Analysis

As terrorists go free, Israel debates keeping enemies close or sending them far away

History shows dangers and possible benefits of setting killers loose in West Bank or Gaza, but also points to risks that come with exiling terror leaders beyond Israel’s reach

An Israeli protester holds a sign with bloody hands and Hebrew writing that reads, 'prison release form,' during a demonstration against a proposed release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails, outside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office in Jerusalem, July 28, 2013. (AP Photo/Sebastian Scheiner)
An Israeli protester holds a sign with bloody hands and Hebrew writing that reads, 'prison release form,' during a demonstration against a proposed release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails, outside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office in Jerusalem, July 28, 2013. (AP Photo/Sebastian Scheiner)

Recent polling conducted before the clinching of a hostage release and ceasefire agreement with Hamas this month found consistently high levels of support for an agreement that would free captives stuck in Gaza for over 15 months, even if many Israelis disagreed over the exact contours of the truce or what concessions should be on the table.

Earlier surveys conducted over the course of the war had shown significantly lower levels of support, indicating impatience had grown over the fate of the hostages and exhaustion with the war and with the mounting death toll among Israeli soldiers still fighting in the Strip.

Hostage release deals provide a hurting nation with a sense of elation at the sight of the emotional reunions between the hostages and their families. That collective euphoria can be fleeting, though, as the realization of the price paid begins to sink in.

For Israel, that price includes nearly 2,000 Palestinian inmates to be released for the first 33 hostages alone, with more expected to be released in exchange for the remaining hostages in the second and third stages of the agreement.

Among those who will walk free are several Palestinian terrorists serving multiple life sentences for murder — the “heavies” in Israeli parlance.

Israel had little choice but to agree to the terms of the agreement if it wanted to recover the 97 hostages in Gaza at the time of the deal’s signing, including at least 35 bodies. While a handful were rescued by Israeli commandos, military officials had made clear that future attempts would be nearly impossible and endanger the lives of the hostages, whose conditions are deteriorating.

However, Israel does have choices to make regarding how best to ensure the worst released terrorists are unable to repeat their deadly attacks. One of the choices is whether the freed murderers are authorized to live in the West Bank or Gaza or exiled outside the region once released.

Within the Shin Bet security service, opinions remain divided.

Hamas terror group leader Ismail Haniyeh kisses freed prisoner Yahya Sinwar, a founder of Hamas’s military wing, as Hamas supporters celebrate the release of hundreds of prisoners following a swap with kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, on October 21, 2011 in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip. (Abed Rahim Khatib / Flash 90)

Israel has demanded that the most prominent murderers — those deemed certain to return to terrorist activity — be deported outside the region

However, some hold the view that it would be preferable to release them to the West Bank, where Israel has full operational freedom and can reach them immediately and relatively easily.

Sadly, Israel has experience to draw on.

Dangers near and far

In 2011, when Israel released 1,027 prisoners for captured soldier Gilad Shalit, it allowed many of them to return to the West Bank. According to Israel, some resumed terror activities, taking advantage of their easy access to Israeli targets.

But three years later, when Israel launched a major crackdown on Hamas following the abduction and murder of Israeli teenagers Gil-ad Shaer, Naftali Fraenkel and Eyal Yifrach, it was able to quickly rearrest many of them.

The seeds of that deadly kidnapping can be traced to another released Palestinian prisoner, Saleh al-Arouri, who was let out of prison in 2010 and exiled abroad.

Working from his new home in Turkey, and later Lebanon, Arouri established Hamas’s “West Bank headquarters,” an operational hub that orchestrated dozens of attacks, including the June 2014 kidnapping of the three teenagers, which led to the 2014 war in Gaza.

Israeli soldiers from a special army unit take part in a search operation for three Israeli teenagers on June 17, 2014 in the West Bank town of Hebron. (photo credit: AFP/MENAHEM KAHANA)

Arouri was also a key figure in building up Hamas’s armed wing in Gaza, leveraging his ties with Iran and Hezbollah.

In Lebanon, he helped establish a Hamas foothold with the tacit approval of Hezbollah, which was able to draw on Palestinian operatives from refugee camps in Tyre as proxies.

A barrage of dozens of rockets fired at Israel in April 2023 was a show of Hamas’s capability and willingness to open another front against Israel under Hezbollah’s watchful eye.

Israel assassinated Arouri in Beirut in early January 2024, but decision-makers initially balked at attacking the senior Hamas figure due to fears of how Hezbollah would respond, underlining the downstream complexities that can arise from deporting terror leaders.

Hamas members carry the coffin of Saleh al-Arouri, one of the top Hamas terror group commanders, who was killed in an apparent Israeli strike Tuesday, during his funeral in Beirut, Lebanon, Jan. 4, 2024. (AP/Hussein Malla)

Neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority have disclosed what countries could take in the high-profile prisoners who are deported. Where they end up will determine how Israel may deal with them if and when these deportees return to terrorist activities. Turkey and Qatar are off-limits for Israeli operations, while actions in other countries would depend on political circumstances and operational opportunities.

In Lebanon, for instance, Israel has retained a policy of taking action against any emerging threat, even after agreeing to a ceasefire with Hezbollah in November.

Jerusalem has insisted on applying the same to Gaza following the war and Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to assert that both former US president Joe Biden and current president Donald Trump have promised to back Israel should it return to fighting.

Israel could decide to deport some of these terrorists to Gaza. That is where many of those released in the Shalit deal ended up, including Yahya Sinwar, the late Hamas leader who masterminded the October 7 massacre.

The Gaza challenge

Beyond attempting to ensure that it does not free the next Sinwar into the fecund terror environment of Gaza, Israel is also focusing on the interim goal of preventing Hamas from rebuilding its military capabilities to a level that poses a renewed threat.

Israeli soldiers patrol along the Philadelphi Corridor in the Gaza Strip on September 13, 2024. (Sharon ARONOWICZ / AFP)

This can only be achieved through the tightest possible closure of smuggling routes from Egypt — a matter currently at the heart of Israeli-Egyptian negotiations in Cairo.

It’s unclear whether a proposal for a new border crossing at the Gaza-Egypt-Israel border triangle remains in play. The idea had been pushed by former defense minister Yoav Gallant, who envisioned the site being monitored by Israel, Egypt and international actors.

Israeli officials emphasize that they have not abandoned the war’s primary objective: preventing Hamas from retaining any governmental or military control. It remains an open question who could take its place, though.

Meanwhile, new challenges are being created with the looming influx of hundreds of terror convicts into the West Bank, administered by a weakened and financially drained PA.

One of Israel’s key achievements in the war has been maintaining relative stability in the West Bank, continuing security coordination with Palestinian security forces, and preventing the eruption of another front. Nonetheless, Hamas still views the West Bank as a place where it can operate with relative ease, and Israel knows it.

Palestinian security forces patrol in the center of the city of Jenin in the West Bank, December 16, 2024. (Nasser Ishtayeh/Flash90)

Both Israel and the PA would like to clamp down on Hamas. But while the PA wants to act, it lacks the capability, thus raising major doubts about its ability to govern Gaza.

In the absence of an alternative, Hamas will fill the power vacuum. On Sunday, when transferring the three freed hostages to the Red Cross, Hamas demonstrated that it still maintains some control over Gaza’s streets — a grip that is liable to strengthen as calm there persists.

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