Independent commission: Multiple IDF chiefs share responsibility for failing to prevent Oct. 7

Sam Sokol is the Times of Israel's political correspondent. He was previously a reporter for the Jerusalem Post, Jewish Telegraphic Agency and Haaretz. He is the author of "Putin’s Hybrid War and the Jews"

Military chief Aviv Kohavi (right), Defense Minister Benny Gantz (center), and Shin Bet head Ronen Bar hold an assessment at the IDF's Southern Command HQ in Beersheba, August 5, 2022. (Ariel Hermoni/Defense Ministry)
Military chief Aviv Kohavi (right), Defense Minister Benny Gantz (center), and Shin Bet head Ronen Bar hold an assessment at the IDF's Southern Command HQ in Beersheba, August 5, 2022. (Ariel Hermoni/Defense Ministry)

According to the findings of the Independent Civilian Commission of Inquiry investigating October 7, multiple IDF chiefs of staff over the past decade, including Benny Gantz, share responsibility for failing to prevent Hamas’s brutal attack.

The commission blames the former defense leadership for advancing the concept of a smaller army “with excessive reliance on technology,” also castigating recently ousted defense minister Yoav Gallant, IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi and other recent and current defense officials for reducing Israeli forces along the Gaza frontier as well as “for the lack of readiness of soldiers at the various bases in the Southern Command and for abandoning the female field observers to their fates on October 7.”

The IDF leadership was also responsible for “ignoring all warning lights; disregarding the warnings of the field observers; the lack of response to the many failures that emerged in the field; and the prevailing lawless atmosphere in the communities surrounding Gaza,” the commission states.

In addition to failing to act on Hamas attack plans obtained in advance, the IDF leadership failed to adequately heed warnings on the evening of October 6 and the morning of October 7 and is responsible “for not immediately conveying the warning to commanders and soldiers in the field so that they could at least prepare themselves.”

According to the commission, the IDF’s Southern Command and the Gaza Division “failed miserably, to the point of collapse of all defense systems, as soldiers in the field were left to their own devices with no reinforcements arriving for many hours.”

“This way, the command echelon failed not only in intelligence and alertness, but also in its planning and readiness for a rapid response to terrorist incidents,” it states.

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