Set red lines, not deadlines, in facing Iran

The debate regarding Iran’s military nuclear ambitions has lately been rife with references to red lines and deadlines. But rather than being issued to Iran, discussion of these lines is part of a heated conversation between the US and Israel, which seems to be driven primarily by their respective fears. Israel fears that Iran is approaching a military nuclear capability and that despite President Obama’s stated policy of prevention, containment of a nuclear Iran just might be an acceptable fallback position if Iran is not caught in time. The United States fears that it will find itself having to employ military force against Iran’s nuclear facilities, with the risk of military escalation and/or severe economic consequences.

Despite the recent dispute, the United States and Israel are very much on the same page regarding the nature and implications of Iran’s nuclear advances, and for both, the best option for dealing with Iran is a more effective negotiation. Setting red lines could help in this regard, but in the conversation that is taking place, the sense is that the leaders on both sides are talking past each other. Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke about red lines, and Secretary of State Clinton shot back that the US would not agree to deadlines. The confusion apparent in these statements is increased by media commentary which seems anxious to play up the differences.

Despite the recent dispute, the United States and Israel are very much on the same page regarding the nature and implications of Iran’s nuclear advances

Red lines and deadlines are actually two different concepts, with different roles and implications. In the hope that the two sides will be able to work out a compromise that both can live with – thereby refocusing this dynamic on Iran, rather than each other – it is important to introduce both conceptual and contextual clarity to a debate that has tremendously significant policy implications.

Netanyahu has been talking of late about setting red lines with regard to Iran in order to avoid the need to use military force. His position comes against the backdrop of close to a decade of failed international efforts to deal with Iran through negotiations. There is no doubt that we have witnessed a string of failures, and the question is how to improve these efforts. The negotiations dynamic is extremely difficult to navigate, primarily because Iran can proceed toward its goal on its own, without negotiations, and therefore currently has no interest in negotiating seriously. This is why pressure – harsh sanctions and credible threats of military consequences – has such a crucial role to play. Pressure is essential in order to alter Iran’s thinking and get it more interested in cutting a deal.

This past year has seen biting sanctions put in place; what is missing is the credible threat. Obama has clearly stated his intention to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons; a red line, however, would give needed clarity to this policy. To say, for example, that enrichment above 20 percent is indication that Iran is moving to weapons production, which would threaten US and global interests and elicit a military response, would clarify that Obama is dead serious about stopping Iran. Obama’s red line last year with regard to Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, and more recently, to Assad, with regard to moving chemical weapons around in Syria or to Lebanon were well understood by the other side; his resolve was unequivocal. In the case of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran backed down in the face of the red line almost immediately. Setting a similar red line on the nuclear issue would help reassure Israel with regard to its greatest fears, and certainly deter Iran.

What about a deadline? A deadline would be a message to Iran that would sound something like, “if you don’t return to a serious negotiation by April 2013, we will declare negotiations over and have no choice but to use military force against your nuclear facilities.” It seems that this is the kind of commitment that Clinton was referring to when she said the US had no interest in setting such lines. Deadlines put the dynamic in the US court, and the US does not want to be perceived as the one closing the door to a possible deal. This is an understandable position, and Clinton knows what she’s talking about. After warning ahead of the Istanbul talks last April that “time is running out for diplomacy”, Clinton – five months and three failed attempts later – is now saying that there is “still time for diplomacy,” when there is nothing even in the preparatory stage. Her deadline was exposed for what it was: an empty threat.

Pressure is essential in order to alter Iran’s thinking and get it more interested in cutting a deal

Moreover, if international actors stand firm on their deadline, and Iran comes forward at the last minute with a half-hearted offer to negotiate, the message can easily (and will surely) be manipulated to appear as if it is the international actors who are to blame because they closed the door to negotiations. This is precisely the dynamic that played out back in 2010. After Iran had rejected the October 2009 fuel deal, and Obama set to work gathering support for a fourth UNSC resolution on sanctions, just as he was on the verge of getting the necessary support to pass the resolution in May 2010, the trio Turkey-Brazil-Iran came up with a last-ditch attempt to present an alternative fuel deal. The deal they presented was different from the previous one in significant respects, and could not be accepted in its stead. Obama’s rejection of the deal, however, was later interpreted by some analysts as a case of the president closing the door on the Iranians.

Red lines are different – they put the onus for crossing them squarely on Iran’s shoulders. It is Iran’s choice whether to cross the line or not. With a red line the Obama administration can both reassure Israel and deter Iran in a manner that might be enough to get the latter to negotiate with the purpose of actually reaching a deal. The trick is that you have to convince the other side that you mean it. There are indications that red lines are being considered in Washington, as reflected in an important article by David Sanger and Eric Schmitt that appeared in the New York Times in early September. The piece reported on plans for further steps to be taken by the US in the Gulf, and noted that the administration was considering new declarations by the president about what might elicit US military action. This would no doubt be a welcome development.

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Dr. Emily B. Landau is Director of the Arms Control program at INSS, and the author of “Decade of Diplomacy: Negotiations with Iran and North Korea and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation.”