Analysis

With hostage deal, Netanyahu is going all in on Trump

The prime minister is risking a schism with his closest political allies to advance a deal with Hamas. He has good reason to think it’s worth the gamble

Haviv Rettig Gur

Haviv Rettig Gur is The Times of Israel's senior analyst.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks on the phone with US President-elect Donald Trump on January 15, 2025. (Amos Ben Gershom/GPO)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks on the phone with US President-elect Donald Trump on January 15, 2025. (Amos Ben Gershom/GPO)

At the time of writing, the deal between Israel and Hamas for a hostage release and temporary ceasefire in Gaza has not, despite much fanfare around the world, actually been signed and sealed. Claims of last-minute demands from Hamas have prevented a formal announcement.

On Hamas’s side, the last hiccup seems to be the identities of some of the terrorist prisoners Israel will be required to release under the terms of the deal.

But there may be an Israeli hiccup too — a complication that emerges from Netanyahu’s political fears of losing the far-right factions of his coalition.

Otzma Yehudit party leader Itamar Ben Gvir has already declared he will leave the government if the deal is signed. While he appears resolved to that outcome, Netanyahu has worked hard to keep the Religious Zionism chief, Finance Minister Betzalel Smotrich, from doing the same. On paper, Netanyahu’s coalition could survive without them for some time, but it would be a far less stable coalition, and a far less loyal one.

Netanyahu has spent much of the week trying to convince Smotrich that the deal will not mean an end to the war, even if outgoing US President Joe Biden has insisted otherwise.

The argument he’s been making behind closed doors emerged into public view on Thursday in a media statement credited to an unnamed “senior official” — more often than not, journalistic code for a Netanyahu spokesman or even Netanyahu himself.

“Contrary to distorted reports,” the statement read, “Israel won’t be leaving the Philadelphi Corridor” that runs along the Egypt-Gaza border. “Israel will remain on the Corridor throughout phase 1, for all 42 days.” Though IDF forces would redeploy in some parts, “the scale of forces will remain the same, including outposts, patrols, observation sites and control of the entirety of the Corridor.”

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (right) of the Religious Zionism party talks to National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir of Otzma Yehudit in the Knesset, December 28, 2022. (Olivier Fitoussi/ Flash90)

And then the statement made a dramatic promise: “If Hamas doesn’t agree [in talks over phase 2] to Israel’s demands for an end to the war (the fulfillment of the war’s goals), then Israel will remain in the Philadelphi Corridor on the 42nd day as well, and certainly on the 50th. In other words, in practical terms, Israel remains in Philadelphi until further notice.”

It’s a strange statement, with the parenthetical about “the fulfillment of the war’s goals” seeming to suggest that phase 2 would depend on Hamas agreeing to surrender or exile after phase 1 — a clear message to Smotrich and the far right — but made by someone trying to phrase it vaguely enough so as not to trigger new obstacles in the negotiations.

Workers paint traffic signs on the Philadelphi Corridor, the Egypt-Gaza border area in southern Gaza’s Rafah, October 20, 2024. (Emanuel Fabian/Times of Israel)

Embarrassment

There’s a reason Netanyahu seems to be struggling to speak clearly — and in fact, has not yet spoken openly to the public about what’s going on in the talks.

A large majority of Israelis, including majorities of both Jews and Arabs, support the hostage deal. Some 58% support the deal in full, including at the cost of leaving Hamas in power in Gaza, according to an Israel Democracy Institute poll released Tuesday. Another 12% support the first phase of the deal — 33 hostages released without a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza — and then want a return to fighting. Some 70%, in other words, want the prime minister to sign on the dotted line.

But Netanyahu’s problem lies with the 23% who do not — who support continuing the military campaign, believe it will lead to a better deal down the road, and are nearly all voters for his coalition.

Right-wing youths protest against a hostage-ceasefire deal with Hamas, outside the Knesset in Jerusalem, January 16, 2025. (Charlie Summers/Times of Israel)

A great many Israelis, especially on the right, are horrified at the costs Israel will pay in the first phase: a thousand Palestinian prisoners released, some of them arch-terrorists and murderers. The hunt for Hamas in Gaza — that long, painful degradation war that has exacted a high cost from Israeli soldiers and families and a much higher one for Gazans and, they believe, must not end with Hamas still in power — will grind to a halt and may not be easy to restart.

If the deal is signed, these Israelis believe, Hamas will survive the war, its forces will be bolstered, its reputation restored, its future control of Gaza all but assured.

If you don’t think your leaders can deliver a victory, you become far more likely to support a negotiated end, even if it leaves a hated enemy in power

What of Netanyahu’s oft-repeated (and oft-mocked) promise of “total victory?”

This is not a small question for him. One of the main drivers of support for the deal is the widespread distrust among many Israelis, measured in many polls, that Netanyahu is either unwilling or incapable of achieving a successful outcome for the war. If you don’t think your leaders can deliver a victory, you become far more likely to support a negotiated end, even if it leaves a hated enemy in power. Distrust of Netanyahu in the political center and left is a major driver of opposition to continued fighting.

Netanyahu cannot afford to create the same impression of incapacity and dishonesty on the far right.

Relatives and friends of people killed and abducted by terror group Hamas and taken into Gaza, take part in a demonstration in favor of a ceasefire and hostage release deal in Tel Aviv, Israel, January 15, 2025. (Ohad Zwigenberg/AP)

The second deal

All of which begs the question: Why would he be committing to a deal that has so many political risks for him?

The deal now on the table is not, despite Biden’s claims, the same deal offered in May. Key Israeli demands that Hamas refused in the spring have now been met, including the rate of hostage release and the significant Israeli presence in Philadelphi in phase 1.

But why would Hamas suddenly be willing to make those concessions? And why would Netanyahu, who has clung tightly to his coalition’s rightist flank for 16 months, suddenly be willing to risk a political showdown?

Enter Trump.

There are two deals on the table this week: Netanyahu’s deal with Hamas and Netanyahu’s deal with the incoming Trump administration. We know a great deal about the first and very little about the second.

US President Donald Trump, right, and visiting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walk along the Colonnade of the White House in Washington, March 25, 2019. (Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP)

Netanyahu’s change of heart seemed to come in conversations with Trump officials, from the president-elect himself down to Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff — so much so that some Arab officials have suggested that one meeting on Saturday between Netanyahu and Witkoff did more to bring Netanyahu around than a year of Biden administration cajoling.

(It must be said for those who take this to mean that Netanyahu was the chief obstacle to a deal: Hamas had never actually agreed to any previous version of this deal.)

But what could the Trump team have offered Netanyahu to make a showdown with Smotrich and Ben Gvir suddenly palatable?

Publicly, the answer seems to be a promise to resume the war. In his Senate confirmation hearing for his appointment as secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth told the senators bluntly, “I support Israel destroying and killing every last member of Hamas.”

And in an interview with the Call Me Back podcast, incoming national security adviser Mike Waltz said Trump sought to fundamentally change the dynamic that encouraged terrorist groups to take hostages.

“Terrorist groups and rogue states have been taking Americans hostage, and they’ve only seen upside [for doing so for] the last four years,” Waltz charged. “So why not take more? Why not take as many as you can and see what you get? With President Trump, he made it very clear very early — not just with Hamas, with groups around the world — there’ll be nothing but downside.”

Hamas, Waltz told interviewer Dan Senor, “has to be destroyed to the point that it cannot reconstitute.”

Could Netanyahu be channeling a solemn commitment from Trump when he promises Smotrich a resumption of the war after phase 1?

Speaking to Fox News on Wednesday evening, moreover, Waltz specified that the US will back Israel if it needs to reenter Gaza. “We’ve made it very clear to the Israelis, and I want the people of Israel to hear me on this: If they need to go back in, we’re with them,” he said. “If Hamas doesn’t live up to the terms of this agreement, we are with them.”

Playing nice

Hamas desperately needs a deal. It acquiesced to Israeli demands it has long rejected out of hand, such as leaving Israeli forces in Philadelphi during phase 1, where they will be able to prevent its rearming through the border tunnels to Egypt for the duration of at least that stage of the ceasefire.

Over the past 16 months, it lost its chief backers, Hezbollah and Iran. Its Houthi allies in Yemen have gone from devoted ally to cautionary tale for the rest of the region. Israeli airstrikes in Hodeida and Ras Issa in the war-wracked country have all but eliminated the Houthi capacity to export oil and gas.

And Trump, of course, reshuffles the deck. Israelis are convinced they will have a freer hand against their enemies in the region after January 20.

And so this deal marks a softening of Hamas’s demands — including the rather significant previous demand for an Israeli commitment in advance not to resume fighting after phase 1. The rebuilding of Gaza will also only begin in the later phases.

Why would Hamas accept this truce, that is so much less than the strategic removal of the Israeli presence it had held out for since November 2023? Why would it leave Israel able and apparently eager to roar back into the war the moment 33 hostages are in Israel’s hands?

Perhaps for the same reason Netanyahu seems so keen on a deal: Trump.

Trump’s arrival has fundamentally changed the dynamic. Given the comments of Hegseth and Waltz, Netanyahu can reasonably expect to have American backing for any future escalation.

But Trump has repeatedly criticized the Israeli war effort for being slow, indecisive and “losing the PR war.”

And so a new dynamic is in play.

Israel can do what it takes to win, but Trump, it appears, wants it to show it is willing to try a ceasefire, publicly and clearly. When Hamas inevitably tries to rearm or launch a rocket, Israel will have its excuse to return to fighting, perhaps better prepared and with better intelligence penetration of the Hamas ranks than on October 8, 2023.

And in the meantime, it will have handed Trump his political win in the form of a ceasefire, and won his backing for a more intensive fight against Hamas.

If that’s the basic dynamic, it explains much of Netanyahu’s and Hamas’s actions over the past two weeks.

It explains why Netanyahu is standing up to far-right resistance. Smotrich and Ben Gvir’s public anger serves to highlight the conciliatory stance Netanyahu wants to project to the incoming Trump administration.

Palestinians, including armed gunmen, celebrate the imminent announcement of a ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel in Khan Younis, central Gaza Strip, Wednesday, Jan. 15, 2025.(AP Photo/Jehad Alshrafi)

Hamas understands this moment as well as Netanyahu. It needed to obtain just enough from an agreement to be able to claim a victory, and then to adhere to whatever is obtained in order to deny Netanyahu the political cover with Trump for a return to war.

Ironically, that’s a position of weakness for Hamas, and Netanyahu appears to have taken advantage of it — and so there are more hostages coming out, a slower Israeli redeployment and no guarantees of an end to fighting.

Yet Hamas retains one great advantage over Netanyahu: Its bar for “victory” is extremely low. It doesn’t need to win; it doesn’t need to rebuild its capabilities. It only needs to be able to claim it survived, even if what survived is a bare fragment of the original organization, now reduced to sending teenagers to fight, overseeing a ruined economy and unable to rebuild Gaza. The simple fact that it still exists is “victory.”

Netanyahu will almost certainly sign the deal. Hamas will too. Netanyahu will eat a lot of political crow, especially from his rightist base. Hamas will declare victory and parade through the streets of Gaza.

Trump has already taken credit, and Netanyahu will continue to credit him.

And Hamas will play by the rules as well as it possibly can.

And in the meantime, Israel will work ferociously to build out the kind of intelligence infiltration in Gaza that it possessed in Lebanon. It will spend the ceasefire preparing the offensive Netanyahu seems to believe will be permitted him at the end of phase 1.

If this is indeed Netanyahu’s calculation, then the deal he will soon sign is a reasonable gambit and a serious strategy.

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