Interview'Multiculturalism could be the wealth of Syria once again'

With Assad’s fall, the possible splintering of Syria buoys hopes for a new Middle East

Anan Wahabi, a former IDF intel officer from the Druze community, says Syria’s groups could rebuild the country as semi-autonomous cantons, ensuring stability and perhaps cooperation with Israel

Gianluca Pacchiani

Gianluca Pacchiani is the Arab affairs reporter for The Times of Israel

A Syrian opposition fighter tears up a painting depicting Syrian President Bashar Assad and his late father Hafez Assad at the Aleppo international airpot in Aleppo, Syria, December 2, 2024. .(AP Photo/Ghaith Alsayed)
A Syrian opposition fighter tears up a painting depicting Syrian President Bashar Assad and his late father Hafez Assad at the Aleppo international airpot in Aleppo, Syria, December 2, 2024. .(AP Photo/Ghaith Alsayed)

The fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has been heralded as a historic moment for the Middle East. But while many in Syria and around the world are celebrating the toppling of a brutal dictator, concern has emerged in Israel over the rise of the Islamist rebel group that brought him down and the risk of instability in a neighboring country plagued by a 13-year old civil war and deep sectarian divisions.

But alongside those worries, there are those who see the dawn of a new Middle East in the stunning events of the last several days, with Iran’s foothold in Syria likely gone along with Assad, among Tehran’s most important regional clients. In place of his iron-fisted rule, some envision a loose confederation of four ethnic substates united by a central government.

“The modern nation state in the Middle East has failed,” said Wahabi Anan Wahabi, a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University in Herzliya. “All the different communities in Syria could not live together in one national state.”

In an interview with The Times of Israel, Wahabi, who is also a colonel (res.) in the Intelligence Corps of the Israel Defense Forces and a lecturer in Political Sciences at the University of Haifa, formulated a vision for the future of Syria that respects the balance between the ethnic and religious diversity of the country – which includes Sunni and Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Christians, Druze, and Alawites, the religious minority of Assad.

This confederation would harness the vested interests of foreign powers in Syria — including both Israel and Russia, which maintains an air field and major naval base in Syria — for the country’s future stabilization and development, while possibly opening the door to normalization between Damascus and Jerusalem.

“The best option is for Syria to follow the model of the Kurdistan region in Iraq,” he posited. Iraqi Kurdistan is a semi-autonomous administrative division in the Republic of Iraq established de facto in 2005 after the fall of Saddam Hussein and the US-led invasion.

A Syrian Kurd waves the flag of YPG (People’s Protection Units) near Qamishli’s airport in northeastern Syria on December 8, 2024. (Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP)

In that region, Kurds built a parliamentary democracy and constituted semi-autonomous armed forces, the Peshmerga, while remaining formally a part of the Iraqi Republic.

The same model of regional autonomy could be applied to Syria’s regions and communities, in order to put the country on the path of political stability and economic development, said Wahabi. The process could have positive repercussions for the wider region, and Israel could play a role in it, he predicted.

According to Wahabi, plans for economic development projects in southern Syria backed by Israel have already been discussed in unofficial meetings between Israeli academics and Syrian opposition figures interested in peace. There are no verifiable reports of those meetings.

A resident of the northern Druze village Daliat al-Carmel who worked in the Prime Minister’s Office on regional strategy between 2010 and 2013, Wahabi developed insights and forecasts based on his decades-long experience in military and academic circles, his personal connections with decision-makers, and what he calls his “mileage in understanding the subtext of declarations, and political and military behavior” of actors in the region.

The interview was lightly edited for clarity:

The Times of Israel: How did the stunning, sudden fall of Bashar al-Assad come about?

Anan Wahabi: I was not entirely surprised. Over the last decade, Assad has gradually lost control of the Syrian state. His Iranian backers were weakened by the war in Lebanon and the Israeli retaliations [against direct rocket attacks by Iran in April and October]. Now that [US President-elect Donald] Trump is coming into office, Iran is not really prepared to support its allies in the region.

Syrians celebrate the arrival of opposition fighters as they step on a picture of Syrian President Bashar Assad in Damascus, Syria, December 8, 2024. (Omar Sanadiki/AP)

The Russians were not surprised either. It appears that there was a prior strategic coordination with rebel forces to bring about a deep change in Syrian politics, remove Assad and rebuild Syria with Russian support, to make it moderate, democratic and hopefully to become part of the regional normalization process with Israel.

Who do you think led this coordination?

The US Republicans are preparing their return to office in January and they have already laid down their plan for the Middle East. According to my understanding, Trump will focus on the Pacific region, China, and the global economy, but first and foremost on American domestic affairs.

So the incoming administration has a plan to deal with the Middle East before Trump comes into office, and that includes a retreat of Iranian forces from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

Then-president Donald Trump shows a map of Syria and Iraq showing the presence of the Islamic State in Syria in 2017 and 2019, as he speaks to reporters before leaving the White House in Washington, Wednesday, March 20, 2019. (AP/Manuel Balce Ceneta)

Trump has given the Biden administration the opportunity to end the Lebanon war and record it as its historic achievement. But the future of Syria will be an issue for the next administration.

I think this strategy for Syria has been designed and coordinated by the Trump team with the Russians – there is presumably a hidden deal between the Republicans and Putin to wrap up the war in Ukraine and sign a ceasefire deal that will grant some territorial gains for Russia. In return, Moscow will be allowed to preserve its foothold in Syria.

At the same time, America will maintain its military presence in the semi-autonomous state in eastern Syria under the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.

Assuming your assessment is correct, how do you envision the future Syria?

Inside Syria, everyone is imagining the future differently, but looking from here at a distance, we can already see that the country is already divided into four cantons. The next step is to make this division official.

The central government will remain in Damascus. The Russians could retain control over the capital, and the center of the country as well as the coastal area [Assad’s Alawite heartland, where the Russian military bases are located], and the Homs corridor linking those two.

Col. (res) Anan Wahabi, a research scholar in International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), and a lecturer in School of Political Sciences in Haifa University, 2024 (courtesy)

In the northwest, there can be a Sunni substate under Turkish influence centered around Idlib and Aleppo, and including border regions which are already under Turkish control, possibly extending to Hama further to the south.

In the northeast, there is already a Kurdish canton supported by the US. That area is very rich in oil and in agriculture. It’s very important for the Syrian economy.

In the far south, in the area around the city of Suweida, there can be a Druze canton. This is a triangle region on the borders with Israel and Jordan, and there are already ideas on the table for its economic development – for instance a train line to Haifa, a water desalinization plant built with Israeli technology, whose water can be used for agricultural development thanks to Israeli know-how.

Supporting the economy in that triangle area would also bring great benefits to Jordan. This is a plan that the Americans and Europeans can get behind.

So we’re talking about four substates, which will be part of Syria but will remain autonomous. The modern nation-state has failed in the Middle East, and all those diverse communities could not really live together in one national state.

A damaged portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad hangs in the city of Qamishli, as Syrian Kurds celebrate the fall of capital Damascus to anti-government fighters on December 8, 2024. (Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP)

How would Turkey, which backs the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham rebel force that beat back Assad but also opposes Kurdish independence, feel about another Kurdish semi-state along its borders in Syria, after Iraq?

Turkey will try and push back on the plan of the Kurds, but for now, it is more important for Ankara to cut [off] the Iranian axis in the region.

Turkey also knows that Arabs in the area don’t like its interference – there have been critical talks among Arabs of a Turkish sultan coming to reoccupy Syria.

There is mistrust of the Turks, and the Turks understand that their influence is limited. Therefore they will concentrate on the northern side of Syria, the area along their border that is closest to their domestic interests.

What about Iran? The Syrian uprising has been a huge blow for Tehran’s axis in the region and the Iranian regime is getting jittery. After the collapse of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Assad, it seems logical that Tehran will be next in line. The development of its nuclear program could be used to justify an attack on its nuclear installations.

Yes, I think that reading is correct. When Israel struck Iran’s aerial defense systems in October, it was a retaliation [against Iran’s ballistic missile attack on October 1], but also a preparation for the next stage of the war. So yes, Iran is under threat.

In my assessment, military action against Iran will lead to political change – we will see the same play out in Lebanon as well.

Little by little, Hezbollah is going to lay down its weapons and integrate into the Lebanese state and will participate in the reconstruction of Lebanon. It is already part of the Lebanese state and the government. Eventually, it will abandon its strategy of liberating [Jerusalem]. And then later on Lebanon will be part of the normalization deal with Israel, just like Syria.

Are the Druze in Syria, who largely backed Assad, concerned today about the country being run by a radical Islamist group such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which could persecute religious minorities?

Yes, of course there is concern that the future government will be influenced by radicals. But we hear voices from the opposition saying that the Islamist groups will not be part of the next government, and that rebels intend to rebuild the country as a democratic one, not replace an authoritarian regime with Islamists.

If we look back at the history of Syria, we see that Syrians are much more free and liberal than Islamists. Syria has historically been a diverse country with many ethnic groups. This multiculturalism can be the wealth of Syrian society once again, and ensure that the next state will be democratic and liberal.

A semi-independent Druze state existed around the Suwayda area from 1921 to 1936. What would it mean for you as a Druze Israeli to see the Druze in Syria re-create their own semi-autonomous state?

Over the past 76 years, the Druze in Israel have become Israelis; we feel we belong to the State of Israel. And we are very beneficial to the Zionist Jewish state. We understand the culture and language of the Middle East and bring great contributions in diplomacy, in intelligence, and for Israel’s integration in the region.

If there will be an opportunity to build a Druze state, I would take part in that process, but eventually, I would come back here again to die as an Israeli.

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