From the Liveblog of
Tuesday, March 4, 2025
Shin Bet probe finds Oct. 7 would have been prevented if it had acted differently, but largely points finger of blame at others
The Shin Bet security agency has published a summary of its investigations into its failures during the lead-up to the Hamas terror group’s October 7, 2023, onslaught, concluding that there were failures within the organization but mostly pointing to external elements such as an unclear division of responsibilities with the IDF, an overly defensive government policy regarding Gaza over the years, and the Shin Bet being unsuited to counter an army-like foe such as Hamas.
The security service says a broader investigation is needed — a likely hint at the perceived need for a state commission of inquiry, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has refused to establish.
The investigations were carried out internally by each of the Shin Bet’s units and by an external team of former senior agency employees and other experts, who provided a series of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
Many of the findings remain classified, as they would reveal the Shin Bet’s intelligence secret tools and methods, the agency says.
The investigation has found that the Shin Bet failed to provide an alert for Hamas’s October 7 large-scale onslaught. Warning signs received by the Shin Bet on the night of October 6 did not result in major actions being taken.
While a small team of elite officers from the Shin Bet and police that were deployed to the Gaza border before the onslaught managed to contribute to the fighting, they were unable to prevent the massive Hamas attack.
The investigation points to several reasons, both related to professionalism and management, which contributed to the failures. “The organizational failures were thoroughly examined and the lessons were learned and continue to be learned,” the Shin Bet says.
Additionally, the investigation found that the Shin Bet did not underestimate Hamas, but rather the opposite, that the agency had “a deep understanding of the threat, and had initiatives and a desire to thwart the threat and especially [eliminate] the leaders of Hamas.”
Several reasons are given as to why the Shin Bet provided no alert for Hamas’s mass onslaught:
- Hamas’s ground invasion plans, which were obtained by the IDF in a document known as Jericho’s Walls, were not handled correctly over several years, and the plans were not turned into a scenario that the military and Shin Bet train for.
- An unclear division of responsibility between the IDF and Shin Bet regarding which organization should provide a warning for war, amid a change of Hamas from a smaller terror group to a full military force.
- The Shin Bet’s focus was on foiling terror attacks, and its methods were not applicable to an enemy that acted like an army.
- During the night between October 6 and 7, there were gaps in the “handling of information and integration of intelligence,” as well as operations that did not follow the usual protocol, and a lack of “fusion” with the IDF’s intelligence.
- There were gaps in the work of intelligence supervision mechanisms.
- The assessment was that Hamas was trying to heat up the West Bank, and was not interested in doing so in the Gaza Strip.
- The Shin Bet had an “incorrect understanding” of the strength of the Israeli border barrier with Gaza and the IDF’s ability to respond.
- Hamas’s believed intentions were not challenged enough during assessments.
- There was relatively little intelligence, including as a result of limited freedom of action in the Gaza Strip, especially independently by the Shin Bet.
The Shin Bet investigation also finds several reasons that enabled Hamas to build up its forces for the October 7 onslaught and decide to carry out the attack:
- Israel’s policy vis-à-vis Gaza was to maintain periods of quiet, which enabled Hamas massive force build-up.
- The flow of money from Qatar to Gaza and their delivery to Hamas’s military wing.
- An ongoing erosion of Israel’s deterrence.
- An attempt to deal with a terror organization based on intelligence and defensive measures, while avoiding offensive initiatives.
- The catalysts to Hamas’s decision to carry out the onslaught included the cumulative weight of Israeli violations on the Temple Mount, the attitude toward Palestinian prisoners, and the perception that Israeli society was weakened.
In an accompanying statement, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar says the agency “did not prevent the October 7 massacre” and “as the head of the organization, I will bear this heavy burden on my shoulders for the rest of my life.”
He adds: “The investigation revealed that if the Shin Bet had acted differently, in the years leading up to the attack and during the night of the attack — both at the professional level and the managerial level — the massacre would have been avoided. This is not the standard we expected of ourselves, or that the public expected of us.
“The investigation shows that the Shin Bet didn’t underestimate our rival — on the contrary, it took the initiative, went on the offensive and tried to nip the threat in the bud — but despite all this, we failed.”
Bar adds that truly investigating the failures necessitates a broader probe that also encapsulates the contact and cooperation between security and political elements.
“The path to reparation, as is emphasized in the report, demands a broad process of clarity and truth,” he says. “So I asked the investigatory committee and the agency’s top command, to probe and to discuss not only the reasons why the service failed, but also to take a wide look at all the relevant work processes at the organization, as part of learning lessons and as an opportunity for a broad change. But it also demands readiness to change in the political-security interface, otherwise, the failures could come back in the future.”
“I believe this organization is strong, stable, humble and its values are even more professional than they were on the eve of the massacre,” he adds.
The Times of Israel Community.