It’s too early to know how deep Qatargate goes, but it’s time to ask tough questions

It remains unclear exactly how far Doha’s alleged infiltration of Israel’s centers of power goes.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insists that the entire Qatargate affair reaches deep into the Israeli state — not to his own hierarchy, however, but to a powerful unelected left-wing bureaucracy that he calls the “deep state,” using a term he openly borrowed from US President Donald Trump.

According to the Qatargate case’s judge, two Netanyahu advisers — Jonatan Urich and Eli Feldstein — are suspected of taking money to spread pro-Qatari messaging to reporters, in order to boost the Gulf state’s image as a mediator in hostage talks between Israel and Hamas, all while in the prime minister’s employ.

Judge Menachem Mizrahi said that Qatar also wanted Feldstein to spread negative messaging about Egypt’s role in the negotiations.

Police believe that Urich — while spreading pro-Qatar messaging — framed the information as having originated from senior Israeli officials in the Prime Minister’s Office.

The recent revelations in the ongoing investigation into ties between Qatar and Netanyahu’s aides point to uncomfortable questions about policies in the fight against Hamas — decisions that have profound implications for the lives of Israel’s soldiers fighting through Gaza’s cities and the hostages held in tunnels below.

The mediation fight

Throughout the 18 months of on-again, off-again hostage talks, Qatar, Egypt and the US have served as the mediators between Israel and Hamas.

The choice of mediators matters. Every country has its unique interests around the war in Gaza and hostage talks, and the wrong mediator could protect Hamas, push its interests, or even get in the way of a deal altogether.

Beyond the US, Egypt was a natural choice for Netanyahu. It has decades of intimate military and intelligence cooperation with Israel, sees Hamas as a threat, and controls Gaza’s southern border.

It also maintains open channels of communication with Hamas, and for years has served as the host for indirect talks between Israel and the terror group during the many rounds of fighting between them.

Since Hamas violently took over the Strip in 2007, any Hamas members looking to leave or enter Gaza could only do so with Egyptian consent. Because the leadership in Gaza ultimately determines what happens on the ground, Egypt is the country with the closest ties to the real decision-makers in Gaza.

That’s not to say the interests of Cairo and Jerusalem neatly line up in Gaza. Egypt wants the war to end yesterday, as the conflict has battered its already struggling economy. Moreover, images of dead Gazans stir up an Egyptian street that is already critical of the regime’s determination to maintain the peace treaty with Israel.

Qatar is a more problematic interlocutor.

No one knows exactly what to make of Qatar and its intentions. Israel does not have diplomatic relations with Qatar, but the two countries established trade relations in 1996. Israel’s trade office in Doha survived the Second Intifada, and was only closed in 2009 after the Operation Cast Lead conflict between Israel and Hamas.

Israeli athletes occasionally competed in international competitions in Doha. Before the 2022 World Cup, a special agreement between FIFA, Israel and Qatar was reached to allow Israeli diplomats to arrive and assist Israelis traveling to the tournament. Urich and another Netanyahu adviser, Yisrael Einhorn, were reportedly involved in a campaign to improve Qatar’s image surrounding hosting the soccer tournament.

But there is a darker side. When Hamas sided with rebels against the Syrian regime in 2012, Qatar took in Hamas leaders, claiming it was coordinated with the US.

With Israeli cooperation, it sent millions of dollars in annual foreign aid to Gaza, which kept government services functioning in the Strip, but also bankrolled Hamas’s military activities.

It also created and funds the Al Jazeera network, which Israel banned last April for inciting terror attacks and violating national security. During the war, the IDF published documents it says proved direct communication and cooperation between the Qatari network and Hamas, and the Israeli military has additionally accused staffers at the outlet of being members of terror groups.

It’s not only Israel — at times — that sees Qatar as a threat. In 2017, four pro-Western Arab countries — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt — launched a blockade to pressure Doha to cease alleged support for Islamists and terrorists, reduce cooperation with Iran, shutter Al Jazeera and kick out Turkish troops from a base there. It took until 2021 for the crisis to be resolved.

Oddly, throughout the war, Israel has shown no consistent preference for Egyptian moderation, allowing Qatar to often take the lead in talks.

Many of the most consequential rounds took place in Qatar, even as some Israeli officials were telling The Times of Israel that the US needed to pressure Doha to bring about a deal.

Israeli officials have said publicly that Qatar is a reliable mediator and that it is doing what it can to get hostages out.

That may be true, and would certainly match US impressions of the emirate. The administration of then-US president Joe Biden granted Qatar the status of a major non-NATO ally, and used it as a preferred mediator with Iran and terrorist groups. In response to a question from The Times of Israel, US President Donald Trump in February made clear that Doha is doing a “great job” as a mediator on hostage talks.

However, Israel’s decision to elevate Qatar as a mediator at Egypt’s expense now has to be revisited in light of Qatargate allegations.

Did Urich and Feldstein work to push Netanyahu’s view of Qatar in a more positive direction?

Did their briefings to Israeli media pave the way for Israel to see Qatar as a partner it can trust in negotiations?

And given Qatar’s history of support for Islamists and its ties with Iran, did giving Qatar such a central role in talks affect the outcome?

Anti-Qatar campaign

We also must ask why a campaign to blacken Qatar’s image was held up.

Shortly after the October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas, the Foreign Ministry prepared a plan to damage Qatar’s public image, according to Haaretz.

The plan was blocked by Mossad chief David Barnea, according to the report. Barnea argued that Israel would need Qatar’s mediation to get hostages out of Gaza.

Foreign Minister Eli Cohen had signed off on the initiative, which would have used social media, diplomats, and messages to the press to portray Qatar as a sponsor of terror.

Was Barnea motivated purely by a desire to get the hostages out, or was he instructed to block attacks on Qatar because of Doha’s influence in the Prime Minister’s Office?

Sinai scare

Israel’s relationship with Egypt is one of its most important. Though they are often strained, the ties have ensured that no conventional Arab coalition makes war against Israel, and have paved the way for close security and intelligence cooperation against terrorist groups.

The personal relationship between Netanyahu and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi was once quite strong. The leaders spoke regularly, and Netanyahu held regular meetings with Egypt’s ambassador.

Ties have soured during the war. Egypt was unhappy with what it saw as Israeli plans to push Gazans into the Sinai. It also vehemently opposes Israeli control over the Philadelphi Route on the border between Gaza and Egypt.

But it was statements from top Israeli officials that have really angered the Egyptians.

Both Netanyahu and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer criticized Egypt publicly in interviews for failing to stop smuggling of weapons from the Sinai Peninsula into Gaza, with Dermer mentioning Sissi by name.

Sissi saw the campaign as a personal affront, and ties grew even more strained. Egypt insists that smuggling hasn’t been a problem since it razed thousands of homes on its side of the border to create a buffer zone with Gaza a decade ago.

The accusations against Egypt also angered its regional allies, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Then came even harsher claims against Egypt.

The right-wing, pro-Netanyahu Channel 14 in January began airing reports on Egypt allegedly violating the peace agreement between the countries and pouring troops into the Sinai. An organized social media campaign appeared in parallel.

Israel’s new US ambassador also pushed the same message. “Egypt is in very serious violation of our peace agreement in the Sinai. This is an issue that is going to come to the fore because it’s not tolerable,” Yehiel Leiter told American Jewish leaders. “We have bases being built that can only be used for offensive operations, for offensive weapons — that’s a clear violation.”

Defense officials were working to try to understand who was coordinating the reports, Haaretz reported.

“They said they could not discount the possibility that Qatari figures were behind the reports in an attempt to undercut Egypt’s status vis-à-vis the United States in Middle Eastern and Gazan affairs,” according to Haaretz.

It would fit the accusations revealed by the judge in the Qatargate case, who said last week that Urich and Feldstein allegedly placed stories in Israeli media designed to harm Egypt’s image.

The reports damaged the trust between Egypt and Israel. If they came from the two Netanyahu aides, then the pair were actively damaging a strategic relationship between Israel and its oldest Arab partner, which also sits on Israel’s and Gaza’s border and is the largest Arab country.

And questions must also be asked about the public allegations made by Israel’s top decision-makers in the war, accusing Egypt of turning a blind eye to smuggling. Was Qatar’s alleged influence on Netanyahu’s aides a factor in the decision to publicly slam Cairo — or does the scandal reach all the way to the top?

Who is left to trust?

The police and Shin Bet allege that Netanyahu’s two aides were being swayed by Qatar, not the prime minister himself.

Still, if journalists are quoting his office as they publish glowing reports about Qatar, why wouldn’t Netanyahu have tried to figure out who is putting out messages in his name?

And now, it would seem to be in Netanyahu’s interest to back an investigation into claims that a foreign power had infiltrated his own office.

But the prime minister is digging in and hasn’t given an inch. It is the deep state that is behind Qatargate, he says, and it is working to block the firing of Shin Bet director Ronen Bar and to bring down a right-wing government.

The Israeli public — not to mention soldiers and the families of hostages — has no choice but to trust prosecutors to carry out a comprehensive and fair investigation into Qatargate.

Already, however, there is some reason to worry.

Police invited an Israeli journalist for a voluntary testimony, then informed him he was being detained and confiscated his phone. If what Jerusalem Post chief editor Tzvika Klein says is true, investigators were ignorant about the basic practices of journalists.

And it’s not as if Israeli journalists have covered themselves in glory. They took at face value messages that were allegedly being dictated from Doha.

With 59 hostages still in Gaza and thousands of troops fighting the terrorists that slaughtered Jews in their homes and at a festival on October 7, Israelis have a prime minister telling the public they can’t trust senior security officials or government bureaucrats.

At the same time, they now have less reason to feel secure that their own elected leadership is working purely for their interests.