New IDF chief appoints external panel to evaluate army’s Oct. 7 probes, implement findings
Zamir names former Southern Command chief Turgeman to head team of former senior officers to look into investigations, re-examine parts if needed
Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian is The Times of Israel's military correspondent
New Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir on Saturday announced that he had appointed an external panel of former senior officers to evaluate the military’s probes into Hamas’s October 7, 2023, onslaught, and oversee implementation of the findings.
The IDF’s October 7 investigations were led by former chief of staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi. Upon entering the role earlier this month, Zamir said he would appoint an external panel to look into those probes.
The move was made by Zamir out of “the IDF’s deep commitment to processes of learning, streamlining and improvement, especially during the war, and for an analysis and examination of the operational, professional and organizational insights,” the military said in a statement Saturday.
The panel is to be headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman, a former head of the Southern Command. The other members include former Navy chief Vice Adm. (res.) Eli Sharvit; former IAF chief Maj. Gen. (res.) Amikam Norkin; Maj. Gen. (res.) Yossi Baidatz; Brig. Gen. (res.) Yuval Bazak; Brig. Gen. (res.) Ofer Levi; Brig. Gen. (res.) Meir Finkel; Brig. Gen. (res.) Yom-Tov Tamir; Col. (res.) Avi Eliyahu; Col. (res.) Talya Lankri; Col. (res.) Benny Da-Levi; Col. (res.) Gila Goldrat; and Lt. Col. (res.) Livnat Bar David.
The IDF said the team was chosen based on their “rich experience and in-depth acquaintance with different and varied areas of work in the military, and out of a desire to reach diverse perspectives.”
The team will “formulate the mechanisms and processes required to implement the lessons learned from the investigations,” as well as add to or reexamine parts of investigations “as required,” and “if necessary,” will recommend re-investigating entire matters that require it, according to the military.
The IDF said the team would present its initial conclusions to Zamir in the coming weeks, and at a later time will provide a plan to implement its recommendations.
Some 5,600 Hamas-led terrorists from the Gaza Strip burst into southern Israel on October 7, 2023, carrying out a murderous rampage of unprecedented intensity and breadth.
The IDF struggled to mount a response, its own probes specify, with bases closest to the border overrun and the chain of command broken amid the chaos.
The attack claimed the lives of some 1,200 people in Israel, with another 251 people kidnapped and much of the area devastated. Most victims were civilians.
The material so far released by the IDF underlines the colossal failures in the years before Hamas’s invasion, in the final hours before it, and in the course of the terror group’s slaughter and abductions.
It was only recognized months after the attack that the military’s Gaza Division, the regional unit responsible for the Strip and for protecting southern Israel, had essentially been “defeated” for several hours. The chaos and confusion catastrophically slowed the fightback on the day.
The IDF has detailed intelligence material that was insistently misinterpreted over the years; the military’s overreliance on having an early warning to prepare its defenses; the degree to which troops were massively outnumbered by the invading terrorists; and the failure to understand what Hamas was doing during the attack.
The IDF’s investigations at the General Staff level, the top command of the military, included four main subjects:
- The development of the IDF’s perception of Gaza over the past decade
- The IDF’s intelligence assessments of Hamas from 2014 until the outbreak of the war
- The intelligence and decision-making process on the eve of October 7
- The command and control and orders given during battles between October 7 and 10
Under those four main subjects are 18 sub-topics. There are several investigations at the General Staff level, including those carried out by the Israeli Air Force, Israeli Navy, Military Intelligence Directorate, Operations Directorate, Home Front Command, Southern Command, and other bodies.
In addition, the IDF investigated 41 separate battles and major incidents that took place during the October 7 attack.
So far, the IDF has released investigations into the attacks that took place at Kibbutz Be’eri, Nahal Oz base, Kibbutz Kfar Aza, Kibbutz Nahal Oz, Netiv Haasara, Kibbutz Nir Oz, and Kibbutz Alumim.
The probes have been aimed at drawing operational conclusions for the IDF and did not look into the policies of the political leadership, thereby avoiding a fight with government leaders, who have insisted that investigations must wait until after the end of the war against Hamas, and are now openly opposing a state commission of inquiry, claiming it would be biased against them.
The military investigations — conducted by units seen as having had a role in the failure to catch Hamas preparations or adequately ready themselves for the terror group’s assault — were carried out concurrently amid the war.
Thousands of hours were spent by officers on the investigations — collecting material, conducting interviews, compiling the information and drawing conclusions.
The Times of Israel Community.