the driver’s seat. It repeatedly rejected the “Witkoff proposal” that the US and Israel wanted to see implemented, and tried to get the mediators to force Israel to accept the release of hostage soldier Edan Alexander — a dual US-Israeli citizen –and the bodies of four other slain captives who are dual US nationals.
The move appeared to be an attempt to drive a wedge between the US and Israel by daring Jerusalem to deny an opportunity to free Americans.
It didn’t work.
Israel expressed its anger over the talks to the White House, and after Boehler gave a series of disastrous interviews, the hostage envoy was effectively removed from the Hamas file.
Witkoff rejected the proposal and issued a stark warning to Hamas: “Hamas is making a very bad bet that time is on its side. It is not. Hamas is well aware of the deadline, and should know that we will respond accordingly if that deadline passes.”
Rubio denounced Hamas as “savages” and said they should be treated as such.
They weren’t bluffing. Early Tuesday morning, Israeli planes roared toward the Gaza Strip to resume intensive military operations against Hamas targets.
The Trump administration couldn’t have been more supportive.
“As President Trump has made it clear: Hamas, the Houthis, Iran — all those who seek to terrorize, not just Israel, but the United States of America — will see a price to pay. All hell will break loose,” said White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt, emphasizing that Washington sees Hamas as an integral part of an enemy coalition.
“Hamas could have released hostages to extend the ceasefire but instead chose refusal and war,” said White House National Security Council spokesperson Brian Hughes.
Netanyahu’s opportunity
As Hamas has seen its position crumble, Israel’s has only improved since Trump returned to office.
Trump has shown that he is on board with every one of Netanyahu’s regional goals, and then some. He restored the maximum pressure policy against Iran and its nuclear program on the day he hosted Netanyahu in early February. He promised to work with Israel “to ensure Hamas is eliminated” — not just pushed out from ruling Gaza. He wants to broker the Saudi-Israeli normalization deal. Trump is going after the International Criminal Court for targeting Israel’s leaders, and has obsessive Israel critics like South Africa and Ireland in his sights.
Netanyahu recognizes this reality. “There are opportunities here for possibilities that I don’t think we ever dreamed of — or at least until the last few months, they didn’t seem possible, but they are possible,” he gushed after his meetings with Trump in the White House.
Paradoxically, Netanyahu, who for decades has eloquently presented a vision of where he wants to lead Israel, has been oddly passive in the face of these opportunities.
He still hasn’t presented his vision of a “day after” plan in Gaza, leaving a key part — perhaps the vital element — of the campaign against Hamas undefined. Instead, he quickly embraced Trump’s ever-shifting “Riviera of the Middle East” plan as Israel’s answer to how Gaza will look after Hamas is defeated.
Netanyahu didn’t lead on Gaza talks either. With Trump stressing that Israel can do what it wants, Netanyahu refused to lay out what that exactly that is. With no direction from Jerusalem, and a ceasefire dragging out without Hamas having to offer anything, it was Witkoff who had to come up with the proposals to extend the ceasefire.
Once again, Netanyahu embraced them after the fact.
He left a vacuum that others rushed to fill, often in ways that were harmful to Israel’s interests. After Boehler had tried talking to Hamas, Egypt offered its own plan for Gaza’s future that didn’t even mention the terror group, much less explain how to force it out of power.
Netanyahu risks letting the same happen on Iran’s nuclear program, a threat that he has for years described as the greatest danger to Israel and the region. But if he sits back and lets Trump lead, Iran might accept the president’s invitation to talk, forcing a confrontation between Netanyahu and Trump.
Netanyahu’s months of strategic lethargy and lack of a vision on Gaza are even more jarring when compared to Israel’s energy in shaping post-Assad Syria. Israel has created a buffer zone, carries out regular strikes across Syria to keep future threats from forming, and positioned itself as nothing less than the defender of the country’s minorities.
With the renewal of strikes on Hamas, Netanyahu could at long last be showing a willingness to energetically pursue a clear strategy in Gaza, one that is more decisive than the previous approach that has left Hamas in power after 17 months of war. He has his handpicked IDF chief of staff in place, a loyalist defense minister, and most importantly, an ally in the White House who wants to see the hostages out, Hamas eliminated, and Israel victorious.
At the same time, there is a worrying scenario that could explain Netanyahu’s decision to return to war. The offensive paved the way for Itamar Ben Gvir to return as national security minister, strengthening Netanyahu’s coalition ahead of a crucial budget vote and likely votes in the coming days on dismissing Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar and possibly Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara.
Netanyahu insists at every opportunity that Israel will not give up on its war aims. He could not ask for a better context in which to achieve them, as well as his grand vision for the Middle East.
But if domestic partisan considerations are driving decisions that impact Israel’s soldiers, citizens, and the hostages, Netanyahu will likely waste his best opportunity to secure Israel’s future and transform its standing in the region.
The Times of Israel Community.