A former head of the Shin Bet’s technology branch said in an interview on October 4, 2023 — three days before the Hamas invasion of southern Israel — that the intelligence agency “very broadly speaking” knew “everything” about what Hamas was up to in Gaza.
The nearly six-month-old interview with Sasi Eliya was broadcast by Channel 12 news, which had originally scheduled to screen it on Saturday night, October 7, but shelved it because of that day’s massacre in southern Israel. It broadcast the interview tonight along with a second, brief and more recent interview with Eliya in which, it reports, he acknowledges that he was part of the failed conception that Hamas was not interested in a major attack on Israel.
Eliya, a recipient of two Israeli security prizes, had stepped down from his Shin Bet job three years ago, Channel 12 notes. It says he had overseen the development of the Shin Bet’s SIGINT capabilities in Gaza, designed to ensure the agency knew exactly what was going on in the Hamas-run enclave.
Asked on camera in the October 4 interview, as the screen shows footage from the mass infiltration three days later of Hamas terrorists across the border, whether he knows “everything about all of them,” Eliya replies: “Very broadly speaking, yes. I don’t know everything. The Shin Bet knows everything.”
He says the Shin Bet network that monitors Gaza tracks transmissions with infinite information “from any sensor you can imagine,” and provides warnings “about anything that should concern you.”
Speaking of a similar technological network operating in the West Bank, he says, “I don’t know of an incident where they didn’t get to any attacker or terror orchestrator.”
In an answer to a question, Eliya also says that if the Shin Bet had had “this infrastructure, knowledge and experience,” it would be reasonable to think that it could have prevented the 1995 assassination of prime minister Yitzhak Rabin.
The report quotes other intelligence experts noting that gathering human intelligence in Gaza became progressively more difficult over the years, because Hamas killed alleged collaborators and because it became increasingly difficult to penetrate Hamas.
Those difficulties culminated in the IDF Intelligence Branch in 2009 closing its unit for recruiting sources in Gaza, the TV report says. The report also claims that the Mossad, Israel’s external security agency, wanted to try to recruit in Gaza, but was blocked by the Shin Bet and IDF Intelligence.
It says the failure of a 2018 IDF intel-related operation inside Gaza marked a further turning point in the increased reliance on electronic and technological intel over human intel. It quotes intelligence experts saying that Hamas improved its capabilities and its capacity to keep the Israeli security establishment in the dark about them — and that Israel did not realize how far Hamas had advanced — with catastrophic consequences on October 7.
Former senior Shin Bet officer Sasi Eliya speaks in a Channel 12 interview broadcast on March 23, 2024. (Channel 12 screenshot; used in accordance with Clause 27a of the copyright law)
Eliya, in the more recent interview, says Israeli intelligence had “pinpoint information” on Hamas plans for a possible infiltration and/or kidnapping, but nothing on the scale of what happened.
“We failed; the whole apparatus failed,” he says, apparently referring to the entire failure of the security and policy-making echelons. “The world of intelligence is not 100%. Sometimes it screws up… There need to be other mechanisms. I believe more in mechanisms that deter and that ensure that any threat is dealt with.”
Adds Eliya: “The Shin Bet felt that Gaza was pretty well covered. Obviously it could have been much better covered if we had a presence in the territory. Lots of times, you knew what was happening but couldn’t do anything about it. If some kind of missile was brought in via Rafah, what could you do? If you have no presence inside the territory in order to tackle it, that missile will come heading toward you one day.”