‘Arrogance and inherent blindness’: Civil probe slams Netanyahu for Oct. 7 failures

PM is ‘responsible for undermining all decision-making centers’ and breaking relationship ‘between the political and military echelons,’ independent commission of inquiry finds

Sam Sokol is the Times of Israel's political correspondent. He was previously a reporter for the Jerusalem Post, Jewish Telegraphic Agency and Haaretz. He is the author of "Putin’s Hybrid War and the Jews"

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a press conference at the Government Press Office in Jerusalem, September 4, 2024. (Abir Sultan/Pool via AP)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a press conference at the Government Press Office in Jerusalem, September 4, 2024. (Abir Sultan/Pool via AP)

During his time in office, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu consistently undermined the government’s national security decision-making process, creating a rift between Israel’s political and military leadership and leaving the country unprepared for Hamas’s devastating October 7, 2023, incursion, an independent investigative committee announced on Tuesday.

Beyond Netanyahu, the Civilian Commission of Inquiry’s scathing report alleged that the entire government had “failed its primary mission” and that the Israel Defense Forces, Shin Bet, and other organizations “completely failed to fulfill their sole objective — protecting the citizens of Israel.”

Established by relatives of the victims of the attack this summer in light of Netanyahu’s continued refusal to approve a state commission of inquiry, and his insistence that he is not to blame for any of the failures, the commission spent more than four months holding hearings in which it interviewed some 120 witnesses — including former prime ministers, defense chiefs and intelligence officials.

Presenting their final report at a press conference in Tel Aviv, the members of the commission repeatedly cautioned that their work could not replace that of an official probe with the power to subpoena witnesses, but said that what they had heard was extremely concerning.

Those who did agree to testify painted a picture of a prime minister “responsible for undermining all decision-making centers, including the cabinet and the National Security Council, in a way that prevented any serious discussion that includes a plurality of opinions on significant security issues.”

According to the commission, “arrogance and inherent blindness also led the political leadership to continue to work to strengthen Hamas by transferring funds and avoiding an offensive initiative in the face of threats, all while idealizing reality and attempting to buy security quiet from Hamas with money.”

Members of the independent civilian commission of inquiry at the presentation of their findings, November 26, 2024 (Sam Sokol/Times of Israel)

Prior to October 7, Netanyahu’s government facilitated the transfer of suitcases holding millions in Qatari cash into Gaza in order to maintain a fragile ceasefire with Hamas.

The report also slammed members of Netanyahu’s cabinet, calling his ministers directly responsible for the “collapse of the government system on October 7.”

A broken system

This arrogance also led to a breakdown in the relationship between the political and military leaderships “and to serious damage to the Israeli government’s decision-making process,” the commission continued, alleging that repeated warnings from senior intelligence and defense officials in the months leading up to the war “were passed on to the prime minister and were not met with in-depth discussions.”

No consideration was given to the possibility that the accepted consensus that Hamas was deterred could be incorrect, it said, arguing that exactly half a century after being taken by surprise at the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur War “we have learned nothing.”

Former prime minister Yair Lapid, now the head of the opposition, told the commission in August that the prime minister had appeared “bored and indifferent” during a joint security briefing last year, while Yisrael Beytenu party chief and former defense minister Avigdor Liberman testified that, as far back as 2016, he had warned about a Hamas attack similar to the one that eventually occurred last October.

The prime minister discontinued his practice of meeting with the head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate, while his rocky relationship with recently fired defense minister Yoav Gallant “seriously damaged the security of the country,” the report charged.

L-R: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Minister Benny Gantz attend a press conference at the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv, December 16, 2023. (Noam Revkin Fenton/Flash90)

In addition, Netanyahu had worked to sideline institutions such as the security cabinet “to the point where they [could] no longer perform their functions,” while centralizing decision-making within his own office.

“Even the National Security Council merely functions as a political body” and “strategic decisions on national security remain uncontrolled, allocating no space for real and full discussion,” it said.

While Netanyahu silenced internal critics, ignored warnings and declined to preemptively attack the terror group, former prime ministers Lapid and Naftali Bennett also shoulder the blame for “maintaining the concept of cash for quiet, albeit in different ways,” the commission said.

In a statement, Lapid welcomed the commission’s findings and argued that “the possibility of a preemptive strike against Hamas, like the possibility of an operation to assassinate senior Hamas figures, was discussed more than once during the ‘government of change,’” which he co-led with Bennett, but that “the intelligence conditions were not ripe for such operations.”

The defense establishment

Beyond criticizing politicians, the commission also laid the blame for October 7 at the feet of the security services, stating that the IDF, Shin Bet, and other organizations “completely failed to fulfill their sole objective — protecting the citizens of Israel.”

Former defense minister Gallant, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, the head of Military Intelligence and their predecessors were also responsible for the debacle, having, among other things, pared down the IDF’s presence along the Gaza frontier and abandoned the observation troops along the border to their fate, the commission contended.

“The IDF was not prepared for the mass invasion of Israel by Hamas terrorists – even though their plan was known in advance,” the commission said, referring to a report that Israel had obtained Hamas’s plans for its assault on October 7, dubbed “Jericho Wall,” over a year before the devastating attack.

Opposition Leader Yair Lapid testifies before the unofficial citizens’ commission of inquiry into the failure to prevent and respond to Hamas’s October 7 attack, on August 29, 2024. (Screenshot)

On the day itself, the IDF’s Southern Command and the Gaza Division “failed miserably, to the point of collapse,” leaving soldiers in the field “to their own devices” without backup or coordination with the Israel Police.

Former senior defense officials, such as current opposition politician and ex-defense minister Benny Gantz, also shared responsibility for the IDF’s failures, including the idea of shifting to a “small and smart army” and placing too much of an emphasis on technological means of controlling the border, the report further charged.

“When generations of commanders grow into the same perception, the same conception, it is very difficult to change it, and the result is disastrous,” it said.

A failed national security concept

Given that Israel’s security outlook “has collapsed,” a comprehensive reform of decision-making processes on all levels is needed, the commission concluded, insisting that “every system, large and small must have a control and review system” and that all relevant actors “adopt a culture of taking responsibility.”

Of special concern was the fact that Israel does not have an official national security strategy approved by the prime minister like other countries, the commission stated. A bill requiring the government to formulate such a strategy is currently making its way through the Knesset.

Maj. Gen. (res) Eyal Ben-Reuven, the deputy commander of the northern front during the Second Lebanon War, presents the findings of an independent Civilian Commission of Inquiry into the events of October 7 during a press conference in Tel Aviv, November 26, 2024. (Tomer Neuberg/Flash90)

Speaking with The Times of Israel, commission member Maj. Gen. (res) Eyal Ben-Reuven, the deputy commander of the northern front during the 2006 Second Lebanon War, said that while the report’s goal was to point out systemic issues, there was no getting around the fact that Netanyahu was the cause of many of the problems.

The government needs people to play devil’s advocate, he said, dismissing as a political exercise recent coalition efforts to establish a so-called “Ifcha Mistabra” unit under the authority of the Prime Minister’s Office to challenge the conclusions of intelligence bodies.

Netanyahu promulgated a message that there was no threat in the south “and it was accepted,” he said. “One of the things I feel is that there were officials who needed to pound harder on the table.”

Pushing forward

Asked what it hopes to accomplish with its report, a spokesman for the commission replied that its goal has been to help the families of the victims to understand what happened to their loved ones while applying pressure on the government to establish its own investigation.

“Imagine if after 9/11 there wasn’t an investigation,” the spokesman said. “I don’t think anyone can even imagine this.”

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