Yahya Sinwar’s message to Israel, sent a few weeks before October 7 and warning of a flare-up in the prisons and on the issue of the captives, was immediately understood by its recipients to be referring not to violence and disturbances among Palestinian security prisoners held by Israel, but to potential developments regarding Israelis held captive and/or missing, Channel 12 reports. That is how the message was defined and cataloged, the report says.
Prior to October 7, when Hamas seized 251 hostages, 116 of whom are still held captive, the terror group was holding two Israeli civilians who entered the Strip in 2014 and 2015, as well as the bodies of two IDF soldiers who were killed in 2014. Furthermore, in March 2023, a Russian-Israeli researcher named Elizabeth Tsurkov was kidnapped in Baghdad, and is being held by an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia.
Sinwar’s message was regarded as “highly sensitive” and was circulated in only a very limited way in the political and security echelons. It was given “the highest possible security classification… very few people” were given access to it.
The Mossad, the Shin Bet, and the IDF all held several discussions regarding the message. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant “were updated about these discussions,” the report says, and were involved in some of them.
The conclusion of these discussions was that Sinwar was indeed referring to Israeli captives and missing.
Israel “did not interpret the message as a warning ahead of an attack,” even though, as has been widely reported in the months since October 7, Israel intelligence had in its hands material relating to Hamas’s attack plans.
Elizabeth Tsurkov in an undated photo (social media; used in accordance with Clause 27a of the Copyright Law)
Rather, Israel understood from the message that Hamas intended to “take charge of matters” regarding kidnapped researcher Tsurkov, and to demand the release of a large number of Palestinian security prisoners in return for her freedom.
Sinwar’s message was not circulated even to all high-ranking IDF and IDF intelligence branch officials, and was also not circulated to lower ranks. Those left out of the loop, therefore, were not able connect his message to other indications they might have raised.
The report says that “nobody” has been able to explain definitively why Sinwar would have wanted to convey the message. Intelligence materials accumulated since October 7 also provide no definite explanation. It makes no sense, the report notes, for Sinwar to have contacted Israel and potentially turned a spotlight onto Gaza just weeks before the invasion.
There are some who speculate that Sinwar may have been dealing with two simultaneous issues, the report goes on to say: planning October 7, while also attempting to maximize ongoing negotiations and contacts that it says were advancing at the time regarding the four Israelis in Gaza — the slain soldiers Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, and the living civilians Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed.
Others in the system speculate — and “this seems ridiculous,” the TV report says — that Sinwar conveyed his clandestine message “because of differences of opinion between him and [Hamas’s military chief] Muhammad Deif regarding the timing of the [October 7] attack.” According to this thesis, Sinwar “maybe wanted to prompt Israel into taking actions that would delay the attack that Hamas was planning to a later date — maybe enabling greater coordination with Hezbollah.” Sinwar “might have been interested” in that kind of delay, while Deif might have wanted the October 7 date.
Speculation aside, the bottom line, says Channel 12, is that Sinwar’s message “was not correctly interpreted.” It should, the report concludes, have turned the spotlight onto Gaza.