The troubled island and the stormy Union

Cyprus assuming the presidency of the Council of the European Union is on the one hand a natural result of the rotating system, but on the other hand also marks quite a dramatic development for the island. The Republic of Cyprus has devoted many efforts to prepare for the presidency and places high significance to this role. However, the fact that the presidency is assumed by de-facto only the Republic of Cyprus and not the island as a whole symbolizes once again the failure to pass in a referendum among the Greek-Cypriots the 2004 Annan Plan and the lingering Cyprus problem.

Looking toward the near future, one can envision three scenarios with regard to the effect the Cyprus presidency will have on the Cyprus problem and vis-à-vis relations between Cyprus and Turkey. One scenario is that in practice, although Turkey is officially boycotting the Cyprus presidency, the presidency in itself will not substantially change dynamics between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots and between Cyprus and Turkey. Another scenario is one in which the Cyprus presidency will add tension to already strained relations. The Turkish boycott will be one of other Turkish actions that will be taken against the EU and Cyprus, and the presidency will become one of the issues that the sides bicker about; along with continuing mutual accusations that the other side is the one that is responsible for the stall in Turkish EU-accession talks and the continuing failure of the Cyprus unification talks; and along with the growing tension between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey over offshore gas explorations made by the Republic of Cyprus and a counter-exploration of gas and oil made by Turkey in Northern Cyprus.

The third scenario is that the Cyprus presidency will bring in the limelight two very important issues: the first is a potentially embarrassing situation for the EU which might have been tucked away in the past but will now unavoidably take center-stage; namely, the admittance of a divided country into its union with no required pre-condition of unification. The second is the increased visibility of the indigenous Turkish-Cypriot community in Northern Cyprus, and the enduring effects that isolation has reaped on their economy and society. In 1983, the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was imposed on the Turkish-Cypriot people who were never given the chance to vote on it via referendum; shortly after its establishment the TRNC, which was declared illegal under UN Security Council Resolution 541, was placed under an economic embargo internationally which ensues to this day. In the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan, when granted the opportunity to vote on the future of their island and community, the Turkish- Cypriots voted en masse 65% in favor of unification. The indigenous Turkic community in Northern Cyprus has been treated as an extension of Turkey and repeatedly bypassed by the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, both negotiating directly with each other without heeding to the needs and opinions of this silent minority group whose population is slowly fading away due to expansive Turkish settlement policies and emigration outside of Cyprus in order to avoid the hardship of living under an international embargo. The Cyprus presidency may afford public awareness of a difficult situation which has been overshadowed by more publicized events and actors in the neighboring region.

Of the three scenarios, the first one that envisions a stalemate in negotiations over the Cyprus problem, and the third one which brings more visibility to the Cyprus problem are the most probable. The Republic of Cyprus is taking over the presidency of the EU in a difficult time for the Union; a time in which there are growing voices asking whether the Union can withhold its unity. The question of Cyprus may not be the most pressing issue on the European agenda, but it does affect significant issues like cooperation between NATO and the EU. Moreover it touches upon the fundamental question of the future of Turkish-EU relations. As such, while it is not clear that the sides will be able use constructively the Cyprus presidency to solve the Cyprus problem, it is important that some pro-active means be taken as to not allow serious rise in tensions.

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Gallia Lindenstrauss is a research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University and Linda Michaud-Emin is a PhD candidate in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.