Daily Briefing May 28 – US and Iran exchange fire as IDF ramps up on Lebanon front

Welcome to The Times of Israel’s Daily Briefing, your 20-minute audio update on what’s happening in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world.

US bureau chief Jacob Magid joins host Amanda Borschel-Dan for today’s episode.

WATCH the full episode here:

US President Donald Trump indicated during a Wednesday cabinet meeting that progress in talks with Iran on a deal to end the war had slowed, departing from his assertion at the start of the week that an agreement was nearly finalized.

On Thursday, Israelis awoke to the news that the US had struck Iranian targets for a second time this week for “defensive” purposes. Later in the morning, it was reported that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeted an American base in retaliation for US strikes on the country’s south.

At the same time, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has instructed the IDF to broaden its activities against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

Magid helps us unravel where things stand in the negotiations, even as the ceasefire appears to be evermore fragile and the chances for a deal increasingly remote.

Also during the Wednesday cabinet meeting, for the second time this week, the US president suggested he may not sign a deal with Iran if neighboring Gulf countries do not normalize ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords. Magid explains how this stance could actually blow up in the US’s face.

In the second half of our program, we turn to the leadership vacuum in the Gaza Strip. Hamas on Wednesday confirmed the death of Mohammed Odeh, the newly appointed head of the terror group’s military wing, whom Israel killed in a strike in Gaza City. Whatever happened with last month’s elections for a new Hamas head?

And finally, we hear the scoop behind Shin Bet chief David Zini’s meeting with the Palestinian Authority’s exiled former Gaza security chief, Mohammed Dahlan, during a recent visit to the United Arab Emirates.

Check out The Times of Israel’s ongoing liveblog for more updates.

For further reading:

Trump says US ‘not satisfied’ in talks with Iran, days after claiming deal imminent

Soldier killed in Hezbollah drone attack as Israel widens strikes on terror group

Hamas confirms death of military chief Mohammed Odeh; defiant funeral held in Gaza City

Shin Bet head met exiled PA Gaza security chief Dahlan in UAE — sources

Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts. This episode was produced by Ari Schlacht.

Check out yesterday’s episode here:

Today’s transcript:

Amanda Borschel-Dan: Welcome to the Times of Israel’s Daily Briefing. Today is Thursday, May 28th. I’m Amanda Borschel-Dan here in Jerusalem, joined by our US Bureau Chief Jacob Magid from Chicago. Jacob, thank you so much for joining me today.

Magid: Hi Amanda, good to be with you again.

Borschel-Dan: It is always such a pleasure. Jacob, we are going to hear first of all about the second strike that US forces have conducted on Iranian targets just overnight for us. We’re going to talk about the status of the Iran negotiations. And in the second half of the program, we’re going to focus our lens on Palestinians. We’ll talk about the Hamas leadership hierarchy and also speak about Fatah. So all of this and more when we’re back.

And we’re back. I’m Amanda Borschel-Dan, joined by our US Bureau Chief Jacob Magid. Jacob, let’s talk about the second strike on Iranian targets of this week. I just have to say, we started the week on Sunday with some kind of anticipation that there would be a deal. Suddenly, of course, I think it was Tuesday, the US targeted Iranian forces in different locations, mostly their military, as far as I understand it. And then I woke up again this morning to news that there was a second strike. So what was targeted in this second strike, Jacob?

Magid: So this time around, the US official briefing some reporters said that the military had struck a military site. It didn’t get specific, but said it posed a threat to US forces. And once again, the official is trying to frame these strikes as defensive in nature. They’re trying to make that differentiation, I guess, to make sure that this ceasefire that’s sort of still in place continues to hold, even though it’s really starting to teeter as we enter Thursday.

Borschel-Dan: Right. And so let’s talk about what’s happening in terms of negotiations. And again, I started the week with this kind of, I don’t know, anticipatory feeling that something was about to happen or definitely could happen this week. It appears to me as the week is rolling out that we’re getting farther and farther away from a deal, even though we’re hearing leaked reports of a 14-point plan that Iran has basically agreed to in a first draft. So, where do things stand right now, Jacob?

Magid: Yeah, I think President [Donald] Trump had this opportunity to update the public and signal progress, given that it’s been, it had been four days since he said, he announced that we’re very close, that the deal is largely signed, we’re just finalizing the details, they’ll be announced shortly. Come Wednesday at a [US] Cabinet meeting, he chooses to use this opportunity to speak about Iran once again and basically says nothing new. Just says that Iran wants a deal, but it’s not really there yet. They’re not offering enough for what we want. We could get a good deal now, but we really, what we want is a great deal, and therefore we will not be signing until we get that. That was basically his message at this Cabinet meeting. And it gets you wondering, is he maybe again walking back this desire for a deal because of some criticism he’s receiving from parts of the Republican Party who are concerned that this is basically acquiescing to Iranian demands? Is maybe he also just back on this idea of we just need to declare victory and leave because no deal could be better than a bad deal? I think that was the approach of the Trump administration during Trump’s first term, when he basically left the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], the Iran nuclear deal from president [Barack] Obama in 2015, and didn’t end up signing anything else.

He just kind of left a vacuum that we did see Iran rush to a bomb afterwards. But he still felt that that was better than staying in the deal that existed. And that’s where he seems to be at as of going into Thursday.

Borschel-Dan: So let’s talk a little comparison. We have this 14-point leaked deal. We don’t know its veracity, but from what we understand, there could be at least some truth in it. And let’s compare that with the deal that Trump left previously. And what are you seeing in terms of compare and contrast? Is this new 14-point deal any better than what was left?

Magid: If you’re talking about the memorandum of understanding that President Trump is suggesting that we were very close to signing on Sunday, that actually, according to a US official I spoke with, does not really touch on the nuclear issue very much. That the idea with that deal is just to push off the negotiations on nuclear issues to the subsequent 60-day ceasefire period and only focus on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and actually giving Iran some sanctions relief in exchange for that. That’s, the nuclear file is actually something that’s separate, and you could argue therefore that the Iran nuclear deal that Obama signed actually at least addressed the issue. Obviously, Trump is saying we’re going to get to those issues and we’re going to take a harder line than President Obama did in 2015. But at least in this MOU [Memorandum of Understanding], it’s not, it’s not talk. It’s just talking about the issues that weren’t even a problem before the war started.

Borschel-Dan: And you and I have discussed so many times a quote unquote, well, I would call it a bad deal that is currently being rolled out in Gaza, meaning there was this big push, a big deal, a big press coverage and then we’re not seeing anything happen. And is there any kind of worry in the United States that we might be in the same situation with Iran?

Magid: If there is, the Trump administration is not trying to show that. But I agree with you that there’s a very strong comparison to make between Iran and Gaza, in that once again, we’re talking about this first phase that is very difficult to get, of getting the ceasefire to an extended period of time. I guess in this case, it’s just 60 days, but still, a substantial agreement if it’s reached, that stops the bleeding, possibly at least ends a very problematic situation for the US economy, but doesn’t address the real thornier issues. The same thing we had in Gaza, where we did get this major accomplishment of a deal that ended the bloodshed and got all the hostages home, but didn’t actually bring longstanding stability to Gaza, because Hamas is still in power and is refusing to disarm. So I do agree with you that there’s a lot of comparisons to be made.

Borschel-Dan: And of course, we can’t forget Lebanon, and Hezbollah is definitely still there, definitely still a player. And any kind of direct talks that were made were, of course, between Israel and Lebanon, not Hezbollah. And it appears to me that Hezbollah at this point is just saying, “We don’t abide by anything Lebanon has agreed to. There is no ceasefire. We are full-on at war.” And this week, our Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ramped up the volume, and the IDF forces and attacks we saw one soldier killed overnight. This war, we can’t call it a ceasefire anymore, in my opinion. This war is ongoing, and yet it is intrinsically linked to the Iran ceasefire and negotiations. So what is happening there in your opinion, Jacob?

Magid: Yeah, according to reports, the MOU actually does touch on this and requires the ceasefire in Iran to extend to Lebanon. I don’t know how much that really means in practice because there’s technically a ceasefire in Lebanon and Israel’s been free to strike pretty much at will, expand its strikes beyond the — or expand its presence beyond the initial security zone in southern Lebanon that it’s created. Yes, there’s this red line from the US regarding strikes in Beirut, but still, there’s quite a bit of work that the IDF has been able to do. The issue is that even in expanding its strikes, I’m not really sure what that actually accomplishes, because unless you can tie these operations that the IDF is expanding to the ability to actually crackdown on the drone issue that Hezbollah has been able to really target Israeli troops relentlessly with, then I don’t know really what you’re accomplishing by just expanding the operations deeper into Lebanon, beyond just saying, look, we’re doing something to try to keep residents of the north safe. It’s somewhat noteworthy that one of the, I believe it was the mayor of Metula, who spoke out in recent days, talking about how now we don’t, the feeling now is that we don’t think that having this buffer zone of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon is actually protecting the towns in the north.

This was a bit of a flip-flop because I think he was one of the people calling for this buffer zone, but now that they’re seeing the results of it, it’s not really protecting them and it’s exposing both these soldiers beyond the Lebanon, beyond Israel’s northern border inside Lebanon, it’s very much exposing them to targeting from Hezbollah, but also the communities as well that have been continuing to be hit.

Borschel-Dan: Let’s turn to another very interesting statement that came from US President Donald Trump this week, and that was in relation to the Abraham Accords. We can’t forget that this is an election year for both Israel and the United States. And I do wonder if this renewed push to have different Gulf countries, and even Pakistan — question mark — join the Abraham Accords has something to do with that, in light of the stalemate in the Iran negotiations.

Magid: Trump made the statement on Sunday shortly after announcing that the deal was very close. That he was calling on countries all over the region, including, and those involved in the deal, this mediation, to join the Abraham Accords. But he goes farther on Wednesday by saying, maybe I won’t even sign this MOU if these countries don’t actually join. And chief among them, he really wants Saudi Arabia, but also Qatar, and as you mentioned, Pakistan as well. It’s noteworthy that he doesn’t go as far as just to say when he’s pushed of, okay, are you making this a condition? He says, well, I don’t want to say yes or no, because I think he recognizes this could be quite, quite the risk. But it’s somewhat of a message of, I guess, of a threat to the Gulf countries to say either you normalize relations with Israel or you see your energy sites get targeted by Iran when this war, if this war resumes. And that’s, I guess, the strategy that he’s taking with this plan. I guess I think I thought of four or so different reasons of why he’s doing it. I think on the one hand, he’s not really accomplishing the main goals that were set out, be it regime change.

I know, I think that’s questionable whether it is an actual goal, but I do think, given the way he talked about it in the first days, that it was. The missile issue, Iran, yes, it’s been depleted, but they still exist. And then also the nuclear file of the enriched uranium that hasn’t been extracted yet. So if you haven’t gotten those things, at least we’ll get something with the expansion of the Abraham Accords. That would be some sort of win you could present. I think you could also maybe suggest that this is part of some grand strategy that he had the whole time, even though they weren’t fully prepared for the Hormuz to be closed. But at least we are always thinking about how this could lead to some sort of normalization deal. It also, I think, just shifts the conversation from the chaos of this, these negotiations, or whether or not there’s, it’s a good deal or not, to, well, at least we’re going to talk about the Abraham Accords instead. And finally, another idea that came to mind is, he recognizes that this deal that he’s trying to push is not very popular in Israel right now.

So maybe, let’s give Israel some sort of carrot along with the stick of the deal, and maybe this will allow Netanyahu to sell it more palatably to the public.

Borschel-Dan: And we heard some responses pretty much immediately, especially, I noted, from Saudi Arabia, which followed the party line essentially. So let’s hear what they had to say.

Magid: So it wasn’t an official on-the-record statement, but I think it was someone from the royal court in Saudi Arabia that leaked to CNN and Fox News on background, saying that we will only normalize with Israel if, as we’ve said all along, if they agree to establish a pathway, an irreversible pathway to a future Palestinian state. I think knowing that this is not something that Prime Minister Netanyahu is willing to do, especially ahead of an election year. I also spoke to an Arab diplomat from one of the countries that was called on by President Trump to join, and basically, he laughed it off and just said, “We’re focused on other things right now.” Notably, though, I did speak also with a different diplomat from a country that’s in the Abraham Accords, and they said, “Look, this could be a good way to test how serious countries are about wanting an end to the war with Iran, that this will force them to expose themselves as saying, as being one of the obstacles rather than one of the reasons that it’s actually solved, being the mediator.” So that was an interesting, I guess, split you had, but both of them agreed that it’s just unlikely to work, that you’re not going to see countries turn around and just agree to this kind of threat by President Trump.

Magid: And even if they do, what you could see is what the Saudis did, is saying, we’re willing to do a pathway to a — we’re willing to normalize if there’s a pathway to a Palestinian state. And President Trump, look, you even called for this in your Gaza peace plan. There’s points 19 and 20 of that 20-point plan that talk about establishing a pathway to a Palestinian state once Gaza reconstruction is moving forward, and also even the US launching peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. So President Trump, if you just reiterate that point and you get Israel to get on board with it, we don’t even need massive steps beyond that, then yes, we could, we could see ourselves supporting it. But in lieu of that, and like, and given that Israel is unlikely to do that in an election year, I just don’t see how that really advances. And this idea that these countries in the region are going to give Netanyahu a win going into the election, I think they really see him as someone who’s problematic for the region and behind these policies in the West Bank and Gaza and Syria and Lebanon that they view as really, as destabilizing.

I don’t think they’d like to see him win the election, and they don’t want to be seen as helping him. I think that also was one of the reasons why Joseph Aoun, the president of Lebanon, among other ones, did not want to meet with or have a call with Netanyahu, just despite the pressure from the US. I think this all just happening right now is not the right time for these countries, and therefore, they’re probably going to say no to this.

Borschel-Dan: Jacob, could there be any major downsides, for example, for the United States, for calling for these countries to join the Abraham Accords, or for other countries as well?

Magid: Yeah, I do think there is a bit of risk here that President Trump is taking. I get the need to be focused in the now, and it’s really possible that this could be forgotten in a few days or just moved aside. Like, it made me think of the Gaza emigration idea of having people leave Gaza that Trump pushed in February of 2025 and then kind of forgot about it since and abandoned the idea. But with this, I think it further risks making the — in the US, making the Abraham Accords a partisan issue. Which it had managed to — it started that way. And then the [president Joseph] Biden administration really adopted it and pushed this idea of Israel and Saudi Arabia normalizing. But this, tying it to an Iran war that is incredibly unpopular in both parties, at least on the public level, but also specifically with Democrats, I think is a real risk. And it also leads to — it gives an opportunity for the far right and the far left in the US to start, to again argue that Israel is controlling foreign policy and that the only way the war is going to end is if Israel gets what it wants.

I think that’s something that’s a real, a real risk. And also, just if the war resumes and Iran does end up seeing, targeting Gulf energy sites in Saudi Arabia or Qatar or other countries that Trump is calling on, what exactly is going to happen? The US and Israel are going to say, look, you should have normalized ties with Israel. And then those countries are going to say, “oh, you’re right Mr. President, now we’re going to normalize”? That feels pretty unlikely. And it just would likely lead to, instead, kicking the can down the road much further for a possibility for normalization, when really you already have the opportunity right now with this Gaza peace plan if President Trump wants, it does talk about this pathway that the Saudis are asking for. So if you instead focus on that, I think you’re more likely to actually advance the Abraham Accords as opposed to making it as this issue that becomes a threat and not a club that people want to be in, that creates a warm peace between Israelis and Emiratis, for example, but something that they’re forced into and then therefore creates cold peaces like we’re used to with Egypt and Jordan.

Borschel-Dan: Just one clarifying question here, Jacob. The Abraham Accords, as far as I understand, are mostly an economic agreement, correct? And we did see during the war that Israel did send an Iron Dome battery, and there was some protection offered from Israel to the UAE [United Arab Emirates], but it is not necessarily meant to be some kind of strategic military alliance. Am I wrong in that?

Magid: No, I actually do think that’s one of the main goals. If you talk about how CENTCOM [Central Command] has been restructured to include the US and some of these Arab countries that are part of the Abraham Accords, there is a desire to create a united front, specifically actually, against Iran in many ways. So yes, this, this, so actually the security frame is, is a key facet of the Abraham Accords in addition to the economic benefits that the countries who are part of it are enjoying.

Borschel-Dan: Let’s go to a short break.

And we’re back. Yesterday, it was confirmed by the IDF that the military head of Hamas in Gaza, Mohammed Odeh, was in fact assassinated in a targeted killing. This is the second head of the military wing who was assassinated within 2 weeks. Jacob, you and I discussed earlier, I think it was more than 2 weeks ago, that there had been elections held in Hamas, international Hamas, shall we say. And there are basically two wings, the wing in Gaza and the wing outside. And we never heard a result from the election. So, what do we know about the hierarchy of Hamas at this point?

Magid: Right, so there’s the Hamas abroad, and that’s what the leadership elections that were being held, it was also just the broader Hamas leadership. And then you have Hamas in Gaza where it, before October 7th and throughout the war, I think the understanding was that Hamas Gaza was the one in control. Yahya Sinwar, the leader, was the one making decisions at the end of the day. And there was this concept, I think, in Hebrew called, “sheket yorim,” this, it’s “be quiet, we’re shooting right now.” You guys are outside of Gaza, you’re not dealing with the war conditions that we’re dealing with, so you don’t have a real right to make decisions.

But, as a result of Israel picking off one after the other of all those military leaders that were involved in the planning of October 7th from Gaza, and the military leadership across the, both the political leadership and the military leadership of Hamas in Gaza, that there was really a weakening of that branch of Hamas and a shift of control to the Hamas leaders that are largely in Qatar or in Turkey, depending on the day. So that meant that it’s Khaled Mashal and Khalil al-Hayya, who actually is part of Hamas Gaza, but left the Hamas, but left the Strip just before October 7th.

He’s very close to Yahya Sinwar, or was very close to Yahya Sinwar, and he, I guess, served as his point man abroad. And he is one of the two people who was running against Khaled Mashal, who’s been abroad for much longer and closer to Qatar. He’s seen — both of them are obviously quite extreme and a hard line — but Khaled Mashal is seen as a little bit more pragmatic and seen as willing to maybe take certain compromises in order to maintain Hamas for years to come, whereas I think the perception of Khalil al-Hayya is someone who’s much more hardline and willing, wants the Hamas Gaza presence to be as strong as possible and not be willing to capitulate. So those are the kind of two wings. He’s also, Khalil al-Hayya, a little bit closer to Iran than Khaled Mashal, who’s seen as very much not. And there were supposed to be results from elections several weeks ago. The process is very murky. It’s clearly not a full, fully democratic process. And I think the fact that it’s taken so long is not because they’re still trying to count votes or find people who are interested in voting, but they’re coming under pressure from a lot of different places, different countries who are involved in mediating that might have a preferred candidate, and they’re trying to figure out a way to assuage or satisfy all sides.

There’s also the Eid al-Adha Muslim holiday going on right now through the end of the week. So I don’t think they’re focusing on this issue right now. And they’re also, I think, using it as a strategy to delay the disarmament talks that are supposed to be taking place with the Board of Peace. And they don’t want to agree to disarm, so this is a way, an excuse to say, look, we need to first make sure our leadership elect — we have a new leader, and that new leader can decide what we want to do in these talks. But until then, we need to wait to advance with those negotiations. So I think that could be a tactic that we’re seeing right now. I don’t think the killing of Mohammed Ouda, or the killing of the previous Gaza military leader for Hamas, Izz al-Din al-Haddad, 11 days earlier, is what’s going to shift the needle any differently. I think the trend was always moving, already moving in the, in favor of the Hamas abroad faction. But I think this has just been the policy of Israel, that it believes that this will help weaken the organization. If you continue to take out each of the leadership, it makes, if there’s this vacuum, it’s much harder for them to make decisions in Gaza and hold down the fort there.

But what we’ve seen is that they haven’t actually had this issue, that Hamas has still managed to regroup, that it even sent out police officers to secure the funeral for Izz al-Din al-Haddad earlier this, last week. And then also for Mohammed Ouda’s funeral, you also saw Hamas police armed even, securing the funeral there. So there, there clearly is a presence that hasn’t been totally taken out by, as a result of these strikes. But we are seeing a continued civilian toll of them as well. I think there was quite a few strikes on Hamas operatives in the past few days where there’s been, not just, that the operatives targeted or killed, but also women and children as well.

Borschel-Dan: The fact that Hamas is holding the Strip is definitely not new, and the fact that they’re deploying their own fighters into the streets and their own police forces is not new as well. We’ve seen that basically immediately since the October ceasefire.

But I want to turn to another Palestinian politician who suddenly was in the news again, and I’m talking about Mohammed Dahlan. And he was an interesting figure before he was ousted by the Fatah group, which is in charge of the Palestinian Authority. He was basically the advisor for Gaza, if I’m not mistaken. And what we’re hearing in terms of the headline is that he met with the Israeli head of the Shin Bet. So, because I have a bit of a conspiracy theory type of mind, I do wonder if he is being kind of earmarked to be a potential leader of the Gaza Strip in the future. I’m sure there are others who have this conspiracy theory as well, Jacob. So what are you hearing?

Magid: No, I think at this point, I think for once here, this is not a complete conspiracy theory. The head of the Shin Bet is not going to just meet with a former senior Palestinian official stem, I think, for nothing. I think there is a real hope, at least amongst some in Israel, that Mohammed Dahlan is the solution to the not [Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud] Abbas and not Hamas problem that Israel has, and these conditions that even the US has abided by. But it’s not new. This is someone who has been floated as a potential replacement to Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] for a very long time. He actually has ties to [MK] Avigdor Lieberman, or at least back in the day when he was defense minister, that he was someone who was touted, Dahlan was, to possibly be a new leader for the Palestinian people. The issue is that he doesn’t necessarily have wide appeal. He is from Gaza, and he has ties to the community there. He’s very close to the UAE. That’s where he’s living now in exile and has the support of the UAE, which Israel really likes. And he’s, again, he’s just not Abbas. So I think that a lot of these points are in his favor.

But he’s not, I think, beyond Gaza, I think he’s got some popularity in the West Bank refugee camps. But beyond that, I don’t see broad appeal. And there’s also, he faces a bit of corruption allegations himself. And the fact that Abu Mazen is so against him will make it very difficult for him to get a foothold. Actually, for listeners to the podcast, I talked about him last week as someone who the Egyptians were trying to push to be involved in the Fatah Revolutionary Council elections. And the Central Committee conference that was held earlier this month, Abbas blocked it. So yes, he has some people working on his behalf, including maybe in Israel right now with the head of the Shin Bet meeting him in the UAE. But I think there’s this perception that it’s been tried before and it’s not necessarily going to work. But we’ll have to keep following this.

Borschel-Dan: For sure, but I do wonder, Jacob, you’re talking how he’s not really accepted by the Palestinian Authority. And obviously, he was ousted by Fatah, by the party itself. But I do wonder if that’s so necessary, meaning it could actually be in his favor that he is not supported by Abbas. It could be in his favor that he’s not directly linked to the Palestinian Authority. And the people in the streets of Gaza, I would propose to you, are looking for a viable solution to get out of the stalemate that they’re in right now. So I say, Jacob, that we should put his name in a time capsule, dig it up in a couple of years, and we’ll see what happened.

Magid: I think it’s a fair suggestion to make. I think the one caveat, which might be a pretty big one, is he’s already said himself that he’s not interested right now in becoming the head of either just only the Gaza Strip or coming back and running all of Palestine if a state is ever created. I do think he is trying to create the cards and better position himself to maybe one day run if an election is held, which is something that he’s really advocated for, holding those elections. But until then, I think it’s still in— we’re still in the early stages of this idea.

Borschel-Dan: All right, Jacob. So we will discuss this further in the future, and I’m digging up my time capsule spot as we speak. Okay. Thanks so much for joining me. Really appreciate it as always. Thanks so much, Jacob.

Magid: Bye, Amanda. Thanks for having me.

Borschel-Dan: Thanks for listening to the Times of Israel’s Daily Briefing. Please check out another installment tomorrow. This episode was produced by Ari Schlacht. If you have any questions or comments about this or any other episode, please drop us an email to podcast@timesofisrael.com. Until tomorrow, shalom.