Against core principles, Israel is leaning on reservists to fight its forever war

Wars must end quickly.

This principle guided Israel’s founders as they developed a military concept for the fledgling state.

Facing a massive and insurmountable demographic imbalance against its Arab adversaries, Israel could only hope to defeat enemy coalitions by mobilizing its society. Reservists, who made up the preponderance of the IDF and without whom offensive maneuver was not possible, would be pulled away from businesses, schools, and families to quickly defeat Arab armies, then return home to restart the economy as rapidly as possible.

Long wars would cost more in casualties, damage the economy, strain family life, allow foreign powers to influence the outcome of the war, and result in growing international campaigns against the Jewish state.

In order to shorten wars, Israel built a highly mobile ground force designed to rapidly and decisively defeat Arab armies. This approach proved itself in the capture of the Sinai peninsula in a week in 1956; the Sinai, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights in 6 days in 1967; and recovering from an atrocious opening act to threaten Damascus and surround the invading Egyptian army in less than 3 weeks in 1973.

Israel began moving away from that imperative as it occupied southern Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s, and as it fought terror in the West Bank. But even in those counterterrorism and counterguerrilla operations — which by their very nature take time — reservist call-ups were limited in time and scale.

The IDF also moved away from a reliance on its ground forces as the key to victory, and instead shifted its focus and resources toward intelligence and the air force. Reserve infantry and armor units were seen as irrelevant wastes of limited resources. Training was rare and formations were mothballed.

That all changed, of course, with the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023. Israel suddenly needed ground forces, and a lot of them. It called up some 300,000 reservists to Gaza and the northern border, who showed up at their bases without being called and served enthusiastically in the opening months of the war. It also dusted off armored and infantry units and sent them into battle.

There would be no speedy victory, however. It wasn’t that Hamas put up an especially effective defense. Rather, Israel didn’t seem like it was in a particular hurry. It took three weeks just to initiate the invasion of Gaza, then a ceasefire to release hostages in late November stopped the operation for a week.

Even without the truce, Israel took its time. With inadequate intelligence on Hamas and the Gaza Strip, and a lack of confidence in its ability to dust off its ground maneuver capabilities, the IDF moved slowly. It used massive firepower to protect its forces, which advanced only as fast as its bulldozers could clear routes.

And Israel didn’t attack in multiple sectors simultaneously, as military doctrine would anticipate. It started with Gaza City, then shifted to Khan Younis in December, and — faced with threats from the US Biden administration — only began its Rafah operation in May.

Despite promises from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the country was only a “step away from victory,” that victory proved elusive. Reservists were released, then called back up weeks later. But hostages remained in tunnels, and Hamas, though battered, remained in the fight.

While tens of thousands of reservists were fighting in Gaza, similar numbers were deployed to the northern border as Hezbollah fired into Israeli towns for nearly a year.

A dramatic change occurred in September of last year. Weeks after a rocket attack that killed 12 children on the Golan Heights, and under growing political pressure to find a way to allow residents of northern Israel to return to their homes, Netanyahu decided to move ahead with a bold operation that saw thousands of Hezbollah pagers and walkie-talkies detonate. Airstrikes followed, killing Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, his replacement, and other senior military leaders.

Then, in early October, the ground forces — including many reserve units — pushed into southern Lebanon. The operation ended with Hezbollah agreeing to a ceasefire that amounted to a capitulation by the Shiite group.

Israel’s victory in Lebanon paved the way for the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria. IDF forces moved into a buffer zone inside Syria, which they continue to hold.

No end in sight

Despite the successes in the north, the war drags on there, and in Gaza.

To pressure Hamas to accept its terms for a new hostage release deal in Gaza, Israel embarked on an expanding ground campaign in March. But Hamas wouldn’t budge.

Over the weekend, the IDF said it would be calling up tens of thousands of reservists to add to the pressure on Hamas. And in a meeting on Sunday, the security cabinet approved IDF plans to conquer Gaza and hold it.

Some reserve units will be showing up for their sixth or even seventh rounds of duty.

And Israel isn’t showing signs that it wants to move beyond the other conflicts. Quite the opposite.

Hezbollah in Lebanon wants no part of the fighting for the foreseeable future, and the new Syrian government has no desire or capacity to take on Israel in any way. Yet IDF troops remain in Lebanon, and Israel continues to carry out airstrikes deep inside the country.

In Syria, Israel is clearly spoiling for a fight. It warned the new government that it would fire on government troops if they deployed south of Damascus. Jerusalem is also embracing the role of defender of Syria’s Druze community, and carries out airstrikes to punish the Ahmed al-Sharaa government when Druze are harmed.

That commitment, predictably, is only expanding. Israel has reportedly begun flying aid directly to communities deep inside Syria, IDF generals have met with Druze leaders in Syrian territory, and Syrian clerics have crossed into Israel.

And Israel is determined to convince Western allies not to grant legitimacy to the new government or relieve sanctions. It wants a weak central government, a de facto — or even de jure — Druze autonomy near the Golan border, and freedom of action to operate against emerging threats.

Reservists worn down; Haredim needed

The IDF seems like it fully recognizes the problem. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir reportedly warned the political leadership that the military doesn’t have combat manpower to meet all of the government’s goals, and that the reserve force is worn down.

The declining numbers of reservists reporting for duty is no secret. WhatsApp groups are full of posts from reservist units looking for more soldiers, even for one-time deployments. One reserve paratrooper brigade is short some 200 men.  The fewer soldiers a unit has, the more difficult every deployment for those who show up, which wears them down even further.

None of that means that the decision to adopt an aggressive posture in the north, or to go back to major combat operations in Gaza, is the wrong call. Israel’s enemies are demoralized and disorganized in Lebanon and Syria, and Jerusalem is doing what it can to fundamentally change the reality in the north to guarantee long-term security for border communities.

Israel has been trying for months to get Hamas to agree to release more living hostages without allowing the terror group to survive as a coherent power in Gaza, but Hamas continues to refuse. A major military campaign might be the only thing that forces Hamas to give up most of the remaining hostages it holds.

Yet the government refuses to take the decision that the situation is unequivocally pointing toward. The obvious untapped reservoir of available manpower, the Haredi community, continues to avoid conscription.

Recent IDF figures show that out of 18,915 Haredi men issued conscription orders during the current enlistment cycle, only 232 have joined the army. Just over 1,800 Haredim have enlisted in the IDF since last summer, far fewer than the military’s goal of 4,800.

Not only are Haredi men avoiding draft orders, but ultra-Orthodox factions affiliated with government ministers have established hotlines helping potential draftees avoid conscription. Thus far, the police and the attorney general have failed to crack down on the groups.

Reservists will show up in sufficient numbers for the Gaza operation, and wherever they are needed. But they already recognize that the current system is not sustainable. At some point, patriotism and camaraderie will be overtaken by a sense that they are being taken advantage of in order to enable governing coalitions to remain in power.

An election looms in 2026, if not before. The fighting might be done by then, but it is conceivable that the war will drag on. In the past, Haredi exemptions didn’t play a meaningful role in election outcomes. However, with hundreds of thousands of reservists being leaned on in an unprecedented fashion, their sense that there is a fundamental injustice at play could create a new political reality.