Analysis

Saudi Arabia on Iran: Public hope, private angst

While publicly welcoming the deal with Iran, Saudi commentators fear Gulf Arabs have gotten the short end of the stick

Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal speaks during a joint press conference with US Secretary of State John Kerry in Riyadh earlier in November. (photo credit: AP/Jason Reed, Pool)

Saudi Arabia has remained remarkably composed in the wake of an interim pact between Iran and six world powers that Riyadh had lobbied against, in marked contrast to Israel, which rushed to sound the alarm bells before the ink had dried Sunday.

Both countries are seen as the biggest losers of the deal, which allows continued Iranian enrichment while rolling back some sanctions.

In a short statement on Monday, Saudi Arabia broke its silence, saying the interim agreement between Iran and the superpowers “could be a step towards a comprehensive agreement for Iran’s controversial nuclear program depending on goodwill.”

Has Iran been displaying the level of goodwill Saudi Arabia requires? Not quite yet.

The Saudis, as leaders of the alliance of Gulf states (and perhaps the entire Arab world), have expressed grave concern in recent months — both publicly and privately — over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. On Monday, the ultra-conservative kingdom was trying to grapple with the agreement’s implications for its security and economy.

“Has the Geneva agreement dispelled the fears of Gulf states?” wondered Ayman Al-Hamad in an analysis piece published by Saudi daily Al-Riyadh. The new Iranian regime, he admitted, has certainly changed its tune on the Arabs since the election of Hassan Rouhani as president in June. But has Iran really foregone its hegemonic aspirations in the region? “The proof is in the action,” said Hamad, quoting Saudi foreign minister Saud Al-Faisal.

Saudi Arabia had tried, and failed, to tie the Syrian crisis to the Iran deal. If Iran withdrew its Revolutionary Guards forces from Syria and ordered its Lebanese ally Hezbollah to do the same, the Saudis argued, that would be a crucial sign of goodwill. But the superpowers didn’t buy the need for a Syria linkage, deciding the Iranian portfolio was complicated enough as it is.

In its tight-lipped statement Monday, Saudi Arabia was following smaller Gulf states which decided — publicly at least — to see the glass as half full.

On Monday, Qatar’s foreign minister called the deal “an important step toward safeguarding peace and stability in the region.” Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have issued similar statements.

But Saudi Arabia was clearly more circumspect in its assessment of the agreement.

“Despite the positive aspects of the agreement … most important of which is the removal of the specter of war from the Gulf, the Kingdom and Gulf states fear the Iranian nuclear agreement may tilt the strategic balances in the region, possibly affecting issues that Arab countries regard as purely internal,” Hamad wrote.

At least some of the Saudi concern is coldly economic. The partial lifting of sanctions will see Iran revived economically. A major oil exporter, Iran will again compete with Saudi Arabia for world oil markets.

Unnamed “experts” speaking to Saudi news website Elaph on Monday said that lifting the ban on Iran’s oil exports would cause a surplus in oil supply and send gas prices plummeting, to the detriment of Saudi Arabia (and benefit of car owners worldwide).

But underneath the veneer of Arab approval, critical and fearful op-eds in Arab press Monday told a different story on the Iran deal.

Tariq Homayed, a former editor-in-chief of pan-Arab daily A-Sharq Al-Awsat (owned by Saudi Arabia), claimed that the deal with Iran resembled a debt relief agreement more than a “serious agreement preventing Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon.”

“Anyone who has ever tried to buy a car or a home in installments can understand the details of this agreement perfectly,” wrote Homayed. “In this agreement we face a disreputable client with assets in the bank. However, the loan conditions do not apply to him; so the bank lends him the required amount of his confiscated money in order to buy his compliance in the coming six months. That’s the story, quite simply put.” 

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