PM vows to respond to all truce breaches, but Hezbollah intends to make him think twice

After almost 14 months of fighting that included numerous stunningly effective combat operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel agreed to a ceasefire on Tuesday night.

Though the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal proclaimed victory for Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and advisers, notably, didn’t go that far in their public statements and private briefings, instead promising that Israel would achieve its long-sought “total victory” in the future. “The war will not end until we realize all its goals, including the return of the residents of the north safely home,” Netanyahu stressed.

That stance was born, at least in part, out of a recognition that the ceasefire and its untested enforcement mechanism will result in complicated scenarios for Israel as it tries to maintain security for its citizens in the face of all-but-certain Hezbollah attempts to regroup and threaten Israel.

There’s no question that Israel achieved a great deal in its war against the Iran-backed terror militia.

The stunning pager operation in September, followed by the elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the top echelons of the elite Radwan force, knocked the organization off balance. The continued decapitation of Hezbollah’s field units further degraded the organization, throwing it into temporary disarray.

And the two-month ground invasion destroyed much of the infrastructure and weapons Hezbollah built up over the years as part of a plan to flood across Israel’s flimsy fences into border kibbutzim and military bases.

Most of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal is gone. A month ago, then-defense minister Yoav Gallant told officers that 80% of Hezbollah’s stock was destroyed; those numbers have only gone up since.

Perhaps most importantly, the psychological barrier that stopped Israel from doing anything against Hezbollah in Lebanon for years has been utterly dismantled.

Before the current campaign, Israeli leaders believed that an escalation of violence with Hezbollah would mean thousands of rockets on the home front and the paralysis of Israeli society.

Now, according to Netanyahu, Hezbollah has not only been “sent back decades,” but it has been cowed to the point that Hamas can no longer rely on its ally for help.

The ceasefire, he said, “separates the fronts and isolates Hamas. From day two of the war, Hamas was counting on Hezbollah to fight by its side. With Hezbollah out of the picture, Hamas is left on its own. We will increase our pressure on Hamas and that will help us in our sacred mission of releasing our hostages.”

Beyond its war gains, Israel insists on maintaining the freedom to strike Hezbollah if it tries to circumvent the ceasefire, as Netanyahu said shortly before his security cabinet ratified the ceasefire.

“If Hezbollah violates the agreement and tries to arm itself, we will attack,” he said. “If it tries to rebuild terrorist infrastructure near the border, we will attack. If it launches a rocket, if it digs a tunnel, if it brings in a truck carrying rockets, we will attack.”

The power of a rocket

Striking Hezbollah when it violates the ceasefire sounds straightforward, but if and when Israel brings its northern residents back home, it is likely to find itself facing complex dilemmas over any response to Hezbollah provocations.

If a Hezbollah anti-tank missile squad is spotted crawling toward the border, no one is going to get upset by an IDF strike.

But Hezbollah knows how to use civilian cover for military purposes and gray areas are sure to emerge.

If “farmers” in Lebanon record IDF troops across the border on their phones, does Israel attack? If eight men on motorcycles drive toward the border, does Israel attack?

If Hezbollah copies an effective Hamas tactic and has civilians launch incendiary balloons toward Israeli fields, does Netanyahu order an attack?

Israel is supposed to lodge any complaints with a new oversight body now led by the US and France. Will they let Israel operate in the aforementioned scenarios? And what are the penalties if Israel ignores the panel’s decisions? The answers are unclear.

One thing is certain — Hezbollah will be determined to show that it is still in the fight and will seek to reestablish a measure of deterrence against an Israel it is sworn to destroy.

Israel might wave around the American letter blessing its right to operate against Hezbollah, but the terror group will do everything it can to constrict and complicate that freedom of action.

The effort to limit Israel’s ability to take military action after ceasefire violations could come in the form of a rocket or two on a repopulated northern Israel.

The first time Hezbollah fires, and sends residents into their safe rooms, Israel would presumably fire back at the launchers, a fragile quiet would be restored, and Israel would continue to target other less overt breaches. But Hezbollah will then likely fire further rockets, in ostensible response, inexorably creating both practical and political problems for Netanyahu.

Before the ceasefire, a rocket from Hezbollah on northern Israel was nothing to get the government in a particular huff about. Now that calm has ostensibly been restored, every rocket is a direct challenge to the ceasefire and to Netanyahu’s adamant promise to respond to any and every violation.

How many sirens will newly returned residents of northern communities sit through before they decide the government has not ensured their safety, and head back south?

Opposition politicians and coalition members like National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir are sure to run to TV studios, proclaiming that the government is too soft and doesn’t know how to provide security for the beleaguered north.

In those circumstances, the political cost of every enforcement action by the IDF becomes a factor in the government’s determination to operate against Hezbollah. Repeat the process enough and new rules of the game emerge, with Hezbollah again establishing deterrence.

Israel cannot prevent Hezbollah from rearming. It is hard enough to stop weapons smuggling with troops stationed along a border. It is impossible to do so with satellites and drones, though Israel can slow down the pipeline and impose a cost on Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons.

The ceasefire agreement tasks the Lebanese Armed Forces with monitoring and enforcing “against any unauthorized entry of arms and related materiel into and throughout Lebanon, including through all border crossings,” but it is hard to imagine the LAF standing up to the far more powerful Hezbollah or Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as they work to rebuild.

It is not at all clear how Netanyahu breaks out of that scenario. Another limited ground operation is going to bring more rockets on northern Israel, as well as an admission that this ceasefire was ill-advised.

An all-out invasion with the aim of destroying Hezbollah’s military force is not especially likely either. After 14 months of fighting, the IDF is a weary force. Reservists are on their fourth round of service and munitions stocks are low. It would mean going into a long and complex war in suboptimal conditions, to say the least.

At the same time, given the military operation that Israel pursued in Lebanon, a new and improved UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was the best that it could expect.

The IDF didn’t fight to shatter Hezbollah’s military organization. It operated against its infrastructure in mostly empty border villages.

Airstrikes in Beirut and elsewhere in Lebanon destroyed rocket stores and took out more commanders, but much of Hezbollah’s military remains intact. It still has most of its fighters, a reduced but functional command-and-control system, and much of its equipment.

The balance of deterrence has decidedly tilted in Israel’s favor; otherwise, Hezbollah would not have consented to the ceasefire. But it is still a potent enemy, and it is already working to shift that balance back.