Attorney general asks High Court to reject government’s terms for process to fire her

Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara called on the High Court of Justice on Monday to reject the government’s counteroffer to the court for how to fire her, and argued that the government’s suggestion was essentially a rejection of the court’s recommendation that the government adhere to the dismissal process as set out in the law.

In a fierce riposte to the government’s proposal, Baharav-Miara argued to the High Court that the government was still seeking to “engineer” the advisory committee for firing her, which she said would ultimately harm the professional independence of the attorney general if the court acceded to the government’s request.

Last month, the government voted to fire Baharav-Miara using a newly introduced, politicized method after failing to meet the requirements for the existing dismissal process, which was adopted in the year 2000.

Earlier this month, the High Court unanimously recommended that the government cancel its decision, implying that the new process isn’t legally acceptable.

The government said last week in response to the court’s recommendation that it would consider reverting to the original process if the court would allow the advisory committee for firing the attorney general to convene without one of its members, specifically a former justice minister or attorney general.

The government had tried to find such an individual for the original process, but told the court in July that it had not been able to find someone who had not already expressed a position on firing Baharav-Miara or who was not a “clear opponent of the government’s policies,” and therefore adopted its new dismissal process in June.

In her submission to the High Court on Monday, Baharav-Miara described the government’s request as merely “another attempt to create a new, ad hoc system while the [dismissal] process is already underway, which is designed to harm the professionalism of the public, professional [advisory] committee and its professional considerations.”

The attorney general argued that the government’s request demonstrated it did not intend to hold “a true consultation” with the advisory committee, but rather to “check a box” and to once again “change the rules in order to engineer the structure of the committee, and to harm its independence by so doing.”

Baharav-Miara argued that “the ministers’ response… brings back the idea that if it is not possible to guarantee ahead of time what the conclusion of the former justice minister or former attorney general will be, as if they were a ‘rubber stamp,’ then it is better to remove this important component from the committee.”

This, the attorney general averred, “is in fact ‘the same scheme in a different guise.’”

The attorney general also insisted that there had never been, and still is not, an objective reason for the government not to appoint a former attorney general or justice minister to the original committee.

She asserted that the government’s refusal to do so was due to its concern “that it will not be able to staff the position in a way which will guarantee from the outset that they will not disagree with the government’s position.”

Heeding the government’s request would “empty of content the only structural guarantee… of the neutrality and professional independence of the institution of the Attorney General’s Office in the context of the authority to fire [the attorney general],” Baharav-Miara wrote.

“The ministers’ proposal is nothing more than another attempt by the government to change the rules for terminating the term of office [of the attorney general] after the process has already begun – and it should not be permitted.”