‘Systemic failure’: How Nahal Oz base, 850 meters from Gaza yet utterly vulnerable, fell to Hamas
90 armed troops among 162 soldiers on base that morning failed to repel first wave of 65 terrorists; Bedouin tracker stayed behind to defend surveillance soldiers
Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian is The Times of Israel's military correspondent
On the morning of October 7, 2023, some 215 Hamas terrorists stormed into the Israel Defense Forces’ Nahal Oz base, located just 850 meters from the border with the Gaza Strip. The troops stationed there were unable to defend the facility, and it quickly fell to the terrorists, who murdered dozens and abducted others.
Military investigators described the battle at the Nahal Oz base as one of the IDF’s biggest failures on October 7, as it highlighted that even a site where 162 soldiers — 90 of them armed, though only 81 were combat soldiers — were deployed was unprotected.
The base served as an army post for combat soldiers, due to its proximity to Gaza, as well as a command center for the Border Defense Corps’ 414th Combat Intelligence Collection Unit, whose female members operate surveillance cameras looking toward the Strip.
In all, 53 soldiers were killed at the base: 31 combat troops and 22 noncombat — including 16 female surveillance soldiers. Another 10 were abducted — seven female surveillance soldiers and three tank soldiers.
On Monday, the IDF presented its probe into the Hamas attack on the base — as part of its detailed investigations of some 40 battles that took place that day — highlighting colossal failures in the military’s ability to defend an army site near a border, as well as the heroism of some troops who fought that day.
The Nahal Oz base was the hardest-hit IDF facility in Hamas’s October 7 onslaught, during which some 5,600 terrorists stormed across the border, massacred some 1,200 people, and took 251 hostages to Gaza.
No warning, no preparation
The probe, carried out by Col. Ido Kas, the commander of the 551st Reserve Paratroopers Brigade, covers all aspects of the fighting in the base that day.
Kas and his team spent hundreds of hours investigating the battle at the Nahal Oz base, reviewing what the IDF says was every possible source of information — the IDF’s radio communications, surveillance cameras, and cameras on tanks, the soldiers’ WhatsApp messages, and footage taken by the Hamas terrorists. Kas also interviewed nearly every soldier who survived the attack, including those who returned from captivity.
The attack on the Nahal Oz base was the most documented battle during the onslaught because it took place at a military site with numerous cameras. Exchanges of fire were captured from multiple angles.
The probe was aimed at drawing specific operational conclusions for the military. It did not examine the wider picture of the military’s perception of Gaza and Hamas in recent years, which was covered in separate, larger, investigations into the IDF’s intelligence and defenses.
Kas’s team stated that “the IDF failed in the battle to protect the Nahal Oz base. The battle results express a systemic failure in the IDF’s and the base’s readiness for a wide-scale ground attack under rocket fire.”
The team also stated that “alongside the failure, the heroism and stubborn fighting of soldiers and officers stood out.”
The investigation found that there was no warning given to the troops at the base that morning ahead of the Hamas assault. But even if they had been given a warning, the protocols at the base for responding to various potential incidents made no provision for the kind of onslaught that took place.
A document describing potential threats to the base and appropriate responses, for example, made no mention of steps to take to defend the unarmed noncombat soldiers stationed there. There was also no official protocol for what to do in the event of rocket fire on the base. Normally in IDF outposts, when there is rocket fire, troops are instructed to take up positions to look out for a possible simultaneous ground attack.
The investigation also found that over the previous several years, the base never carried out a drill simulating a ground-based attack against it. Various combat units were deployed to the base for several months at a time over this period, and none simulated such a scenario.
Hamas knew exactly how vulnerable the base was
The base — unlike an actual IDF border post — was not built to defend against a ground attack: The perimeter wall had gaps and holes in it; and the shelters, as well as the war room from which the surveillance soldiers operated, were designed to withstand rocket fire but not a ground attack.
The base had one soldier on guard duty that morning, at the entrance to the base facing away from Gaza. Two guard posts in the base facing toward the Strip were not manned and rarely were.
Hamas knew all of this.
The terror group had collected intelligence on the Nahal Oz base over the years, using drones, soldiers’ social media posts, and IDF publications in the news media.
A document from early 2023 with Hamas’s information on the Nahal Oz base was found by the IDF in Gaza during the ground offensive. The level of detail in the document could compete with IDF special operation dossiers, the IDF’s probe found.
Hamas knew how many troops were deployed at the Nahal Oz base normally, and that on weekends there would be half that number, the document showed. The terror group understood when the best time to attack was, how long it would take for the IDF to send backup troops to the base, and what the best routes to take to reach the base were.
The document detailed the exact layout of the base, including the bomb shelters, barracks, generator rooms, communication antennas, surveillance cameras, and the war room. Hamas knew where the commanders slept, how effective the shelters would be against rocket fire, how many soldiers had weapons, and which weapons.
Hamas also understood the IDF’s defense perception, under which it would try to end the attack in the border barrier area, and not fight at the base itself.
The terror group in its document concluded that it would reach the base and enter it within 15 minutes of crossing the border, outpacing the backup troops. In reality, it took Hamas slightly longer than 15 minutes to breach the base, but the backup did not arrive for hours.
A total of 35 terrorists were killed inside the Nahal Oz base and another 10 just outside it. Dozens more were killed between the base and the Gaza border barrier.
The timeline of the attack
In the early hours of October 7, at around 4 a.m., the Nahal Oz base received an alert after something touched the IDF’s security barrier on the Gaza border. It turned out to be nothing of significance. However, because of that incident, the commanders on the base became aware of other suspicious signs received by the military overnight. As a result, troops who were set to carry out a routine patrol at 5:30 in the morning were instructed not to approach the border, as they would usually have done, fearing an anti-tank guided missile attack.
Troops in four vehicles were supposed to carry out the patrol. One company commander’s team was late by three minutes, and as a punishment, its vehicle was sent back to the base. The other three vehicles were still out on patrol when the Hamas rocket fire on the south began an hour later.
Also at 5:30 a.m., those on shift at the base carried out a routine check of radio systems.
At 6:29 a.m., Hamas launched an initial barrage of over 1,000 rockets, mostly aimed at Israeli military bases and posts near the Gaza border. Soldiers at the Nahal Oz base headed for the bomb shelters, where many later confronted the Hamas terrorists, and many were killed and abducted.
At 6:31 a.m., the surveillance soldiers identified two Hamas squads approaching the Israeli border at two locations across from the base, carrying large explosive devices to destroy the barrier. At 6:33 a.m. and 6:34 a.m., the terrorists detonated bombs at two locations on a barbed wire fence, which was several dozen meters east of the larger high-tech barrier.
At 6:36 a.m., two members of the Golani Brigade’s 13th Battalion, Staff Sgt. Dor Lazimi and Staff Sgt. Ori Karmi, who were stationed at the base, ran toward the entrance to provide backup for their comrade, Staff Sgt. Adir Eshto Bogale, who was the sole soldier guarding the site. All three were killed in a battle with the terrorists later in the morning.
At 6:37 a.m., two members of the Gaza Division’s Bedouin trackers unit withdrew from the base, despite knowing that it was under attack. The third tracker, Warrant Officer Ibrahim Kharuba, stayed and later tried to defend the female surveillance soldiers until he was killed.
At 6:38 a.m. and 6:41 a.m., the Hamas terrorists blew up the Gaza border barrier in two locations near the base, and dozens of terrorists began streaming into Israel, on pickup trucks, on motorbikes, and on foot. Some headed to the Black Arrow memorial site area, and others toward the base.
Cpt. Shir Eilat, the commander of the female surveillance soldiers, passed on a detailed report of what was occurring to the deputy commander of the 13th Battalion, and backup forces were called.
By 6:45 a.m., some of the Hamas terrorists reached the base’s perimeter wall. Others were delayed after getting stuck while trying to cross the fields between the base and the border barrier.
The deputy battalion commander, meanwhile, headed outside the base to try to block any Hamas terrorists who were attempting to reach the nearby Israeli border communities.
At the same time, the Golani soldiers began to deploy to the normally empty guard posts on the western edge of the base. The troops were underequipped, with only their assault rifles and no grenades.
Also at that moment, one of the tanks parked in the base began to move out to a position overlooking the border. But by the time the tank got there, the first wave of some 65 terrorists were already on the outer wall of the base, some on the eastern side and some on the southern side.
The base’s wall had two large gaps in it, which allowed Hamas terrorists to open fire into it from the outside. The wall sections also had small holes in them, allowing the terrorists to stick their guns through and open fire.
The deputy battalion commander, who was in a vehicle, came under fire first at 6:46 a.m. He returned to the base, where he came under fire again at 6:55 a.m., this time being hit in the head, leaving him critically wounded.
Between 6:48 a.m. and 6:56 a.m., the 65 Hamas terrorists, who were still outside the base, were exchanging fire with the soldiers who were inside it. RPGs were launched at the perimeter wall, and the guard posts came under massive fire.
At 7 a.m., the commander of the Gaza Division’s Northern Brigade became aware that the deputy battalion commander was critically wounded, and handed command over the base to the company commander who had been ordered to stay behind when the patrol set out earlier.
Of the three patrol vehicles that set out that morning from the base, one returned to Nahal Oz at 7:05 a.m. — after coming under attack several times on the way — while the other two fled to Sderot, also after coming under fire. The soldiers in those two vehicles ended up fighting at the city’s police station, which was captured by Hamas terrorists later in the day.
At the same time, at 7:05 a.m., the first Hamas terrorists breached the base and headed for the command center. At 7:09 a.m., the surveillance soldiers stopped scanning the border and went to hide in their commander’s office in the command center.
At 7:30 a.m., the Hamas terrorists who were on the eastern side of the base managed to flank around it, reaching the entrance, where they killed the three soldiers guarding it following a lengthy battle. The three soldiers managed to kill several of the terrorists attacking the entrance to the base.
At 7:41 a.m., a team of six Golani soldiers, led by Maj. Shilo Har-Even, who was stationed at a nearby post, arrived at the Nahal Oz base in a Namer armored personnel carrier, after battling terrorists near the border. At 7:46 a.m., Har-Even was shot in the hand inside the base but continued to fight.
At 7:43 a.m., an Israeli Air Force drone reached the area. It carried out a first strike at 7:47 a.m., though without hitting anyone.
At 7:49 a.m., Hamas terrorists killed five surveillance balloon operators who were stationed inside the base. The balloon had been out of service for several days, and the five troops were waiting for a repair crew to arrive and fix it when the Hamas invasion began.
Meanwhile, Hamas terrorists had reached a bomb shelter where the base’s female soldiers who were not on shift at the time were sheltering. The terrorists hurled a smoke grenade and two fragmentation grenades inside.
Of the 31 female soldiers in the shelter, six were armed. Amid the chaos and smoke, 14 of the soldiers — including four who were armed, and all of whom were wounded in various degrees — managed to flee the shelter. One was killed while running away, and two were later killed in the base’s clinic after terrorists hurled grenades there as well. The other 11 were saved after a drone strike was carried out next to a group of terrorists attempting to reach a room where they were holed up.
One of the armed soldiers remaining in the bomb shelter, Cpt. Eden Nimri, a commander in the Artillery Corps’ drone unit, still in pajamas, positioned herself at one of the two entrances to the shelter, aiming to protect the unarmed surveillance soldiers inside.
She opened fire on the first terrorist to enter, but he was followed by many more. Eden ran out of ammunition and was killed. Sgt. Shir Biton, another armed soldier there, killed one of the terrorists before she was also killed.
The terrorists later abducted seven surveillance soldiers from the concrete shelter.
One, Ori Megidish, was rescued from captivity in the early weeks of the war.
The body of another, Cpl. Noa Marciano, was recovered after she was killed in Gaza.
The final five — Daniella Gilboa, Karina Ariev, Naama Levy, Agam Berger and Liri Albag — were returned in a hostage deal with Hamas in January.
At 8:09 a.m., tanks arrived at the entrance to the base, as Har-Even, who was missing a hand, tried to lead a counterstrike on the base. At 8:18 a.m., the troops began to move into the base in an attempt to recapture it but came under fire from four locations. By 8:26 a.m., the Golani assault had fallen apart and, with the exception of a single soldier, the entire force, including Har-Even, were killed.
At 8:53 a.m., a tank that was fighting inside the base was hit by RPG fire and disabled. A second tank drove to the western side of the base, in an attempt to prevent terrorists from kidnapping soldiers.
Also shortly before 9 a.m., a third tank stationed outside the base identified the second wave of some 50 Hamas terrorists crossing the border. The tank charged forward toward the terrorists, opening fire and running them over, before being overwhelmed by RPG fire and also being disabled.
Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force was carrying out several drone strikes to try and disrupt Hamas’s attack without harming the soldiers. The Nahal Oz base was the location with the largest number of airstrikes on October 7, because many soldiers were directing the drone operators.
At around 10 a.m. the third wave of some 100 terrorists was arriving at the base. Backup forces had still not arrived, and would not arrive until around 1:30 p.m.
At 10:20 a.m., Hamas terrorists from the first and second waves were kidnapping the seven surveillance soldiers.
At the same time, troops were exchanging fire with terrorists from other concrete bomb shelters, and a group of terrorists was trying to breach the command center, where several surveillance soldiers and officers were still holed up.
Several troops still in the base, including the Bedouin tracker Kharuba, rushed to the war room to try and protect it. They killed at least eight terrorists at the entrance to the command center during a long battle there.
The female surveillance soldiers and staff officers were hiding in the back, while Kharuba was at the front, trying to protect the open entrance. The terrorists called on Kharuba and the other troops to surrender, and they refused.
Kharuba managed to call his family, as well as the commander of the Gaza Division’s Northern Brigade, during this time, telling them he would not surrender.
At around 12 p.m. after the terrorists failed to defeat the troops at the entrance to the command center, they set fire to the building by hurling grenades inside and flammable substances.
Heavy smoke covered the command center, and four officers, a soldier, and one female surveillance soldier managed to escape, running down a hallway into a bathroom that had a small window, through which they got out. Another officer who was trying to put out the fire managed to escape through another window.
Kharuba, who stayed behind to protect the female surveillance soldiers, went up to them and said: “It was my greatest honor to die for you and the State of Israel.”
Fifteen soldiers, including Kharuba, were killed inside the war room.
At the same time, members of the Paratroopers Brigade’s 890th Battalion, who had been fighting in Be’eri and Kfar Aza, were called to help out at Nahal Oz. They met up with other paratroopers, members of the police’s Yamam unit, and a number of Golani officers.
At 1:36 p.m., the troops entered the base and began to clear it of terrorists, while rescuing surviving soldiers.
At 5 p.m., the base was declared cleared of terrorists.
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