Full text of inquiry’s findings on officials’ responsibility for 2021 Meron disaster
Commission finds Netanyahu ‘personally responsible’ for crush at shrine in which 45 men and boys were killed, but declines to make operational recommendations against him
The following document produced by the state commission of inquiry into the Meron disaster is a summary of its conclusions regarding the personal responsibility of the officials who were investigated:
Benjamin Netanyahu, prime minister
The committee holds Netanyahu personally responsible. Considering that the role of prime minister is in essence an elected position with unique characteristics, the committee decided not to make any operative recommendations regarding Netanyahu.
Amir Ohana, public security minister at the time of the disaster
The committee holds Ohana personally responsible and recommended that he not be given the position of public security minister again in the future.
Yaakov Avitan, religious services minister at the time of the disaster
The committee holds Avitan personally responsible and recommended, given the findings regarding his conduct, that he not be appointed as a minister again in the future.
Israel Police Commissioner Kobi Shabtai
The committee holds Shabtai personally responsible. The committee noted on January 17 that Shabtai’s term was extended by six months because of the war. It also stated that the findings regarding Shabtai would have led it to recommend he be removed from the position, but considering the special circumstances, it will leave it to the government to set the appropriate time for him to end his term.
Shimon Lavi, Israel Police northern district commander during the disaster
The committee holds Lavi personally responsible. It noted that Lavi took responsibility immediately after the incident and drew his own conclusions later, resigning from his position. For this reason, the committee concluded that Lavi conducted himself in a way that was fitting for a commander and in keeping with the force’s commanding values.
The committee noted that Lavi has not served in the police since June 30, 2023. Considering this, the committee decided to suffice with presenting its findings and conclusions regarding his conduct.
Assistant Commissioner Shalom Avitan, commander of the police’s Amakim area at the time of the disaster
The committee holds Avitan personally responsible and noted that the findings regarding his conduct would have led it to recommend that he no longer serve as commander of Amakim, but that this would be redundant as he has resigned from the police force.
Assistant Commissioner Morris Chen, head of Israel Police’s security and licensing department at the time of the disaster
The committee holds Chen personally responsible and recommended that the findings and conclusions regarding his conduct be considered in future considerations on promoting him or appointing him to future positions in the police.
Chief Superintendent Asaf Manzour, Nof Hagalil Police Station commander at the time of the disaster
The committee holds Manzour personally responsible and noted that it would have recommended removing him from his position as commander of the police station, but that the recommendation would be redundant following his resignation from the police.
Superintendent Shmuel Piamenta, head of the Northern District’s Security and Licensing Division
The committee holds Piamenta personally responsible and concluded that the findings regarding his conduct were particularly severe. The committee recommended that Piamenta leave the police force and not be hired in any position connected to Mount Meron and the Lag B’Omer events in the future. The committee also recommended that the attorney general explain the findings about the licensing for the event and expand on how to continue the investigation on the subject.
Chief Inspector Asaf Shayach, intelligence and detective officer at Nof Hagalil station at the time of the disaster
The committee holds Shayach personally responsible. Since the event, Shayach has been promoted to superintendent, and the committee recommended he not be promoted in rank or position for four years from the release of the report and that every decision regarding a promotion after that time be made in consideration of the findings and conclusions about his conduct.
Amit Sofer, head of the Merom HaGalil Regional Council
The committee holds Sofer personally responsible and concluded that the findings regarding his conduct were particularly severe. Since he is an elected official, the committee decided not to make an operative recommendation about him and leave the matter to his conscience and public opinion.
Oded Plus, director-general of the Religious Services Ministry at the time of the disaster
Considering the circumstances and the appropriate balance between the steps Plus took regarding the site that led to improvements and the issues that remain, and per the method that states that in situations where there are real doubts that can lead to unjust damage to Plus, the doubt will be to his benefit, the committee decided not to hold Plus responsible.
Rabbi Yosef Shvinger, CEO of the National Center for Development of Holy Sites
The committee decided to hold Shvinger personally responsible and concluded that the findings regarding his conduct were particularly severe. The committee recommended that Shvinger be immediately removed from his position and that he not hold another position related to Mount Meron or the Lag B’Omer events in the future.
Rabbi Shmuel Rabinowitz, chairman of the Hamisha Committee
Considering the circumstances under which he acted and the actions Rabinowitz took to improve the situation and per the method that states that in situations where there are real doubts that can lead to unjust damage to Rabinowitz, the doubt will be to his benefit, the committee decided not to hold Rabinowitz personally responsible.
Inaj Amer Khalilia, 2021 Lag B’Omer event security engineer
The committee holds Khalilia personally responsible and concluded that the findings about his conduct are particularly severe. The committee recommended that he not be allowed to hold a position as a security engineer or security consultant in the future and that the Registration of Engineers and Architects reconsider his continued eligibility for his engineering license. It also recommended that the attorney general explain the findings about Khalilia’s conduct and address the question of renewing the criminal investigation into him.
Reuven Ben Gal, 2021 Lag B’Omer head of security
The committee holds Ben Gal personally responsible and recommended that he be not allowed to manage security for large events in the future. The committee also recommended that the attorney general explain the findings about civil security and consider how to proceed with investigations into Ben Gal’s conduct.
Shimon Malka, security manager at 2021 Lag B’Omer event
The committee holds Malka personally responsible and recommended that he be unable to manage security for large events in the future. The committee also recommended that the attorney general explain the findings about civil security and consider how to proceed with investigations into Malka’s conduct.
Meir Karlibach, acting manager of Hachnasat Orchim Rashbi Association
The committee holds Karlibach personally responsible as the association’s acting head. Considering his health, and assuming he won’t be active anymore at the Rashbi’s grave, the committee made no recommendation about him.
