‘Out of deep concern for the State of Israel’: Full text of Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar’s affidavit

The following is an unofficial full translation of Shin Bet head Ronen Bar’s eight-page affidavit, submitted to the High Court of Justice on April, 22 2025, regarding the petitions against his dismissal. This Times of Israel translation retains the original document’s format and wording.

Bar also submitted a 31-page classified affidavit, with appendices, that has not been made public.

I, the undersigned, Ronen Bar, having been warned that I must speak the truth and that I am liable to the penalties prescribed by law should I fail to do so, hereby make the following written declaration:

1. Following the government counsel’s claim during the hearing that the statement I submitted to the court on April 4, 2025, ought to have been supported by an affidavit, and pursuant to the Honorable Court’s decision of April 8, 2025, I hereby respectfully submit an affidavit relating to the factual background relevant to the matters under review in the petitions.

2. Before I proceed to the substance of the matter, I wish to emphasize two points:

First, this affidavit is being submitted in accordance with the Court’s decision and out of my duty to the citizens of Israel, as well as deep concern regarding the ability of future heads of the service to uphold the organization’s statesmanlike character, its professionalism, and its operations strictly in line with its legal mandates, despite external pressures and without fear that the threat of dismissal – carried out hastily and improperly – would loom over them.

I am submitting this affidavit despite the heavy price that both the organization and I are paying

I am submitting this affidavit despite the heavy price that both the organization and I are paying, in order to safeguard the professional independence of the service and of my successor, as well as to preserve the ability to refuse improper directives and to enable the Honorable Court to rule on the case on the basis of the fullest possible factual foundation.

Second, the core details and their elaboration – including references to documents and real-time records – will appear in a classified affidavit to be submitted to the Court and to the Prime Minister only, in accordance with the permission granted to me by the Court. In this public affidavit, I will add to the statement previously submitted on my behalf several details in response to claims raised during the hearing before Your Honors. This division was created due to a desire to preserve the statesmanship nature of the organization and the protected space for discourse between the Prime Minister and the head of the service.

[The] origin [of my dismissal] does not lie in the professional realm but in a demand for personal loyalty to the Prime Minister

3. At the outset, I clarify that although I am not aware of all the reasons underlying the desire to end my term, the course of events compels the conclusion that these reasons began to take shape in late 2024 and early 2025, and that their origin does not lie in the professional realm but in a demand for personal loyalty to the Prime Minister.

These motives, as I understand it, led to a series of exceptional actions by the Prime Minister, which were accompanied by a media campaign against me and the service on social media platforms.

4. In this context, I note that from the beginning of the war until November 2024, the service received considerable praise from the Prime Minister – both in public forums and in work meetings and discussions. In this regard, I would especially point to the leading of operations to rescue live and fallen hostages, the thwarting of senior figures in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and more. The role of the service – and my personal involvement – in initiating, planning, leading, and executing these operations is well known to the Prime Minister, without detracting from the contributions of our partners in the other security agencies.

Between November 2024 and February 2025, I made several decisions as part of my duties that related to the Prime Minister. For example:

– I authorized, following a request from the IDF Chief of Staff, the opening of an investigation into the theft of classified military documents and their transfer to media outlets.

– I refused to draft a legal opinion whose aim was effectively to prevent the possibility of the Prime Minister continuing to testify in his trial.

– The draft of the internal Shin Bet review was submitted to the Prime Minister. It refers to the service’s failure to prevent the massacre, while also presenting the long-standing policy of the political leadership regarding the Gaza Strip and the exceptional and repeated warnings delivered by the Shin Bet to the political echelon throughout 2023 – which were ignored.

– A letter was attached to the review, addressed to the Prime Minister, explaining how Hamas’s military buildup occurred before the eyes of the State of Israel, funded by Qatar and enabled by a defensive policy, and highlighting the need for a state commission of inquiry to investigate all aspects of the road that led to October 7.

– The Shin Bet’s formal position on the national security necessity of establishing such a commission of inquiry was conveyed to the Cabinet Secretariat.

– An additional investigation was opened against employees in the Prime Minister’s Office, on suspicion of their ties to Qatar – a country that the Prime Minister himself defined as a state that supports terrorism.

5. I confirm everything stated in the letter submitted on my behalf to the Court on April 4, 2025, and declare that all the facts detailed therein are true.

6. Regarding Section 13 of that letter (the manner in which the Service handles issues concerning Israeli citizens), I wish to expand as follows:

a. The Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), in accordance with its responsibilities and powers, acted vigorously to secure the institutions of government, including the Prime Minister himself, and to thwart terrorist and subversive threats. However, I refused to employ the Shin Bet’s authorities in a way that deviated from its mandate and role – and certainly not in any way that could infringe on the right to legitimate protest.

b. In this context, I note that under my leadership, the Shin Bet established a number of criteria for the exercise of its powers. These criteria were based on the definition of subversion presented about a decade ago before the Supreme Court and accepted by it. At the core of this definition: illegal activity that involves clandestine elements and has the potential for violence. Anything beyond this criterion is not within the purview of the Shin Bet’s powers but, if anything, falls under the jurisdiction of the police for maintaining public order. In borderline cases, my staff and I consulted with the Attorney General’s legal advisory system to ensure that the broad authorities granted to the Shin Bet would be exercised solely within the framework of its designated roles. This is consistent with its explicitly codified legal obligation to act in a statesmanlike manner and not in service of any other interest.

Requests by the Prime Minister to act in violation of these criteria were refused. In many instances, the Prime Minister sought to raise such matters at the end of work meetings – after instructing the military secretary and the stenographer operating the recording device to leave the room, with the clear intent of ensuring that these exchanges would not be documented

c. Requests by the Prime Minister to act in violation of these criteria were refused. In many instances, the Prime Minister sought to raise such matters at the end of work meetings – after instructing the military secretary and the stenographer operating the recording device to leave the room, with the clear intent of ensuring that these exchanges would not be documented.

d. I find it appropriate to quote from Section 62 of the government’s submission to the Supreme Court on April 5, 2025, which states, among other things, with regard to me: “He refrained from taking action against an organized and premeditated campaign to generate mass insubordination within the IDF, with the aim of paralyzing entire units and strategic branches of the defense forces of a state under threat.”

e. These statements – from the Prime Minister and from the government – illustrate the way in which the Prime Minister conceived the role of the head of the Shin Bet, and his expectation that the agency’s capabilities would be used even in relation to visible and public protest actions against the government and its policies – even when those actions involved no clandestine activity or threat of violence.

The Prime Minister expressed to me, on more than one occasion, his desire to see the Shin Bet act against citizens involved in protest activity and demonstrations against the government

f. In this context, I note that the Prime Minister expressed to me, on more than one occasion, his desire to see the Shin Bet act against citizens involved in protest activity and demonstrations against the government. For instance, I was asked to provide information about the identities of Israeli citizens and protest activists who had followed security protectees. I was also made aware of an expectation to monitor “protest funders.”

It was made clear to me that in the event of a constitutional crisis, I would be expected to obey the Prime Minister and not the High Court of Justice. Full details of this matter are included in the classified affidavit

Furthermore, during a conversation regarding the protest movement, it was made clear to me that in the event of a constitutional crisis, I would be expected to obey the Prime Minister and not the High Court of Justice. Full details of this matter are included in the classified affidavit.

g. I saw it as my duty – as did all my predecessors as heads of the Shin Bet – to carefully and diligently scrutinize any requests that might affect freedom of thought and the right to protest in Israel. This was done alongside my directive to significantly enhance the protective measures and security protocols for institutions of government in a manner that was unprecedented and commensurate with the threat assessment in this context.

h. I do not view any of these actions as a legitimate basis for dismissal on the grounds of “lack of trust” by the government and its head. It should be noted that the first time such claims were cited as the grounds for dismissal due to lack of trust was in the context of the legal proceedings.

7. Additional context and expanded details regarding the Prime Minister’s requests in matters relating to the management of his criminal trial:

a. During the hearing, the Prime Minister’s legal representative claimed that the Prime Minister merely requested a “change in the location of his criminal trial’s testimony.” The truth is otherwise.

b. The Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) provided unprecedented and wide-ranging security arrangements for the Prime Minister, out of an understanding of the threats and a commitment to ensure the continuation of democratic proceedings – including the Prime Minister’s full ability to carry out the public functions required of him during wartime, and his regular daily routine. His testimony in the criminal trial is only one component of that.

The Prime Minister exerted unusual and repeated pressure on me to issue a directive… in effect, rendering the trial impossible to carry out

c. Regarding the trial, the Prime Minister exerted unusual and repeated pressure on me to issue a directive that would require the trial to be conducted in a way that precludes repetition, publicity, and exposure to missile attacks – in effect, rendering the trial impossible to carry out.

d. In this context, there was an attempt to compel me to adopt a draft of a so-called professional opinion, which had been formulated by the Prime Minister or someone on his behalf, and was passed on to me with the expectation that I present it as a position paper authored by the head of the Shin Bet.

e. Full details on this matter will also be included in the classified affidavit.

8. Regarding the criminal investigations:

a. The Shin Bet’s responsibility for safeguarding classified information requires special sensitivity when it comes to state secrets held by the Prime Minister and those close to him. Against this backdrop, it is clear to me that the two relevant investigations are essential and must be conducted quietly and thoroughly – without any attempt to influence public opinion, the court, or the professional and law enforcement bodies involved.

Even the slightest suspicion that individuals employed by a state that supports Hamas may be present in the innermost circles of Israel’s decision-making process – and may be engaged in influence operations – demands full investigation

I wish to clarify: even the slightest suspicion that individuals employed by a state that supports Hamas may be present in the innermost circles of Israel’s decision-making process – and may be engaged in influence operations – demands full investigation, particularly at a time when that same state is mediating negotiations between Israel and Hamas.

b. The role of the Shin Bet chief in sensitive investigations of this nature, for the purpose of uncovering the truth, is critical. The dismissal of the Shin Bet chief while such investigations are underway sends a chilling and damaging message – to the organization and to the other investigative and enforcement bodies. This is particularly troubling given the extremely serious suspicions of harm to national security. In the second investigation, these concerns center on damage to the negotiations for the release of hostages, the strengthening of Hamas, and the deterioration of Israel’s relations with Egypt.

c. The incitement campaign surrounding these two sensitive investigations – directed against me and against those responsible for protecting state secrets – illustrates the connection between the timing of the investigations and my dismissal.

d. Beyond this, for obvious reasons, I will provide further details in the classified portion of the affidavit.

9. Regarding my removal from the (hostage release) negotiations team:

a. Given the Shin Bet’s unique role – and my personal role – in reaching the hostage release agreement, I was surprised to be summoned to a meeting in which I was informed of my dismissal from the team, concurrently with a sudden demand to submit the internal review.

b. The timing of this removal – just as hostages were returning from Phase A, and shortly before the expected start of talks on the framework for Phase B – was all the more surprising.

c. Since everyone involved in the matter, including the Prime Minister and his staff, was fully aware of the Shin Bet’s central role in reaching the agreement – and the corresponding risk that my removal could jeopardize efforts to reach a further agreement – I concluded that there was another motive behind my dismissal from the team.

10. Regarding the timeline of my dismissal process:

a. I wish to present before the Honorable Court the sequence of events relevant to the claim of “professional and ongoing lack of trust” made against me by the Prime Minister and the government, and to demonstrate that this alleged “lack of trust” was neither professional nor ongoing.

b. A review of the timeline indicates that the claim of “lack of trust” – which, according to the Prime Minister’s attorney during the hearing before Your Honors, supposedly began even before October 7 and was based primarily on the events of October 7 itself – in fact only emerged starting in November 2024, more than a year later.

c. In this context, I note that from the beginning of the war until November 2024, the service received considerable praise from the Prime Minister – both in public events and in work meetings and discussions. I specifically refer here to the leadership of operations to rescue live and fallen hostages, the targeted eliminations of senior operatives in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and more. The role of the service – and my personal role – in initiating, planning, leading, and executing these operations is well known to the Prime Minister, without detracting from the contributions of our partners in the other security agencies.

d. The claim of a supposed “lack of trust” is closely tied to a very different series of events than those cited by the Prime Minister. Chief among them is my refusal to yield to pressure from the Prime Minister regarding the use of the Shin Bet’s legal opinion to influence matters concerning the continuation of his testimony in his criminal trial; subsequently, the investigations that began and concerned individuals close to the Prime Minister – investigations which have been and continue to be a source of discomfort for him; the Shin Bet’s internal review, which pointed to the need for a reassessment of the security-political policy that enabled the rise of Hamas’s military force and the events of October 7; and finally, the formal position I submitted to cabinet ministers in support of establishing a state commission of inquiry to investigate and correct, at every level, the failures that led to this immense disaster – and to prevent its recurrence. This series of events is what led to the Prime Minister’s shift in attitude toward me – and is the sole reason behind the demand to end my term.

e. It is no coincidence that multiple, inconsistent versions have been put forth by the government and its representatives regarding when this alleged “lack of trust” began. Some versions pointed to recent months, some claimed it started on October 7 itself, and one even alleged it began long before that. Yet this claim was never once raised in my presence until the moment the Prime Minister informed me of the decision to terminate my tenure – and even then, no explanation was provided.

11. Regarding the allegation of supposed prior knowledge by the Shin Bet about the October 7 massacre – and the related claim that the Prime Minister was not adequately briefed:

a. These allegations are false and amount to nothing less than an organized campaign of incitement against me and against the organization.

b. In 2023, the Shin Bet issued forceful warnings to the political echelon about the deteriorating security situation – in particular, that “our enemies perceive a window of opportunity” in light of the internal rift within Israeli society, and that we could find ourselves in a “perfect storm.” Accordingly, in April 2023, a firm, targeted action was recommended to halt the erosion of deterrence. Later, in July 2023 – on the eve of the Knesset vote to cancel the reasonableness clause – I told the Prime Minister that I was obligated to present to him the severity of the security situation. I did so using language akin to a “war warning” – a highly exceptional and unprecedented expression coming from a Shin Bet chief.

In the early hours of October 7, it was the Shin Bet that alerted the entire system

c. In the early hours of October 7, it was the Shin Bet that alerted the entire system – first through working-level channels early in the night, and later that night to senior leadership.

d. After receiving anomalous (though not unequivocal) indicators, the Shin Bet began analyzing the signs and immediately updated relevant partners at the working level.

e. The commander of the Gaza Division, the division’s intelligence unit, and the head of Southern Command Intelligence were updated by phone about anomalies detected on October 6, 2023, at 11:00 PM.

f. At 03:03 AM, the Shin Bet issued a warning to all relevant bodies, indicating an unusual level of alertness and the possibility of offensive intentions by Hamas. I note that the alert level itself was flawed – and this constitutes a failure on the part of the Shin Bet.

g. The intelligence picture that began to emerge indicated anomalies that were mistakenly assessed as Hamas’s heightened alertness in anticipation of an Israeli operation – and, conservatively, as preparation for a localized raid. The Shin Bet prepared to respond to all of these scenarios. Accordingly, and in parallel to coordination with the IDF, a dedicated joint force of Shin Bet operational personnel and Yamam (special police) fighters was deployed. A phone update on the decision was relayed to the head of Southern Command at 1:33 AM on October 7. Members of the dedicated team fought bravely, saved many civilians – and some of them paid with their lives.

h. Following this, a meeting was held at 3:12 AM under the command of the Southern Command general, during which operational orders were issued to IDF forces.

i. In light of the developments and the series of steps taken, I decided to report to Shin Bet headquarters and conduct a multi-front situational assessment at 4:30 AM, in case of escalation into a broader conflict. At the conclusion of this assessment, at 5:15 AM, alongside various directives, I instructed that the Prime Minister’s military secretary be updated.

I say this with pain – no one anticipated an attack of this scale, certainly not on that morning

j. I say this with pain – no one anticipated an attack of this scale, certainly not on that morning. The update to the Prime Minister was part of a series of directives I gave at the conclusion of that meeting, and it was delivered immediately, as part of the continuous chain of command from the moment I was alerted during the night until the end of that discussion.

The attack was not “coordinated by us,” our teams were not “sent to rescue Shin Bet personnel,” and nothing that night was “hidden – not from the security establishment and not from the Prime Minister.” The opposite is true

k. The actions taken by the Shin Bet that night did not succeed in preventing the murderous assault that had been meticulously planned for years. A thorough and comprehensive internal investigation was conducted within the Shin Bet to ensure that such a disaster never happens again. However, the attack was not “coordinated by us,” our teams were not “sent to rescue Shin Bet personnel,” and nothing that night was “hidden – not from the security establishment and not from the Prime Minister.” The opposite is true.

From this, I can only conclude that what we are seeing is an attempt to divert the discussion – a discussion that must take place – away from an inquiry into the political and security decisions that led to the massacre.

12. Conclusion

a. It is not lightly that I present all of the above to the Honorable Court. For nearly 35 years I have served the State of Israel – beginning with my military service, through many years in the Shin Bet, and to this day. I am unaccustomed to legal proceedings. Dealing with this is not easy for me, and it comes at a significant cost – to both the Shin Bet and me.

Out of deep concern for the State of Israel in general and the functioning of the Shin Bet in particular, I saw it as my duty to present to the Honorable Court – and to the public – a full and truthful account of the sequence of events

b. Nevertheless, given the current situation, and out of deep concern for the State of Israel in general and the functioning of the Shin Bet in particular, I saw it as my duty to present to the Honorable Court – and to the public – a full and truthful account of the sequence of events. This is my duty to those who will come after me, so that their ability to fulfill their role with professionalism and statesmanship is preserved – ensuring that the agency’s powers and tools are used solely for their intended purposes, and drawing a clear line between the trust required in a democratic system and the kind of loyalty that characterizes other regimes.

In my view, the concise documentation in this affidavit – and especially the details presented in the classified affidavit – make this point clear. My aim is to clarify what is demanded of a Shin Bet chief who operates solely in accordance with the law, and how dangerous it is for a dismissal order, issued without proper procedure, to loom over him.

c. The chain of events detailed in the classified affidavit indicates that the decision to end my term was motivated by non-professional considerations.

Everything stated above… does not detract from my decision to assume responsibility. I will soon announce the date on which I will conclude my tenure

d. Everything stated above, and the great importance I attach to a judicial determination regarding the essence of the role of the head of the Israel Security Agency, does not detract from my decision to assume responsibility. I will soon announce the date on which I will conclude my tenure. However, as stated, the significance of the ruling before Your Honors goes far beyond my personal circumstances and will affect the agency’s ability to fulfill its mission and responsibilities over the long term.