IDF identified Deif, other top Hamas commanders entering tunnels on eve of Oct. 7
Other anomalous signs seen by IDF on night between Oct. 6-7, now cleared for publication, include activity at rocket-launching tunnel shafts and in Hamas's anti-tank missile array
On the eve of Hamas’s October 7, 2023, onslaught, the Israeli military identified the chief of the terror group’s military wing, Muhammad Deif, and other top commanders heading underground into tunnels, according to information from the IDF’s investigations, now cleared for publication.
The movement of top Hamas commanders into tunnels on the night between October 6 and 7 was among at least five warning signs identified by the IDF prior to the attack that pointed to unusual activity in the Gaza Strip.
Until Wednesday, most of these signs had remained classified.
Previously, the only anomalous sign permitted for publication was the activation of dozens of Israeli SIM cards held by Hamas terrorists in the group’s elite Nukhba force.
Israeli security officials on Wednesday authorized the publication of additional signs identified on the eve of October 7, including Deif and other top Hamas commanders entering tunnels, Hamas operatives removing tarps from rocket-launching tunnel shafts, and various preparations and movements in Hamas’s anti-tank missile array.
At around midnight between October 6 and 7, the military received intelligence that Deif’s underground command center, meant to serve the Hamas commander in times of emergencies, had been activated for use.
Due to this identification, the military dispatched a surveillance drone that was flying over the West Bank to the Gaza Strip, in an attempt to determine whether Deif himself had entered the underground site, or if it was one of his aides.
In hindsight, it was confirmed that Deif had indeed entered the subterranean command center. But in real time, the anomalous sign was a mystery to intelligence officers. The Israeli Air Force drone that arrived above the site in the early morning hours was unable to confirm Deif’s presence at the site.
The unusual signs that night also prompted the IDF and Shin Bet security agency to dispatch to the Gaza border an elite counterterror force, known as a Tequila team — made up of Shin Bet fighters and members of the police’s elite Yamam unit — to be on alert.
The team was deployed to operate advanced capabilities unrelated to a scenario involving a terrorist infiltration into southern Israel.
Some officials in the Shin Bet at the time also believed that the activity at the emergency compound might be an opportunity to eliminate Deif, if it was indeed confirmed that he was at the location.
Read more: IDF identified but ignored 5 warning signs of Hamas attack on eve of Oct. 7, its probe shows
The military’s investigation into the failures surrounding the onslaught found that some of the five anomalies also had alternative explanations or were not considered strong enough indications of a threat.
And alongside the anomalies, several other signs were received that indicated Hamas was maintaining its expected routine activity.
Each of the signs alone did not indicate anything significant to the IDF, and some had occurred several times in the past. However, the accumulation of the signs was unusual, and as a result, during the night, numerous checks were made by intelligence officers to confirm or refute Hamas plans to attack Israel.
Some of the checks led to signs being dismissed, while others remained open. Regardless, no officer interpreted the signs as meaning something could happen imminently.
Still, the investigation found that if a full intelligence picture had been seen by top officers, it is possible they would have decided to raise the level of alert for a pinpoint Hamas attack, though not for an all-out war.
The IDF’s investigations into the failures of October 7 found that the military’s conduct, decision-making and the intelligence it possessed on the night between October 6 and 7 were based on the results of years of false assessments about Hamas. As a result, intelligence officials on all levels failed to provide a warning for what would come.
Hamas’s October 7 attack claimed the lives of more than 1,200 people in Israel, mostly civilians, with another 251 people kidnapped and much of the area devastated. It launched the war in Gaza, which raged until an October 2025 ceasefire that has largely held, though violence has continued.
Deif led Hamas’s military wing for years and evaded several assassination attempts. He was killed in a strike in Khan Younis in July 2024.