Op-edBarely reported in Israel, Nevatim base took 32 direct hits

How effective was Iran’s attack? The Israeli public doesn’t have the full picture

Official Israel has told Israelis less than foreign media has about the actual impact of Iran’s missile barrage; but the public needs to know, and its leaders should be forthcoming

Tal Schneider

Tal Schneider is a Political Correspondent at The Times of Israel

A satellite photo of Israel's Nevatim air base after Iran's missile attack appears to show damage to a hangar roof, October 2, 2024 (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
A satellite photo of Israel's Nevatim air base after Iran's missile attack appears to show damage to a hangar roof, October 2, 2024 (Planet Labs PBC via AP)

Iran’s missile attack on Israel on October 1 was more aggressive than initially reported in Hebrew media. While most local media provided limited information on the impact of the strike, international news outlets analyzed satellite images and drew some critical conclusions about the extent of the damage and Iran’s ballistic capabilities.

The lack of coverage in Israel might be related to the long Rosh Hashanah holiday weekend that began the day after the attack, but there was also internal caution, possibly stemming from a reluctance to reveal information to the enemy, and some censorship restrictions. Tehran, however, doesn’t need Israeli public discourse to understand the results of its own attack.

In contrast to the missile attack on April 13 — which involved 36 cruise missiles, 185 drones and around 120 ballistic missiles, most of which were intercepted — the latest attack consisted exclusively of about 200 ballistic missiles. Approximately 20 of them were intercepted or thwarted before entering Israel’s airspace by the United States, British and Jordanian air forces, leaving around 180 missiles that were either intercepted or impacted within Israeli territory.

Leading global media outlets including AP, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal have since published reports based on satellite imagery, videos and interviews with ballistic experts, focusing on strikes on military targets in Israel.

According to foreign media assessments, the missiles used by Iran in the latest attack were likely the “Fattah” or “Khaibar Shikan.”

The “Fattah,” unveiled by the Iranians in June 2023, is claimed to reach speeds of five times the speed of sound (Mach 5) and has a range of up to 1,400 kilometers (875 miles).

Fattah missile is unveiled in a ceremony in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, June 6, 2023. Iran is claiming that it has created a hypersonic missile capable of traveling at 15 times the speed of sound. (Hossein Zohrevand/Tasnim News Agency via AP)

The Iranians assert that the missile can maneuver inside and outside the atmosphere, bypass defense systems, strike them, and clear the way for additional ballistic missiles.

The “Khaibar Shikan,” while slower (Mach 2-3), is equipped with wing systems for improved accuracy. It, too, has a range of up to 1,400 kilometers (875 miles).

When a large number of missiles are launched at high speed, detection and interception systems can struggle to cope with the volume. Thus, one of Iran’s strategies was to launch a large number of missiles simultaneously at a specific target.

According to foreign reports, the Nevatim Airbase in the south of Israel was one of the primary targets, with up to 32 hits identified in the base’s open areas, structures, and surrounding fields.

These details were revealed in satellite images and were not denied by the IDF in foreign media reports. The IDF has stressed that no fighter jets were damaged in that attack.

Overseas experts noted two additional strikes near Mossad headquarters in the Glilot Junction area north of Tel Aviv and about three possible hits on structures inside the Tel Nof Airbase, near the city of Rehovot.

An additional strike, on a restaurant in the “Sea and Sun” complex in northern Tel Aviv, may also have been an attempt to hit the Mossad headquarters, while a strike on a school in Gedera may have been part of the attempt to target the Tel Nof Airbase.

Israeli security forces at the scene where a missile fired from Iran hit a school in the town of Gedera, October 1, 2024. (Liron Moldovan/Flash90)

The foreign media analysis of the strikes near the Mossad HQ and Tel Nof base is based on video footage posted on social media. Some videos show the size and depth of a crater left by a ballistic missile, while others captured from afar document the shock waves, fire, and smoke rising from the impact on the base.

Lack of public discourse

Doesn’t the Israeli public have the right to know the potential cost of continuing the reciprocal strikes between Israel and Iran? While the IDF prepares its response to the latest Iranian attack, there is little public discussion of the potential implications of a possible third Iranian ballistic attack.

In the six months since the April attack, the Iranians have tweaked and improved their strategy — they abandoned drone attacks, which gave Israel about eight hours’ warning, and switched to solely using ballistic missiles, which take about 12 minutes to reach Israel.

Footage captured of Iranian ballistic missiles striking the Nevatim Airbase on October 1, 2024 (Used in accordance with clause 27a of the Copyright Law, taken from social media)

The Iranians targeted IDF bases but failed to disable Israel’s forces. However, there is concern that next time they will try to hit energy facilities, many of which are located near population centers. Therefore, if they miss the intended target, this could lead to massive damage and harm in densely populated areas.

Compared to possible damage to an F-35 or other air force asset — which did not materialize either last time or this time but was possible — a hit on an apartment building or other residential area would be far more difficult for the Israeli public to stomach.

Greater public discussion might either reduce or raise support for ongoing direct conflict with Iran, but the public plainly ought to be fully informed of the stakes.

Members of Israel’s Home Front Command and police forces inspect a crater left by an exploded projectile at a heavily damaged school building in Israel’s southern city of Gedera on October 1, 2024, after Iran launched a barrage of missiles at Israel (Menahem KAHANA / AFP)

Additionally, the foreign reports appear to suggest that Israel’s defense systems were more vulnerable in last week’s attack. About 80% of the missiles were reportedly intercepted — a lower rate than in April, where the IDF claimed a 99% interception rate.

However, it could be that a higher proportion of the missiles were headed to open ground, where they could do little or no damage. A related possible factor may have been a strategic decision by Israel not to try to intercept all 180 incoming missiles due to limited stockpiles of Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 interceptors. The IDF may have chosen to save the interceptors for future potential attacks on population centers.

Israelis look at the remains of an Iranian missile, in the Negev desert near Arad on October 3, 2024. (MENAHEM KAHANA / AFP)

Another consideration may be the economics of armaments — the cost of repairing a damaged hangar or runway is far lower than the cost of using an Arrow interceptor.

The limited quantity of interceptors, the need to increase funding for purchasing more interceptors in the coming months and years, the relative cost of missile interception versus base and other target repairs, and the technological improvements needed for the air defense systems — these are all issues of which the public should be aware.

It is the public that lives with the consequences of government and military policies and actions, and therefore, it should be enabled to more fully understand the steps being implemented on its behalf.

Translated and edited from the original Hebrew on Times of Israel’s Hebrew sister site Zman Yisrael.

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