Seniority system for Supreme Court head to go, as Levin seeks overhaul laws by Feb.
Under Levin-Sa’ar plan, Judicial Selection Committee would choose head of judiciary; justice minister aims to get entire contentious overhaul package passed into law next month
Jeremy Sharon is The Times of Israel’s legal affairs and settlements reporter

The seniority system by which the president of the Supreme Court has been chosen since the founding of the court in 1948 would be annulled under planned proposals made by Justice Minister Yariv Levin and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar for far-reaching changes to Israel’s judiciary, it has emerged.
A spokesperson for Levin told The Times of Israel on Sunday that the president of the court would be elected by a simple majority of five of the nine members of the Judicial Selection Committee, doing away with the seniority system.
Proponents of seniority have argued it ensures that the manner in which the Supreme Court president is elected is not politicized, although critics have claimed it means under-qualified judges can automatically become president.
The seniority system is a custom in use since the beginning of the state, whereby the Supreme Court judge with the most years on the court automatically becomes the only candidate put up for a vote in the Judicial Selection Committee for the position of president.
Since judges do not have to vie for the appointment, or curry favor with members of the committee in any manner in order to be appointed president, it is thought to serve as a safeguard against the politicization of the position.
The last 15-months have witnessed an intense fight over who will head the Supreme Court, since the three Supreme Court judges representing the judiciary on the Judicial Selection Committee which makes the appointment have resisted Levin’s efforts to ditch the seniority system.

Levin has sought to have a conservative appointed to head the court, but Isaac Amit, a liberal, is next in line under the seniority system and the justice minister does not have the votes to block him. As a result, he has refused to call a vote to elect a new president, leading the the Supreme Court, sitting in its capacity as the High Court of Justice, to order him to do so by this Thursday in a showdown between the two branches of government.
The Times of Israel has learned that Levin will allow a vote to go ahead this Thursday, but will not participate in it, and will continue to refuse to meet with Amit, who has been serving as acting president since October, or deliberate on issues in the judiciary requiring the consent of both figures.
Levin and Sa’ar’s proposal has already faced criticism from several quarters for politicizing the Judicial Selection Committee itself, since the changes would switch out the two members of the panel who are currently selected by the Israel Bar Association with two attorneys to be selected by the coalition and opposition respectively.
This would increase the power of politicians over the committee at the expense of independent legal professionals, possibly giving even greater incentive to Supreme Court judges to ingratiate themselves with the largest number of politicians on the committee in order to be elected president.
The manner in which the president of the court is elected takes on even greater significance given the new constraints Levin and Sa’ar would impose on the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review.
Under the new proposal, the High Court could only strike down Knesset legislation with a majority of all serving judges on the court. Today, there are 11 serving justices — out of a full complement of 15 — meaning six votes would be needed to annul a Knesset law.
But the proposal also stipulates that judicial review over legislation can be carried out with a panel of a minimum nine judges on the court, while still requiring a majority of all serving justices.
Today, the vote on such a panel would need to be six votes in favor, out of nine, a high bar, but when the court has a full complement of judges it would mean fully eight of nine judges on the panel would be needed to strike down legislation.
It appears likely, although unconfirmed, that the ability to determine the size of the judicial panel reviewing legislation would remain in the hands of the Supreme Court president, as it does today. This means that the power of the president over the implementation of effective judicial review of the Knesset would be greatly increased under the new system.
It is possible or even likely that a president elected by the votes of coalition members of the Judicial Selection Committee, who also voted in favor of the legislation under review, would be more sympathetic to the legislative priorities and goals of that coalition.
Additionally, the High Court has only ever heard a motion with 15 judges once in its history, for a petition asking the court to strike down the current government’s amendment to one of Israel’s quasi-constitutional Basic Laws on the issue of the judicial standard of reasonableness.
The court also faces a heavy burden, and numerous panels reviewing the considerable number of petitions filed against government legislation involving all serving judges would increase that case-load burden.
So the power of the Supreme Court president to determine the size of a panel reviewing Knesset legislation would take on even greater significance.
The Supreme Court president, as head of the judiciary, also has other important powers, including deciding which rulings can get a review hearing; disciplinary powers over serving judges in all courts; the appointment of magistrate and district court presidents, along with the justice minister; and key appointments in the bureaucracy of the judiciary.
Levin and Sa’ar hope to pass into law their new proposals by the end of February, a very short timeframe for such consequential legislation, but they will not need to start from the beginning of the legislative process to approve either the changes to the Judicial Selection Committee or the seniority system.
The ministers intend to use previous legislation to overhaul the Judicial Selection Committee that was on the cusp of being passed in its final Knesset readings in March 2023, and bring it back to the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, where it will be amended with the details of the new proposal.
It would then need to be approved in committee before coming to the Knesset plenum for the back-to-back second and third readings.
Levin’s original bill also removed the seniority system by stipulating explicitly that the Supreme Court president would be chosen by a simple majority of the Judicial Selection Committee, so no further changes would be needed there.