From the Liveblog of
Friday, February 6, 2026
PM seeks to place blame on Bar and Gallant in his response to comptroller’s Oct. 7 questions
Add ToI as a Preferred Source on GoogleLazar Berman is The Times of Israel's diplomatic reporter
In his newly publicized answers to the state comptroller’s October 7 inquiry, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu releases a partial cabinet meeting transcript from September 12, 2023 in which then-defense minister Yoav Gallant says the security situation in Gaza is “stable,” and that Israel should “hold back its forces” against Hamas.
The released answers — designed to place responsibility on the shoulders of IDF and Shin Bet leadership — were presented to State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman on December 25, 2025.
In the highly curated document meant to present Netanyahu in a positive light and reduce his responsibility for the October 7, 2023 attacks, he includes a summary of a September 21, 2023 situational assessment headed by then-IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi that says that “the chief of staff believes that it is possible to create a positive direction with Hamas” with economic incentives.
In a meeting with Netanyahu ten days before Hamas invaded, a representative from the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate said that Hamas “does want to reach an escalation,” while then-Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar said “they very much want to avoid a round of fighting.”
Gallant, subsequently fired by Netanyahu during the war, voices a similar assessment about Hamas’s intentions, and pushes for a long-term arrangement with Hamas to ensure quiet.
Through the selected debates he released, Netanyahu seeks to show that top ministers and security chiefs were consistently pushing for ways to buy extended quiet from Hamas, while the prime minister was arguing for preparations for assassinations of Hamas leaders.
He focuses especially on Bar — whom he also sacked during the war — and releases quotes in the day leading up to the invasion in which Bar says that quiet has been returned to the Gaza border, and a “deeper arrangement” with Hamas can be reached.
On the day of that attack itself, Netanyahu presents a timeline of the events.
At 6:29 a.m., his military secretary Maj. Gen. Avi Gil informed him that an attack has begun.
At 6:44 a.m., Netanyahu asked if Israel can take out Hamas leaders, and whether the call-up of reserves is necessary.
He headed to the IDF Kirya headquarters in Tel Aviv at 8 a.m. During a 9:55 a.m. meeting, he ordered the Gaza border closed hermetically to stop continued incursions and hostages being taken into Gaza, according to Netanyahu’s curated answers to Englman. He also said he ordered a full call-up of reserves and prepare for attacks from the north as well.
Netanyahu also stated that he ordered plans for a ground invasion of Gaza to be drawn up as well.
According to Netanyahu, in parallel Gil received a summary of the Shin Bet situational assessment that wrapped up at 5:15 a.m., shortly before the Hamas attack.
In fragmented quotes shared by Netanyahu, the summary of the Shin Bet meeting says that the chances of a broad conflict with Hamas are low, and therefore Israeli actions should focus on stopping any attacks and not anything that could lead to a miscalculation and a war with Hamas.
Netanyahu points out that nowhere in the summary is there an instruction to update his military secretary, seeking to bolster his claim that key information was kept from him before the invasion.
The Times of Israel Community.