A hostage deal that also averts regional war should be a no-brainer for Netanyahu. But…
He might seize the moment, but has been insisting on ‘total victory’ over Hamas, and has two coalition partners that won’t settle for anything less. And then there’s the Sinwar factor
David Horovitz is the founding editor of The Times of Israel. He is the author of "Still Life with Bombers" (2004) and "A Little Too Close to God" (2000), and co-author of "Shalom Friend: The Life and Legacy of Yitzhak Rabin" (1996). He previously edited The Jerusalem Post (2004-2011) and The Jerusalem Report (1998-2004).
On October 18, 2011, Israel began freeing 1,027 Palestinian security prisoners in exchange for the release of Gilad Shalit, an IDF soldier who had been abducted from his base inside Israel five years earlier and held by Hamas in Gaza. The prime minister who signed off on this spectacularly lopsided deal was of course Benjamin Netanyahu.
In Doha on Friday, American, Egyptian and Qatari mediators presented a “bridging proposal” for a deal on a permanent ceasefire in Gaza and the release of all 111 Israeli hostages held by Hamas since its invasion and slaughter in southern Israel on October 7, and four more whose captivity precedes that date. They made plain their assessment that the accord could and should be both finalized and implemented within days.
On the face of it, accepting what is starting to look like an imminent “take it or leave it” final demand from the mediators is a no-brainer for Netanyahu.
From what we are learning of the main ostensible areas of discrepancy between Israel and the mediators, it is apparent that Netanyahu’s insistence on some kind of mechanism to prevent the return of armed Hamas forces to northern Gaza is proving a problem. By contrast, we are given to understand, potential solutions are being advanced as regards his call for an ongoing Israeli presence along the Gaza-Egypt border, under and over which Hamas imported the weapons and materials for its war machine. Not much is being said about the prime minister’s reported demand for a US guarantee that, in principle, Israel would be able to resume its campaign against Hamas until the terror group is destroyed.
Nonetheless, by saying yes to the emerging terms, Netanyahu would expect to secure the release in the first six weeks of the deal of some 30 living hostages in the so-called humanitarian category — women, the elderly and the sick. Were the deal to hold up through its second and third envisaged phases, the rest of the hostages, alive and dead, would come home.
A vital, major step would be taken toward restoring the covenant between Israel’s political and military leadership on the one hand, and its citizenry on the other, which was torn asunder when Hamas was able to smash through the fence, massacre some 1,200 people, mostly Israeli citizens, and abduct over 250 more.
Moreover, it is being widely assessed, a hostage-for-ceasefire deal in Gaza could yield relative quiet on Israel’s northern frontier, with Hezbollah holding its fire, and the prospect of a rebuilding and return for those tens of thousands of Israelis who have been internally displaced from their homes there for more than 10 months.
This in turn could also relieve the pressure on Israel’s standing army and its reservists, and enable the beginnings of economic revival.
The US administration, furthermore, has made plain its belief that an accord could see Iran delaying or perhaps forgoing its promised “revenge” against Israel for the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran two weeks ago, thus averting inevitable Israeli counterstrikes and a possible descent into full-fledged war. Hebrew media reports on Friday night were also asserting an unspoken American threat — that if Netanyahu were to reject the deal, the US might be rather less supportive of an Israel that found itself plunged into regional conflict.
The negotiations now coming to a head have been based on a proposal that Netanyahu and his colleagues themselves approved and conveyed at the end of May, and relentless reports have indicated that all of Israel’s security chiefs and negotiators have been imploring him to seize the opportunity for a deal ever since.
They reportedly assess, among other things, that a six-week IDF withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border is too short a period to enable a significant rearming of Hamas. They reportedly note that tackling a resurgent Hamas in northern Gaza one more time would be far less dangerous and protracted than the initial high-intensity conflict in the area. And they reportedly argue that while Israel may have to continue fighting Hamas for a long, long time if it endlessly regenerates itself, there is no more time for the hostages — many of whom have died in captivity.
Set against all this, the prime minister continues to insist that the war will not end until all Israel’s declared aims are achieved — that is, all hostages are returned and Hamas is dismantled. Hence his repeated assertions, in defiance of the published text, that Israel’s May 27 proposal does not provide for a permanent ceasefire, and his insistence on the right, at least in principle, to resume the battle against Hamas.
And then there is the issue of his coalition. His two far-right partners, Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism party and Itamar Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit, are adamant opponents of what they consider a defeatist and reckless deal; far from ending the war and withdrawing the troops, they would have Israel permanently resettle the Gaza Strip. And they have threatened, not entirely credibly, to bring down the government if Netanyahu defies them. Moderate opposition parties have promised to sustain Netanyahu in power through the implementation of a deal, but he knows they will provide no safety net beyond that.
Among those 1,027 Palestinian security prisoners whose freedom Netanyahu sanctioned 13 years ago was one Yahya Sinwar, the architect of the barbaric October 7 assault and the undisputed overall leader of Hamas in the aftermath of Haniyeh’s departure. Sinwar had been in prison for 22 years, with no prospect of release, having been sentenced to four life terms for involvement in the killing of two Israeli soldiers and four suspected Palestinian collaborators with Israel.
It may well be that Netanyahu would have had fewer problems with a deal were Sinwar, the monster he freed, not still eluding Israel in the Gaza underworld
It may well be that Netanyahu would have had fewer problems with a deal were Sinwar, the monster he freed, not still eluding Israel in the Gaza underworld, potentially poised to assert victory.
Israel has been demanding the right to veto or exile some of the dozens upon dozens of murderous terrorists Hamas is now seeking to get released in exchange for hostages in the first stage of the deal precisely because of its recognition that there are other possible Sinwars among them.
But it could also be that Netanyahu, who knows that much of the Israeli public is clamoring for this deal, will judge that the time is ripe. (A snap Channel 12 TV poll published on Friday night found 63 percent of Israelis back the agreement coming together in Doha to 12% opposed, with his own voters backing it 42% to 21% against.)
He could conclude that, as his preferred next US president Donald Trump told him, this is the moment to “get your victory.” He could regard a successful deal, if not constituting his oft-promised “total victory,” at least as vindication of 10 months’ military pressure and the targeted killings of almost all key Hamas figures with the exception of Sinwar and his brother, proof of his commitment to the hostages, an opportunity to salvage his legacy after the October 7 catastrophe, and a potential election-winner.
Could be.
Then, of course, there would remain the not-insignificant issue of what Hamas intends to say and do.
