Haredi draft is no longer a mere political issue: The IDF’s readiness depends on it
Over the past year, the outgoing head of the Personnel Directorate devoted most of his time to quiet diplomacy with rabbis in the ultra-Orthodox community. It didn’t work
After nearly five years as head of the IDF’s Personnel Directorate, Maj. Gen. Yaniv Asor will soon step down from the role and await the next round of appointments in the General Staff. Asor holds a significant advantage over many other generals: While he has been part of the General Staff for several years, he was not directly involved in operational decisions prior to the October 7 Hamas invasion and massacre.
Asor, who went up the army ladder in the Golani Brigade, had long been on the operational front lines, however, commanding the 51st Battalion, the Egoz Unit, Golani Brigade and the Golan Heights Division. Stories abound from his days as a young company commander during the 1990s in the South Lebanon security zone, where he reportedly knew every valley and hill better than many of the intelligence officers in the command.
He commanded the 51st Battalion during the fierce 2006 battle in the town of Bint Jbeil in South Lebanon, where his deputy, Major Roi Klein, famously jumped on a grenade to save his soldiers and was killed.
That battle, one of the most grueling in the Second Lebanon War, with eight soldiers killed and dozens wounded, remains etched in Asor’s memory. Hezbollah was well-prepared in the town, and Golani forces found themselves caught in a planned ambush and at a severe disadvantage. Under those conditions, evacuation of the wounded was impossible, and some succumbed to their injuries. Asor has carried that with him ever since.
His tenure as head of the Personnel Directorate has been the longest he has spent in a single role and his first outside the operational sphere. Not that this is a bad thing; it appears to have given him a different perspective on the army — or more precisely, on what it should look like after the current war ends.
Over the past year, Asor has maintained a measured tone in conversations with colleagues and friends, but between the lines, there has been discernible criticism and disappointment regarding the lack of understanding in the political echelon and government bureaucracy of the military’s needs.
Filling the ranks
Asor’s primary task this past year was, unsurprisingly, filling the ranks.
The IDF is currently short nearly 20% of its combat forces, a figure expected to increase by another 5% in the next few years. In simple terms, the military is now scraping together combat personnel from every possible source — including the recall of tens of thousands of reservists previously discharged due to their age. But that isn’t enough.
The IDF finds itself in a prolonged war on multiple fronts, which is exhausting its regular and reserve combat forces, while also facing a political environment that stymies efforts to expand its numbers by drafting from the ultra-Orthodox communities.
The IDF finds itself in a prolonged war on multiple fronts while also facing a political environment that stymies its efforts to expand its numbers by drafting from the ultra-Orthodox communities.
In the meantime, it is seeking to partially bridge the gap by extending mandatory service to 36 months. However, this emergency measure is being held up by Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Chairman MK Yuli Edelstein, who explains his hesitation as a matter of fairness: he does not want to place a heavier burden on the serving population without addressing the conscription law for the ultra-Orthodox. This seems logical and just, but in the meantime, IDF ranks continue to dwindle.
Over the past year, Asor met several times with prominent rabbis in the ultra-Orthodox community, which seems to have convinced him to prefer a soft, inclusive approach — attempting to increase recruitment through dialogue rather than coercion. In closed forums, he has said, “Respect is needed; don’t storm in. Bring them in not by force. The war has sparked solidarity in this community.”
His successor, Maj. Gen. Dado Bar Kalifa, hails from the national-religious camp. It will be interesting to see how he approaches the growing divide between religious Zionists and ultra-Orthodox Jews regarding military service versus Torah study.
Modest goals
Starting this week, the IDF will gradually issue 7,000 draft orders to ultra-Orthodox men aged 18 to 26. Why 7,000? Because in the previous round, when 3,000 orders were issued, the army fell far short of its target, with only 120 ultra-Orthodox men reporting for duty. The hope, albeit slim, is that increasing the number of orders will improve enlistment rates.
Related: First 1,000 of 7,000 new ultra-Orthodox draft orders sent out
It’s worth noting that the decision to issue 7,000 draft orders was made by outgoing defense minister Yoav Gallant, who was seen by the ultra-Orthodox as confrontational. This fueled pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to replace him.
It was clear that with the resolute Gallant, Netanyahu would struggle to secure ultra-Orthodox support for the state budget without a conscription law that meets their demands. And without a state budget, the Knesset automatically disassembles and new elections are declared — the last thing Netanyahu wants.
Gallant’s decision to issue these 7,000 draft orders faced sharp criticism within his own party, Likud, but it was not rescinded by incoming Defense Minister Israel Katz. Katz has hinted that while he won’t cancel the move, he might water it down to avoid upsetting the ultra-Orthodox coalition partners, Aryeh Deri’s Shas and Yitzhak Goldknopf’s United Torah Judaism.
As if in a parallel universe, the IDF recently presented to the government its updated personnel figures from the latest conflict. The bottom line is clear: the IDF must grow, which means significant budget increases. For now, discussions focus on principles rather than numbers, and the Finance Ministry has yet to weigh in.
But the IDF has no choice: It is moving forward with its plans, regardless of what the government decides. The establishment of an ultra-Orthodox brigade has already begun, independent of the numbers that will be dictated by political deals in the coming weeks.
Numerically, the IDF is modestly aiming for the enlistment of 4,800 ultra-Orthodox men in 2025, most of them for combat roles. In the coming years, the army’s ground forces will need 7,500 new combat soldiers annually, in addition to 2,500 combat support personnel.
In the coming years, the army’s ground forces will need 7,500 new combat soldiers annually, in addition to 2,500 combat support personnel
In total, this translates to an increase of 10,000 soldiers per year over the next five years — just to meet current standards and missions. The current recruitment pool has been exhausted, even assuming the 36-month service extension is ultimately approved by the Knesset.
The bottom line is that the gap must be filled by ultra-Orthodox recruits. Without them, the day is fast approaching when the IDF will have to announce a decline in its readiness — not due to conscientious objectors but because of officially sanctioned draft dodgers.
Translated and edited from the original Hebrew on ToI’s sister site Zman Yisrael.
