The Israel Defense Forces publishes its final findings of a probe into the mistaken killing of three Israeli hostages by troops in Gaza City’s Shejaiya neighborhood earlier this month, saying forces on the ground did not have “sufficient awareness” of the possibility that troops would encounter Hamas-held captives in a situation that was not a special operation to rescue them, despite the army having intelligence of possible hostages in the area.
The three hostages killed by troops were Yotam Haim, Samar Talalka and Alon Lulu Shamriz.
The probe found that on December 15, during “intense fighting” in Shejaiya, a soldier of the Bislamach Brigade’s 17th Battalion opened fire at three figures he had wrongly identified as a threat, killing two, while the third fled to a nearby building.
Commanders at the scene called on the soldiers to cease their fire in order for the third figure to be identified. Some 15 minutes later, the battalion commander heard someone shouting from the building “Help” and “They are shooting at me” in Hebrew, and again ordered troops to halt their fire, while shouting back at the figure “Come my way.”
The third man came out of the building toward the troops, but two soldiers who, according to the probe, did not hear the commander’s order due to noise from a nearby tank, shot and killed the hostage.
The IDF says that based on its analysis and aerial footage, the three hostages were shirtless and one was waving a makeshift white flag as they initially approached the forces. The probe says the position from which the first soldier opened fire at the hostages gave him limited vision of the trio.
After the gunfire, commanders at the scene suspected the men were hostages and their bodies were taken to Israel for identification.
(From L-R) Hostages Yotam Haim, Samar Talalka and Alon Lulu Shamriz, who were killed mistakenly by IDF troops in Gaza on December 15, 2023. (Courtesy)
Before the incident, on December 10, the IDF says troops found a note next to a tunnel shaft in Shejaiya, reading “Help” in Hebrew. It says that next to the note was an ID card belonging to a Hamas operative. The note was taken for examination, but the probe says there was no information linking it to the presence of hostages in the Shejaiya area, and troops assessed it was an attempt by Hamas to lure them into an ambush.
Also on December 10, troops of the Golani Brigade’s reconnaissance unit operating in Shejaiya raided several buildings to locate Hamas gunmen and weapons. In one building the troops breached, a dog of Oketz canine unit was sent inside, following which a gun battle broke out between Hamas operatives and the Golani soldiers.
The Golani troops returned fire, killing at least one Hamas gunman. The Oketz dog was also killed in the battle.
Amid the fighting, Golani commanders heard shouting of “Help” and “Hostages” in Hebrew from the building, but the troops assessed it was an attempt by Hamas to lure them into an ambush.
Combat engineers with the Golani force also suspected the building was booby-trapped, and the troops did not enter further into the building.
“Some of the forces heard the cries but suspected it was an attempt by the terrorists to draw the forces inside the building to harm them, as had happened in the past,” the probe says.
This infographic published by the IDF on December 28, 2023, details the locations of an incident in Gaza City’s Shejaiya neighborhood where three hostages were killed by troops (Israel Defense Forces)
The IDF says the forces left the building and directed an attack helicopter and tanks to strike the building. In the strikes, at least five Hamas operatives were believed to have been killed.
Only on December 18, when troops scanned the building where the gun battle took place and recovered the camera on the Oketz dog, did the military find that it had recorded the three hostages’ cries for help. The three were not seen in the video, only heard.
“At the end of the battle, after the terrorists holding the hostages were killed, the hostages likely fled the building,” the probe says.
On December 14, a day before the shooting, signs written in Hebrew reading “SOS” and “Help, 3 hostages” on the side of a building around 200 meters from where the incident took place, were identified in drone footage. “Near the building, blue barrels commonly found in rigged areas, which the forces encountered in the Shejaiya area, were spotted, thus it was suspected as a trap,” the probe says.
The IDF says the investigation reveals that commanders involved had information about the presence of Israeli hostages in the Shejaiya area, “and even took actions to prevent strikes on locations suspected of having hostages inside.”
“In this case, there was no intelligence about either building where the hostages were in. Also, as part of the assessments on the issue, special forces brigades were prepared in every combat zone, immediately available for intervention in case a force identified a building with hostages inside,” it says.
The probe adds that “there was insufficient awareness among the forces in the field in the case of hostages reaching IDF forces, or when the forces would encounter hostages during the clearing of buildings as part of combat and not as part of a special operation to free hostages.”
This infographic published by the IDF on December 28, 2023, details the locations of an incident in Gaza City’s Shejaiya neighborhood where three hostages were killed by troops (Israel Defense Forces)
“IDF soldiers involved in the incident experienced complex combat situations in the days preceding the incident and were in a state of high alert for a threat. During the battles, they encountered deceptions by the enemy and attempts to draw them into shafts and buildings rigged with explosives,” the probe concludes.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi in a statement says the shooting of Haim, Talaka and Shamriz, is a “difficult event with very difficult outcomes. The IDF failed in its mission to rescue the hostages in this event.”
“The entire chain of command feels responsible for this difficult event, regrets this outcome, and shares in the grief of the families of the three hostages,” Halevi says in his conclusion of the probe.
Halevi says the shooting of the hostages “could have been prevented” but that “there was no malice in the event, and the soldiers carried out the right action to the best of their understanding of the event at that moment.”
“The shooting at the hostages should not have occurred, this shooting did not match up to the risk and the situation. However, it was carried out under complex circumstances, and in intense combat conditions under a prolonged threat,” he says.
The chief of staff also “emphasized the utmost importance of adhering to standard operating procedures.”
“In a situation where there is no immediate threat and the identification is not a clear enemy, there is a need for a moment of examination before firing, given the opportunity. This action is necessary to prevent, among other things, incidents of our forces firing at our forces. In this case, the three hostages were not moving threateningly and held up a white flag; therefore, it was right to confirm the identification before firing. The pressurized conditions and operational environment made it difficult for the soldiers to implement these aspects,” Halevi says.
“We, the commanders, must ensure that the operational instructions are clear, and that the operation of the forces in the field weighs additional aspects, which are expressed in the application of the soldiers’ and commanders’ discretion in the field. The standard operating procedures are necessary, and they are also intended to protect us, so that we do not kill our own forces. They set and impact fateful decisions, as happened in this event,” he adds.
Halevi also instructs all commanders to review the probe and raise the awareness of hostages among their forces, including possible locations, their photographs, and other various findings about them.
The probe was also shared with the families of Haim, Talaka and Shamriz, the IDF says.